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Whilst the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its accompanying 
guidelines recognise that adults with learning disabilities may be `vulnerable' as 
suspects during police detention and interviewing because they may be `particularly 
prone in certain circumstances to provide information which is unreliable, misleading or 
self incriminating (Code C, Codes of Practice, Home Office, 1995a), no attempt is made 
to specify why they might be vulnerable. 
Based on Gudjonsson's (1992a et seq. ) influential concept of `psychological 
vulnerabilities', a series of experimental studies examines three factors which may 
contribute to this putative 'vulnerability'. Compared with their counterparts in the 
general population, the participants with mild learning disabilities (Full Scale IQ scores 
<_ 75 and attending designated `learning disability' services): 
(i) have more limited understanding of the Notice to Detained Persons (NDP) 
which provides information about the caution and legal rights; 
(ii) are more likely to be impaired in making decisions which might protect their 
rights; 
(iii) are more susceptible during questioning to the personality characteristics of 
acquiescence and interrogative suggestibility, and, though not more likely to 
confabulate, recall proportionately more incorrect information. 
Two practical initiatives to alleviate this vulnerability are then described. Whilst an 
attempt to develop a version of the NDP which is more accessible is ineffective, a 
screening questionnaire to encourage self-identification by `vulnerable' suspects, 
including people with learning disabilities, is more successful: it has now been 
introduced in the largest police force in England and Wales. 
At the end of the thesis, the practical implications of the findings are considered and 
Gudjonsson's (1992a et seq. ) concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' is revisited. It is 
argued that positioning the concept within a capacity-based framework has advantages 
for further work aimed at understanding, and alleviating, the `vulnerability' of suspects 
with mild learning disabilities during police detention and interviewing. 
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POLICE DETENTION AND INTERVIEWING AND THE 
SAFEGUARDS FOR SUSPECTS 
Many suspects who are held in police detention and interviewed about alleged criminal 
offences are significantly intellectually disadvantaged (Gudjonsson, Clare, Rutter and 
Pearse, 1993). They may also have the significant impairment of social functioning and 
the history of developmental delay (Lyall, Holland, Collins and Styles, 1995) required to 
meet the accepted diagnostic criteria for a `learning disability' (previously known in the 
U. K. as `mental handicap'; American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; British 
Psychological Society, 2001; World Health Organisation, 1992). Whilst the frequency 
with which suspects with learning disabilities subsequently become involved in 
miscarriages of justice is unknown, there is convincing evidence that, on occasion, they 
have been convicted of, and imprisoned or detained in hospital for, offences they did not 
commit (Kennedy, 1988; and see Gudjonsson, 1992a, 2003). In the words of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ, Runciman, 1993), this is: 
`both an individual tragedy and an affront to the standards of a civilized society' 
(ibid., para. 1.9). 
Even when the consequences are less dramatic, they may be no less serious: innocent 
people may be remanded in custody and subsequently experience the psychological 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1994) or be 
treated as guilty by their local communities and suffer harassment and even threats to 
their lives (Pithers, 1993). At the same time, errors involving innocent people, including 
people with learning disabilities, may reduce the likelihood that the actual perpetrator 
will be identified, and then charged, prosecuted and convicted; as a result, the victim 
and his or her family may be denied access to justice whilst the offender may go on to 
commit further crimes. 
Though acknowledging that many practices and professional groups within the criminal 
justice system may contribute to a miscarriage of justice, Zuckerman (1994) has argued 
that it: 
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`almost invariably has its root in faulty police work. Most commonly, it is an 
unreliable confession, or a false piece of forensic evidence or a misdirected police 
inquiry which is found at the root of convictions of innocent persons' (ibid., p. 
120). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, analyses of miscarriages of justice involving innocent people 
have often focussed on the role of the police in the investigation of alleged offences (for 
example, Gudjonsson, 1992a; McConville, Sanders and Leng, 1991; Walker and 
Starmer, 1999). In England and Wales (the situation in other parts of the U. K. is not 
considered in this thesis), police investigations are regulated by a single piece of 
statutory legislation, the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereafter, PACE, Home 
Office, 1985a), accompanied by guidelines, the Codes of Practice (Home Office, 1985b, 
1991,1995a, 2002a, b). Inter alia, this legal framework provides suspects with learning 
disabilities with the same safeguards during police detention and interviewing as their 
`general population' counterparts. In addition, though, it gives them some special 
protection because it is believed that, compared with their peers, they are `vulnerable' 
to, or `at risk' of, providing information which may be misleading, unreliable or self- 
incriminating, including a false confession (Home Office, 1995a, Note 11 B). The 
importance of the legal framework introduced by PACE and the Codes has been 
summarised by Zander (1995) who concludes, on the basis of case law, empirical 
research, and the views of organisations involved in its operation, that nothing has: 
`called into question the basic structure created by PACE. It has clearly been 
accepted by all as a piece of legislation that, subject no doubt to occasional 
amendment, will be with us into the indefinite future' (ibid., p. xi). 
Since the legal framework is, then, apparently unlikely to change at present, it is 
important that the safeguards it provides should be adequate for their intended purpose 
of protecting suspects. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine these safeguards. 
First, though, to highlight their practical significance, an overview of the importance to 
the criminal justice system of police interviews with detained persons, is presented. 
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1.1 THE IMPORTANCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
OF INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS 
The investigation of alleged criminal offences involves many different elements 
(including, for example, taking statements from witnesses, examining forensic 
evidence). However, there is widespread agreement, both among the police themselves 
and observers (for example, Gudjonsson, 1992a, 1994; Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980; 
Walkley, 1987; Williamson, 1994), with the view that police interviews with suspects 
are: 
`a critical - perhaps the most critical - stage in the processing of almost all 
criminal cases' (Baldwin, 1994, p. 66). 
Whilst interviews with suspects may be carried out by the police for a number of 
reasons, there is substantial evidence (Baldwin and McConville, 1980; Irving, 1980; 
McConville et al., 1991; Moston and Stephenson, 1993) that, until the introduction of 
PACE and the Codes of Practice in 1986, the main purpose of detaining, and then 
interviewing, the alleged perpetrators of offences was to obtain a confession from them. 
Police behaviour during this process was often manipulative, if not frankly abusive 
(Firth, 1975; Gudjonsson, 1992a, 1994a; Irving, 1980; Softley, Brown, Forde, Mair and 
Moxon, 1980; Williamson, 1994; Zander, 1972), and there seemed little awareness that 
this was unacceptable. For example, more than half (sample size not given) of the 
detectives interviewed by Walkley (1983, cited in Williamson, 1994) reported that they 
were prepared to threaten, or actually assault, a suspect during interviewing. 
Even now, police officers still, apparently (Pearse, 1997; but c. f. Williamson, 1993), 
believe that the outcome of a `good' interview is a confession. From a police 
perspective, securing a confession enhances the status of the interviewing officer 
(Moston, 1990, cited in Pearse, 1997) and, from a practical point of view, minimises the 
need for further enquiries and, indeed, often completes the investigation. Why should a 
confession be so important? Undoubtedly, the reason is that, in contrast with some other 
jurisdictions, which require additional evidence from an independent source, 
uncorroborated confessions are recognized in English law (i. e. the law in England and 
Wales). As a result, the courts can convict defendants solely on the basis of their 
confessions (McConville, 1993); this does happen (Gudjonsson, 2003). In addition, 
guilty pleas are often submitted by suspects who confess during an interview (Baldwin, 
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1993; Baldwin and McConville, 1980; McConville, 1993; McConville, Sanders and 
Leng, 1991; Pearse, Gudjonsson, Clare and Rutter, 1998), minimising the duration and 
complexity of court proceedings. From the perspective of the criminal justice system, 
then, confessions obtained by the police during interviews with suspects are economical 
and efficient. Unfortunately, as Zuckerman (1994) comments, `faulty police work' 
(ibid., p. 120) lies at the heart of many of the notorious miscarriages of justice involving 
innocent people (such as Engin Raghip, Gudjonsson, 1992a, 2003; and see Ch. 2.1.3 for 
more detailed discussion), including men and women with learning disabilities (for 
example, Colin Lattimore, Gudjonsson, 1992a; and see Ch. 1.2.2). 
The extent to which, post-PACE, police interviews are still directed towards obtaining 
confessions is vigorously debated. A reassuring perspective (Gudjonsson, 1994; 
Maguire, 1994; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996; Robertson, Pearson and Gibb, 1996; 
Williamson, 1990,1994) is that radical change is taking place. Advocates of this view 
suggest that the traditional prosecution orientation towards interviews with suspects is 
being replaced by an inquisitorial approach, conducted by police officers who are more 
neutral and are concerned with seeking out the truth. 
Certainly, it seems that the police service is attempting to change. Until ten years ago, 
police officers received no formal training in interviewing (Williamson, 1994). Instead, 
they tended to learn by experience or from `manuals', such as that of Walkley (1987; 
based on the `Reid' model, Inbau, Reid and Buckley, 1986; see Ch. 4.1.3), which 
advocate practices which are ethically unacceptable and lead to confession evidence 
being ruled inadmissible by the court (as in R. v. Mason (Carl) 1988). Over the past few 
years, however, following an initiative by the Home Office and the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO), a major national training programme has been implemented 
(Williamson, 1994). This approach, which focuses on `investigative interviewing' is 
based on an `ethical framework' which is non-confrontational and, in part, derived from 
strategies initially developed to enhance the memories of witnesses and victims of crime 
(Central Planning and Training Unit, 1994 a, b; National Crime Faculty, 1996,1998). 
In striking contrast with this perspective, however, a number of researchers (Baldwin, 
1993,1994; Brown, 1997; Hodgson, 1994; McConville, 1993; McConville et al., 1991; 
Maguire and Norris, 1994; Moston, Stephenson and Williamson, 1992) argue that 
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training and similar initiatives are most unlikely to be effective because the traditional 
purpose of interviewing suspects to obtain confessions will always take precedence in 
police practice over compliance with procedures. Maguire and Norris (1994), for 
example, argue that: 
`virtually the sole aim of interviews becomes the extraction of a confession, 
`ploys' are used to deny suspects legal advice, witnesses are manipulated into 
producing statements which precisely support the police account, and contrary 
evidence is often disregarded and concealed from the defence' (ibid., p. 74). 
The debate has not yet been resolved. However, regardless of the perspective adopted 
towards the intended purpose of interviews with suspects detained by the police, there is 
general agreement about the importance of interviews within the investigative process 
and of the most acceptable outcome for the criminal justice system. 
1.2 SUSPECTS' EXPERIENCES OF POLICE DETENTION AND 
INTERVIEWING 
Though the extent of the change has been debated, it seems accepted that the 
introduction of PACE has had some effect on the practice of detention and interviewing 
by the police (for example, Baldwin, 1993; Bottomley, Coleman, Dixon, Gill and Wall, 
1991; Brown, 1997; Irving and McKenzie, 1989; McConville et al., 1991; Pearse and 
Gudjonsson, 1996). In general, as was intended by the legislation, the duration of 
detention at a police station seems to have decreased (Irving and MacKenzie, 1989), 
with the overwhelming majority of suspects released within twenty-four hours. At the 
same time, interviews are also much briefer than before: though the range is very wide, 
the average duration is now less than three-quarters of an hour (Baldwin, 1993; Irving 
and McKenzie, 1989; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996; Williamson, 1990). 
More importantly, there is evidence that police are less likely to use persuasive and 
manipulative tactics during interviews. For example, in a direct comparison of 
interviewing before and after the introduction of PACE, Irving and MacKenzie (1989) 
observed that the use of such strategies had decreased by a half (53%, N=68 interviews, 
ibid. ). Subsequent research, carried out since the introduction of audio-taping (and, in 
some cases, video-taping) of all interviews with suspects detained at police stations, has 
broadly confirmed the observational findings. Based on their analysis of the audio-tapes 
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of interviews carried out during 1991-1992, Pearse and Gudjonsson (1996) found that, 
in `run-of-the mill' cases, mostly involving alleged property offences (N=161), 
persuasive or manipulative tactics were not widely used. Indeed, many opportunities for 
challenging discrepancies or inconsistencies in suspects' accounts were simply missed 
(Pearse and Gudjonsson, ibid). 
The findings suggest that, at least until the implementation of the national training 
programme, police interviewing was not particularly skilled. Baldwin (1993), 
summarising his analyses of six hundred audio- and video-taped interviews from police 
stations in different parts of the country, noted that fewer than half (40%) per cent of 
interviewers could be regarded as competent in the sense that they: 
" were well-prepared; 
" explained the procedures carefully before starting questioning; 
" tested the suspect's explanation fairly without prejudgment; 
" listened carefully to what was said; 
" adapted their interviewing styles to the particular suspect and circumstances of the 
case; and generally 
" allowed the suspect to present his or her version of events. 
Subsequently, reflecting on the experience of watching and listening to these tapes, 
Baldwin (1994) concludes that: 
`the single most striking characteristic of police interviewing to emerge from ... 
the tapes of interview is its general ineptitude. Much interviewing is simply feeble 
and aimless, scarcely matching the macho image of police interviewers as 
professional, skilled and forceful interrogators. The tapes reveal instead that many 
officers are nervous, ill at ease and evidently lacking in confidence. Even in the 
simplest cases, officers can be seen with their eyes glued to a written statement 
which they have evidently not even bothered to read before embarking on the 
interview' (ibid., p. 67). 
Similar conclusions have been reached by others (Moston et al., 1992; Pearse, 1997; 
Robertson et al., 1996). Not surprisingly, then, in many cases, suspects do not seem to 
respond to police strategies during the interview. Instead, they adopt a position from the 
start and remain with it, whether it is to admit the alleged offence, deny it, or something 
in between. Though the validity of their decision-making can never be known, most of 
those who admit some involvement in the offence about which they are being 
20 
questioned apparently do so willingly, needing little pressure (Baldwin, 1993; Moston et 
al., 1992; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996). 
In striking contrast, though, there are occasions on which the approach of the police 
seems coercive (Baldwin, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Pearse, 1997; Pearse 
and Gudjonsson, 1996,1999). Many miscarriages of justice involving innocent persons 
have arisen from practices during detention and interviewing which involve pressure 
(for example, maximising a suspect's anxiety about his or her predicament; emphasising 
the severity of the alleged offence; repeatedly saying that the suspect's account is not 
believable) and/or are psychologically manipulative (such as minimising the 
individual's responsibility, or offering inducements; the use of `leading questions' to 
shape the suspect's account to fit what the interviewers know about the offences). Such 
practices increase the likelihood that self-incriminating admissions will be made to the 
police (for detailed accounts of the impact of police interviewing `tactics', see Pearse, 
1997). 
Still, and accepting that tapes of formal interviews provide only partial information 
about police detention and interviewing, the evidence suggests that, in most cases, 
interviewing by the police is not particularly threatening - at least from the perspective 
of outsiders. Surprisingly, though, there have been few empirical attempts to gain 
accounts from suspects - the `experts by experience' (Faulkner and Layzell, 2000) - of 
their experiences of police detention and interviewing. Some insight into the powerful 
effects of the experience may be provided by the reports of legal advisers about their 
own feelings about police stations, for example: 
`Solicitor: I rarely go to police stations myself.. . 
Every time I go there, I feel 
nervous. I don't in court or here [in the office], but I do there. 
Researcher: Isn't that the idea? 
Solicitor: Yes, you are in their control. They decide to let you in, lock you up, 
when you do what you do. It's their place - they are in control' (McConville and 
Hodgson, 1993, p. 35). 
The extent to which such feelings are widespread among suspects is uncertain but it 
does seem that the self-confident `old hand' is a much less frequent figure at the police 
station than fiction and police mythology suggest (Brown, Ellis and Larcombe, 1992; 
Baldwin, 1993). Instead, it appears that many suspects are highly anxious or distressed 
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(Brown et al., 1992; Gudjonsson, Glare, Rutter and Pearse, 1993; Irving, 1980; Irving 
and McKenzie, 1989). Gudjonsson and his colleagues (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), for 
example, found that almost one in five (19%, N= 160) of detained suspects whose 
current level of anxiety was assessed before police interviewing scored at, or above, the 
98th percentile for the general population (on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale, Spielberger, 
Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970). 
Whilst some suspects seem better able than others to deal with their situation (Brown et 
al., 1992; Gudjonsson et al., 1993), and, indeed, arguably, are active decision-makers 
(Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980), the admissibility of uncorroborated confession evidence 
in English law arguably means that detention and interviewing always has the potential 
to be a coercive experience for the alleged perpetrators of criminal offences (see, for 
example, McConville, 1993). Recognising this potential, there is a long-standing 
tradition, pre-dating the establishment of a national police force, of providing safeguards 
for suspects (Mirfield, 1985). 
1.3 SAFEGUARDS FOR SUSPECTS BEFORE THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PACE 
1.3.1 SAFEGUARDS FOR ALL SUSPECTS 
For a long period before the introduction of PACE, the safeguards for suspects were 
mainly provided by the Judges' Rules, a set of guidelines about detention and 
interviewing which were originally formulated by senior judges on the basis of the 
common law (Mirfield, 1985). They were accompanied by a brief set of Administrative 
Directions for the police which were revised at intervals up to 1978 (Home Office 
Circular 89/1978) and remained until they were superceded by PACE. Their main 
purpose was to ensure that evidence from suspects would be admissible in court because 
it would have been given voluntarily, not obtained: 
`by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person in 
authority, or by oppression' (Home Office Circular 89/1978, e)) 
Failure to comply with the Judges' Rules, in particular (the consequences of breaches of 
the Administrative Directions were less clear), could lead to evidence being excluded 
(Mirfield, 1985). In practice, however, breaches appeared to have occurred regularly 
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(Softley et al., 1980) and were often' overlooked by the Courts (Irving, 1990), possibly 
because they were unfamiliar even to lawyers (Fisher, 1977). From a practical point of 
view, too, they were unhelpful: the findings of an observational study (Irving, 1980) 
indicated that the concepts of `voluntariness' and `oppression' were very difficult for 
police officers to operationalise so that they could be used to guide their interviews with 
suspects. 
Concerns about the adequacy of these safeguards had been expressed widely for at least 
two decades (Gudjonsson, 1992a) before a miscarriage of justice in the 1970s involving, 
among others, a young man with a learning disability, provided the impetus for reform 
which culminated in the introduction of PACE (Fennell, 1994; Irving and MacKenzie, 
1989). 
1.3.2 SAFEGUARDS FOR `VULNERABLE' SUSPECTS 
In early versions of the Judges' Rules and the Administrative Directions, a parent or 
some other adult who was independent from the police was supposed to be present when 
children (below 17 years of age) were interviewed; however, until 1978, there were no 
explicit safeguards for `vulnerable' adult suspects 
Reform of this situation was precipitated by the Confait case (Fisher, 1977; Gudjonsson, 
1992a; Irving and MacKenzie, 1989; Price and Caplan, 1977). In 1972, during police 
detention, three youths (two of whom were technically children, and an adult, Colin 
Lattimore, then aged 18 years) confessed to killing Mr. Maxwell Confait before setting 
fire to his house. Three years later, after the convictions were quashed by the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division), an inquiry was conducted by a retired senior judge, Sir 
Henry Fisher (Fisher, 1977). 
The report of the inquiry highlighted the likely impact of the psychological functioning 
of the three youths (Fisher, 1977, para. 5.9) on their false confessions. Of particular 
relevance to this thesis, the eldest, Colin Lattimore, clearly fulfilled the criteria for a 
diagnosis of learning disability: he had attended special schooling, was significantly 
intellectually impaired (his tested IQ was 66) and had just started attending a day-centre 
for people with learning disabilities (ibid., paras. 5.16 and 5.17). Whilst he was held on 
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remand, it was noted that he appeared to have difficulty appreciating the seriousness of 
his situation (ibid., para. 5.20). He was also apparently suggestible in that, according to 
a note of psychiatric evidence taken by junior counsel for the prosecution, he was: 
`(v)ery unreliable in distinguishing what was put to him about events and what he 
recollects himself about them' (ibid., para. 5.22). 
Though Fisher (1977) concluded incorrectly that Colin Lattimore and his friends had 
been involved in some way (later, they were exonerated completely), his report provided 
a detailed indictment of the way in which official practice at all stages of the 
investigation and prosecution contributed to, or failed to protect against, the convictions 
of these vulnerable suspects. Of special relevance, in the context of this thesis, are the 
criticisms of the detention and interviewing by the police of Colin Lattimore: 
" the guidance in the preamble to the Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions 
had been breached because he had not been advised of his right to consult a 
solicitor; 
" he had been prompted by the interviewing officers during the preparation of his 
written statement; and 
" whilst it was recognised that he had a learning disability (in the terminology of the 
time, the `mental age' of a person of 14 years), this had not been taken into 
account (for example, by postponing the interview until one of his parents could 
attend). In addition, his appreciation of the likely consequences of making self- 
incriminating admissions may have been affected by the response `I will see about 
your father about that later' (ibid., p. 266) given by one of the interviewing 
officers in answer to his question about whether he might be able to go home after 
making a confession (para. 2.13). In Fisher's view, this response was 
`disingenuous and unfair' (ibid., para. 2.13 (d)). 
Fisher's (ibid. ) report which received a great deal of publicity, raised serious disquiet 
about the protection of suspects, especially suspects who were `vulnerable' such as 
Colin Lattimore, and provided an important counterbalance to widespread public 
anxieties about the activities of `sophisticated professional criminals' (Criminal Law 
Revision Committee, 1972, para. 21 (vi)). 
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During the inquiry, the safeguards for children were extended to adult suspects who, in 
the terminology of the period in which it was drafted, had a `mental handicap' (but not 
any other `vulnerable' suspects). Subsequently, they were incorporated into the 
Administrative Directions in the following terms: 
`(a)s far as practicable, and where recognised as such... a mentally handicapped 
adult... should be interviewed only in the presence of a parent of other person in 
whose care, custody or control he is, or of some person who is not a police officer 
(for example a social worker)' (Home Office Circular 89/1978,4A, a)). 
However, it was recognised that much more radical reform was required. Almost 
immediately after the publication of Sir Henry Fisher's report, the government 
responded by appointing the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), 
chaired by Sir Cyril Philips, to consider the investigation and prosecution of all crime 
and, in particular, the `fundamental balance' (Philips, 1981, p. iv) between the powers 
of the police and the rights of the suspect. Though causing massive controversy (see 
Zander, 1995), the majority of the recommendations of the RCCP for the investigation 
of offences (the recommendations for changes in the prosecution of offences were 
treated separately in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985) were broadly given effect in 
PACE and its accompanying Codes of Practice. 
1.4 SAFEGUARDS FOR SUSPECTS SINCE THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PACE 
1.4.1 THE CAUTION AND LEGAL RIGHTS 
The Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Home Office, 1985a) which was introduced 
on 1St January, 1986 comprises little more than an outline of the law (Zander, 1995). 
Practical guidance about the implementation of PACE is given in the accompanying 
Codes of Practice (Home Office, 1985b, 1991,1995a, 2002a, b), which are supposed to 
provide a self-contained handbook to the police (Zander, ibid. ). Each of the six Codes 
(A-F) covers a different area relating to the investigation of alleged offences. In the 
context of this thesis, Code C, which has not been amended since 1995 (Home Office, 
1995a), is of most relevance because it focusses on: 
`practice for the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by police 
officers' (Home Office, 1995a, p. 25), 
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and outlines the safeguards to all suspects, including people with learning disabilities, 
during police detention and interviewing. 
Under s. 36 of PACE, a new role is defined, that of the Custody Officer, a uniformed 
officer of at least the rank of sergeant who is independent of any investigation and who, 
under s. 39, has overall responsibility for the suspect's welfare. Once the Custody 
Officer has established that there are grounds for detaining a person under arrest, he or 
she `books in' the suspect. An important part of this procedure involves opening the 
Custody Record, an account, which is completed contemporaneously until the suspect 
leaves the police station, of the detention. At the `booking in' stage, the Custody Officer 
has to record information about the suspect's personal details and property, as well as 
the grounds for the arrest and the authorization of detention. He or she also has to decide 
whether the suspect may be `vulnerable' on the grounds of age or status and/or in need 
of medical assistance. 
During this procedure, the Custody Officer is also required to provide oral information 
about the caution and the three legal rights (the right to have someone informed of the 
person's arrest, to consult a solicitor, and to consult the Codes of Practice). A written 
leaflet, the Notice to Detained Persons (NDP), is then provided to the suspect which 
reiterates and expands on these rights, and provides information about a fourth right, the 
right to a copy of the Custody Record. 
Since 1991, Code C (Home Office, 1991) has specified that a written leaflet should also 
be given to suspects telling them about their other entitlements during detention (for 
example, access to food, drink, and exercise, see Notes 3A and 3B, Home Office, 
1995a). Suspects are asked to acknowledge receipt of the NDP and the leaflet about 
their entitlements on the Custody Record; if they do not do so, this also must be 
recorded. Normally, the suspect is then taken to a cell. 
The Custody Officer remains responsible for the suspect's welfare until custody is 
handed to another person, usually to the investigating officer for interviewing. Unless 
there are exceptional circumstances, the caution and right to legal advice must again be 
presented orally, and recorded on audio-tape, at the start of the interview (each 
interview, if there is more than one). 
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Since its introduction in 1986, Code C has been amended on two occasions (Home 
Office, 1991,1995a), accompanied by changes in the Notice to Detained Persons (see 
Ch. 3 for further details). From the point of view of suspects, undoubtedly the most 
important of these developments is the modification of the right to silence (or right of 
silence; the two phrases mean the same, Zander, 1995). 
The right to silence 
Traditionally, the ultimate safeguard to prevent innocent suspects from self- 
incrimination has been the right to remain silent during questioning without adverse 
inferences being drawn at trial. Whilst, according to Mirfield (1997), there is radical 
disagreement among legal historians about the the way in which the right to silence 
became accepted in English common law, there is agreement that it was established long 
before the organisation of any formal police service. After the formulation of the 
Judges' Rules, the right to silence was presented to suspects through a standard caution, 
informing them that they did not have to respond to questions, and protected indirectly 
by the right to legal advice. Reflecting the views of the majority of the RCCP (Philips, 
1981), it was preserved when PACE was introduced. 
However, the preservation of the right to silence was stringently criticised, particularly 
by the police, who argued that it was: 
`a protection for hardened criminals' (Association of Chief Police Officers, 1993, 
quoted in Leng, 1994, p. 27). 
In response, the issue was re-examined by the RCCJ. The final report (Runciman, 1993, 
Ch. 4, p. 49 ff. ) recommended that the right of silence should be retained because the 
benefits of removing the protection from experienced criminals were outweighed by the 
risk of miscarriages of justice arising from false confessions, particularly by `vulnerable' 
suspects (ibid., para. 4.22). However, this recommendation was rejected by the 
(Conservative) government, apparently primarily for political reasons (Bridges, 1994; 
Morgan and Stephenson, 1994; Zander, 1994). 
The right to silence was modified under the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 
(s. 34) so that the court is now allowed to draw adverse inferences about someone who 
raises a defence at trial after refusing to answer questions at a police station (Leng, 
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1994; Wasik and Taylor, 1995; Zander, 1995); the main inference being, of course, that 
the defence is untrue. These adverse inferences may only be drawn, however, if the 
suspect has received the caution (Wasik and Taylor, 1995; Zander, 1995), and, since the 
introduction of the Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (s. 58), if the suspect 
has not been denied access to a solicitor. The modification to the right to silence 
required that the caution be re-worded and a new version, which is currently in use, was 
introduced on 1St April, 1995 (see Ch. 4.4 for a detailed discussion). 
The right to silence contained in the caution is protected indirectly through the right to a 
solicitor (or more properly, to legal advice, since the majority of suspects do not receive 
assistance from qualified legal advisers, McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Pearse and 
Gudjonsson, 1997). Based on empirical evidence, it has been argued (Bucke, Street and 
Brown, 2000), that, since the modification of the right to silence, the right to access to a 
solicitor has assumed even more importance. 
The right to a solicitor 
Following the recommendation of the RCCP (Philips, 1981), PACE (s. 58) greatly 
strengthened the law on the right to a solicitor. With limited exceptions, which are 
strictly defined under s. 58, suspects in police detention can consult in private with a 
solicitor, any time of the day or night, and the solicitor can be present during any 
interview with the police. Legal advice is available free of charge to suspects, whether 
they choose to have their own solicitor or use a duty solicitor, under the scheme 
provided for by the legislation (s. 59). 
Though many criticisms have been made of the competence and effectiveness of legal 
advisers (Brown, 1997; Hodgson, 1994; Lord Chief Justice in R. v. Paris, Abdullahi and 
Miller 1993; McConville et al., 1991; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Runciman, 
1993), there is overwhelming evidence that suspects who receive such help are less 
likely to make self-incriminating admissions, including confessions, and more likely to 
exercise their right to silence (Baldwin, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Leng, 
1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1993; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 
1997). For example, based on a substantial sample of interviews (N=1067), Moston et 
al. (1993) found that the right to silence was used by almost one third of suspects who 
received legal advice, compared with fewer than five per cent who did not. Similarly, in 
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a more recent study, suspects who were not supported by a legal adviser during 
interviewing were four times more likely than their counterparts to make a partial or full 
admission (Pearse et al., 1998). Given the impact of legal advice, it is, perhaps, 
surprising to find that legal advisers are so inactive (McConville and Hodgson, 1993; 
Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997): in more than three-quarters (N=180) of interviews, they 
made no intervention whatsoever (McConville and Hodgson, 1993). Perhaps, as Pearse 
and his colleagues (Pearse et al., 1998) suggest, their mere physical presence challenges 
police authority and, at least in `routine' interviews, may support suspects in 
maintaining the strategies they have already decided to use. 
In view of its importance, it might be expected that the majority of suspects would wish 
to exercise the right to a solicitor. In fact, however, even the most generous figures 
(Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997) indicate that fewer than two-thirds of suspects are 
supported by a legal adviser when they are interviewed by the police; in other studies 
(for example, Bucke et al., 2000; Bottomley et al., 1989; Phillips and Brown, 1998), the 
number is much lower. One important reason is that the proportion of requests is 
limited: fewer than one-third of detained persons ask for legal advice (Brown et al., 
1992; McConville et a1., 1991). Brown (1997), discussing this surprising finding, 
concludes that there is no single explanation. It does appear that, unless suspects are too 
drunk or aggressive, Custody Officers normally present the rights orally and give out the 
written leaflet, the Notice to Detained Persons (Bottomley et al., 1991; Brown et al., 
1992; McConville et al., 1991). However, the quality of the presentation is sometimes 
unsatisfactory because it is hurried, or garbled, or incomplete. For example, in more 
than a quarter of `booking in' procedures observed by Brown and his colleagues (26%, 
N=517, Brown et al., ibid. ), Custody Officers did not present the caution or one or more 
of the rights adequately. Such sloppiness is not limited to Custody Officers: Baldwin 
(1993) found that more than one in ten of cautions presented by investigating officers at 
the start of suspect interviews were unsatisfactory or incorrect. 
In addition, Custody Officers' responses to suspects' attempts to exercise the right to a 
solicitor are not always satisfactory. On some occasions, they are simply unhelpful, but, 
on others, they blatantly discourage the suspect from exercising his or her rights. 
McConville et al. (1991), for example, cite a case in which, when the suspect says that 
he is uncertain whether or not to seek legal advice, the Custody Officer replies: 
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`(w)ell, I've put you down as `no' for the moment' (ibid., p. 50). 
Despite the changes introduced under PACE, then, in practice it may be difficult even 
for suspects who are not `vulnerable' to use the safeguards which are meant to protect 
them during police detention and interviewing. This enhances the importance of the 
specific provision for `vulnerable' suspects. 
1.4.2 THE `SPECIAL PROVISION' FOR `VULNERABLE' SUSPECTS 
Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
(RCCP, Philips, 1981), the introduction of PACE formalised an additional safeguard, 
the `special provision', for `vulnerable' suspects (and for victims and other witnesses), 
children (aged below 17 years) and adults in cases where a police officer: 
`has any suspicion, or is told in good faith, that a person ... may 
be mentally 
disordered or mentally handicapped, or mentally incapable of understanding the 
significance of questions put to him or his replies' (Home Office, 1995a, Code C, 
para. 1.4). 
According to this `special provision', an independent person (usually understood to be 
the Appropriate Adult or AA, Fennell, 1994) must be present when a `vulnerable' 
suspect is interviewed by the police or involved in any formal procedure (such as 
receiving the caution and legal rights). 
Responsibility for implementing the `special provision' lies with the Custody Officer. 
He or she must identify that the suspect is `vulnerable' and contact a person to attend the 
police station and act as the AA. Though the suspect's wishes are, as far as possible, to 
be respected, and a family member or carer can be used, it is recommended in one of the 
Notes for Guidance in Code C (Home Office, 1995a, Note 1E) that, for adults, the role 
should be undertaken by someone involved with relevant professional experience or 
training, such as a Social Worker or health care practitioner. Importantly, since 1991, 
the AA cannot be the solicitor acting for the person; nor, since 1995, can he or she be a 
lay visitor to the police station (ibid. para. 11.14). When the AA arrives at the station, 
the Custody Officer must reiterate the caution and legal rights to the suspect, and, it is 
implied, also take responsibility for ensuring information is provided to the AA about 
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his or her role during an interview. Code C explicitly directs that the Appropriate Adult 
is not expected simply to act as an observer but that he or she should: 
" advise the person being questioned and observe that the interview is being 
conducted properly and fairly; and 
" facilitate communication with person being interviewed (ibid., para. 11.16). 
Contrary to what many Custody Officers apparently believe (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; 
Brown et al., 1992, p. 78; Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse, 2000; Palmer and Hart, 
1996; Phillips and Brown, 2000; see Ch. 7), the `special provision' is not discretionary. 
Failure to implement this safeguard is a breach of the Codes and can lead to disciplinary 
action against police officers; moreover, it may have potentially serious implications 
under PACE. 
Nevertheless, there is a striking discrepancy between the estimated prevalence of 
`vulnerable' adult suspects (Gudjonsson et al., 1993) and the use of the `special 
provision' (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Gudjonsson et al., 1993; 
Medford et al., 2000; Robertson et al., 1996; see Ch. 7). Whilst, in part, this discrepancy 
reflects difficulties in the way in which the provision is implemented (see Ch. 7.1), its 
drafting is also problematic. In para. 1.4 (Home Office, 1995a, Code C), it is suggested 
that `mental disorder' and `mental handicap' are distinct. Similarly, the Notes for 
Guidance (notes to guide in the application and interpretation of the main text) state 
that: 
`(i)t should be noted that `mental disorder' is different from `mental handicap' 
although the two are dealt with similarly throughout this code' (Home Office, 
ibid., Note 1 G; my italics). 
However, earlier in the same Note, `mental disorder' is defined as: 
`mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic 
disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind' (ibid. ). 
This broad definition, adopted from the Mental Health Act 1983 suggests that `mental 
disorder' includes `arrested and incomplete development of mind', arguably (Jones, 
2003, p. 13), a synonym for `mental handicap'. Unfortunately, the confusion is not 
resolved by consulting PACE because the definition of `mental handicap' there, as: 
`a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes significant 
impairment of intelligence and social functioning' (Home Office, 1985a, s. 77(3)) 
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is not consistent with all of Note 1G (Home Office, 1995a). Following the 
recommendation in the RCCJ's report (Runciman, 1993) for a comprehensive review of 
the `special provision', a multi-disciplinary working group, convened by the Home 
Office, proposed that Note 1G (Home Office, 1995b) should be reworded to clarify the 
relationships between `mental disorder', `mental illness' and `mental handicap'; 
unfortunately, their proposal was not accepted and the confusion remains. 
The poor drafting of Code C has practical implications because there are different 
procedures for implementing the `special provision' for suspects with a `mental 
handicap' and their counterparts with a `mental disorder'. For men and women with 
learning disabilities, the Custody Officer need only seek the presence of an Appropriate 
Adult. In contrast, suspects who are `mentally disordered' must also be assessed by a 
police surgeon (known in the Metropolitan Police District as a Forensic Medical 
Examiner) to establish whether they are `fit to detain' and `fit to interview' (Home 
Office, 1995a, para. 9.2). Custody Officers often delay involving an AA until this 
assessment has taken place, abrogating to police surgeons their responsibility for 
deciding whether to implement the `special provision' (Medford, Gudjonsson and 
Pearse, 2000; Phillips and Brown, 1998; Palmer and Hart, 1996; though c. f. Robertson 
et al., 1996). This is a breach of the Codes and, since the available evidence 
(Gudjonsson, Hayes and Rowlands, 2000) suggests that police surgeons often have 
limited understanding of the safeguards for `vulnerable' adults, it may mean that 
suspects who are treated by Custody Officers as `mentally disordered' rather than 
`mentally handicapped' are disadvantaged in terms of their access to the `special 
provision'. The working party convened by the Home Office in response to the report of 
the RCCJ (Runciman, 1993) proposed that Code C should be amended to specify that an 
Appropriate Adult be called whenever a police surgeon is asked to assess a suspect's 
mental health (Home Office, 1995b); again, however, the proposal was not accepted. 
Since the `special provision' simply formalised and extended the pre-PACE safeguard, it 
is, perhaps, not surprising that the relevant sections were poorly drafted in the original 
version of Code C (Home Office, 1985b). More reprehensible is the failure, despite 
informed recommendations, to attempt to address the difficulties comprehensively in 
subsequent versions (Home Office, 1991,1995a). It is difficult to disagree with 
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Hodgson's (1997) conclusion that the `special provision' remains `something of the 
poor relation of criminal justice' (ibid., p. 785). 
The purpose of the safeguards for suspects, including `vulnerable' suspects, in Code C 
is to ensure that self-incriminating information provided during police detention and 
interviewing is admissible as evidence in court. Under PACE, there are a number of 
provisions to enforce the safeguards provided by the Codes. 
1.5 CONFESSION EVIDENCE SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF 
PACE 
Though PACE preserved the protection provided by the powers of the court to exclude 
self-incriminating evidence, it introduced a number of radical changes. First, for the first 
time, a `confession' was defined: under s. 82(l), it includes: 
`any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made 
to a person in authority or not and whether made in words or otherwise' (Home 
Office, 1985a). 
Secondly, the criteria for excluding evidence were altered. The notion of `voluntariness' 
was replaced by the concepts of `reliability' and `fairness', whilst `oppression', though 
retained, was defined more closely. Importantly, the issue to be considered is not 
whether the confession is true but whether it has been obtained by means or in 
circumstances which are likely to render it unreliable. This has been stated most clearly 
in the leading case of Cox (R. v. Cox 1991; confirmed by R. v. McGovern 1991 and R. v. 
Kenny 1994) where the court stated that: 
`(i)t is perfectly true that the judge must have regard to all the circumstances. But 
one of the matters to which he plainly cannot have regard is the truth of the 
statement' (quoted in Zander, 1995, p. 220. ). 
The three concepts of reliability, fairness and oppression are dealt with primarily under 
sections 76 and 78 of PACE. Section 76 is concerned with `proof of facts', meaning that 
the burden of proof lies squarely with the prosecution whilst s. 78 relates to `the exercise 
of judgment by the court' (Birch, 1989, p. 96). Section 76 often involves some form of 
impropriety on the part of the police relating to `oppression' (s. 76(2)(a)) or: 
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`anything said or done which is likely in the circumstances existing at the time, to 
render unreliable any confession... in consequence thereof (s. 76(2)(b), Home 
Office, 1985a). 
Section 78, which provides for the exclusion of `unfair evidence' may be used when, 
even if there has been no impropriety by the police, it would be unfair to the defence to 
allow the evidence to go before the jury. In a widely cited analysis of the three sections, 
Birch (1989) draws the analogy of the prosecution needing to clear successive hurdles in 
a steeplechase, starting with section 76, crossing section 78, and finally, having to jump 
section 82(3) which effectively retains the common law power for the court to exclude 
any evidence where the `prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value' (Zander, 1995, 
p. 250). 
Of these three sections, s. 78 has been most widely used to exclude self-incriminating 
evidence by suspects during police detention and interviewing. Though the courts have 
declined to lay down guidelines, by far the most frequent basis for its application has 
been substantial breaches of the Codes of Practice or other aspects of PACE (Zander, 
1995). These include (see Zander, 1995, p. 238 if. for many more examples): 
" not informing suspects of their legal rights (R. v. Gokan and Hassan 1990); 
" denying access to a solicitor (R. v. Samuel 1988); 
" failing to present the caution (R. v. Doolan 1988; R. v. McGovern 1991); 
" not providing an independent person (an Appropriate Adult) when the suspect was 
a juvenile (R. v. Glaves 1993; R. v. Weekes (Trevor Dave) 1993). 
In addition, evidence has been excluded because the police have: 
" misrepresented the nature of identification evidence from witnesses (George 
Heron 1993); 
" misrepresented the strength of forensic evidence to the defendant and his solicitor 
(R. v. Mason (Carl) 1988). 
Most of the Court of Appeal judgments where a conviction by a lower court has been 
quashed because the suspect is a person with a learning disability have resulted from the 
application of section 76(2)(b) (Palmer and Hart, 1996). Learning disability may be 
relevant both to what was `said and done' and to the `circumstances existing at the time' 
(Birch, 1989). Importantly, the criteria for the application of this section depend on 
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what the suspect's actual mental -state is likely to have been at the time of the 
confession, not what it was believed to be by the police (R. v. Everett 1988). This was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal's decision to quash the conviction of Engin Raghip 
(R. v. Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip 1991) for the murder of a police officer (since this 
case is a landmark in the development of the concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' 
which provides the framework to this thesis, it is discussed in detail in Ch. 2.1.3). 
Learning disability and other vulnerabilities have also been considered in applications to 
exclude self-incriminating evidence under s. 76(2)(a). One of the leading cases 
providing the police with concrete guidance about the meaning of `oppression' is that of 
Stephen Miller, one of the `Cardiff Three' (R. v. Paris, Abdullahi and Miller 1993) who 
were wrongly convicted for a brutal murder (Williams, 1995; Pearse, 1997). Though not 
a person with a learning disability, Mr. Miller was significantly intellectually 
disadvantaged (his Full Scale IQ score was 75) and was extremely suggestible and 
acquiescent. He was interviewed over five days for a total of 12 hours 42 minutes. A 
solicitor was engaged but was not allowed to be present during the first two interviews. 
He was present for the remainder but the audio-tapes indicated that he only intervened 
on one occasion, during the final interview (Pearse, 1997). Having denied the offence 
more than three hundred times, Mr. Miller made self-incriminating admissions after an 
interview which the Court of Appeal, having heard some of the audio-tapes, found 
horrific. In quashing Mr. Miller's conviction, the court made clear, following a case law 
tradition pre-dating PACE (R. v. Priestley 1966), that the impact of his difficulties had 
been taken into account. 
Several of the sections of PACE, therefore, can be, and have been, used to exclude 
evidence obtained from suspects who are `vulnerable', including those with learning 
disabilities (see Gudjonsson, 2003; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Zander, 1995, for more 
detailed discussions). In addition, though, reflecting its background in the Confait case 
(Fennell, 1994), there is particular provision for men and women with learning 
disabilities. 
This provision is found in s. 77 of PACE. In the only qualification to the acceptability in 
English law of uncorroborated confession evidence, s. 77(1) states the court must warn 
the jury: 
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`that there is a special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance 
on the confession' 
when: 
`(a) the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on a confession 
by him; and 
(b) the court is satisfied - 
(i) that he is mentally handicapped; and 
(ii) that the confession was not made in the presence of an independent 
person'. 
It has generally been assumed that the `independent person' is the Appropriate Adult of 
the Codes of Practice (Fennell, 1994; R. v. Campbell 1995) but, according to Palmer and 
Hart (1996, p. 20 ff. ), more recent Court of Appeal cases (R. v. Bailey 1995; R. v. Lewis 
(Martin) 1996) suggest that the two may not be entirely interchangeable. An 
Appropriate Adult is only required when a person with a learning disability makes a 
confession to a criminal offence during police detention and interviewing; an 
independent person should be present whenever someone with a learning disability 
confesses. 
The uncertainty about the interpretation of this provision may reflect its very limited 
use. In contrast with other sections of PACE, the responsibility of convincing the court 
that the defendant has a learning disability and that his or her confession was made in 
the absence of the Appropriate Adult rests squarely on the defence, on the balance of 
probabilities (Mirfield, 1985, p. 166). Most cases where the issue of a warning under s. 
77 might have been raised have been dealt with under ss. 76 or 78, with s. 77 used as a 
`fallback' (Fennell, 1994; Zander, 1995). 
Following a Court of Appeal judgment (R. v. MacKenzie 1993) involving a man of 
Borderline intellectual ability with a severe personality disorder who made a series of 
voluntary false confessions (Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 243 ff; Gudjonsson, 2003), the Lord 
Chief Justice issued a Practice Note stating that where: 
`(1) that prosecution case depends wholly upon confessions; 
(2) the defendant suffers from a significant degree of mental handicap and 
(3) the confessions are unconvincing to a point where a jury properly directed 
could not properly convict upon them, 
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then the judge... should withdraw the case from the jury' (R. v. MacKenzie 1993, 
p. 108). 
Though it is more likely that Mr. MacKenzie's confessions reflected his personality 
disorder than his intellectual disadvantage, the decision in this case provides people with 
learning disabilities with a safeguard beyond those contained in PACE and the Codes of 
Practice. However, it appears that use of the Practice Note, like that of s. 77, is very 
limited. 
In practice, then, the only `special' safeguard for people with learning disabilities is the 
poorly-drafted provision for an Appropriate Adult. Still, the legal framework provided 
by PACE and the Codes of Practice constitutes a formal acknowledgement by the 
criminal justice system that, compared with their counterparts in the general population, 
suspects with learning disabilities experience particular difficulties during police 
detention and interviewing. What is the nature of these difficulties? In all three versions 
of Code C of the Codes of Practice, it is stated that: 
`although people who are ... mentally handicapped are often capable of providing 
reliable evidence, they may, without knowing or wishing to do so, be particularly 
prone in certain circumstances to provide information which is unreliable, 
misleading or self-incriminating' (Home Office, 1995a, Note 11B). 
However, no systematic attempt has ever been made to examine why suspects with 
learning disabilities might be more 'vulnerable'. In the next chapter, a possible 
theoretical framework is presented which may enable this issue to begin to be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
`PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' AND PEOPLE 
WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 
PACE and the Codes of Practice assert that people with learning disabilities are 
`vulnerable' because they are at greater risk than their counterparts in the general 
population of providing information which is unreliable, misleading or self- 
incriminating. However, neither the legislation nor the guidance contain any attempt to 
specify the nature of this putative 'vulnerability'. Instead, it is assumed that any 
difficulties experienced by people with learning disabilities simply reflect the 
impairments in intellectual and social functioning which form part of the diagnostic 
criteria for the condition (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; British 
Psychological Society, 2001; Emerson et al., 2001). 
In part, the lack of attention to exploring the putative `vulnerability' of people with 
learning disabilities reflects a wider neglect of suspects and their experiences in the 
literature on police detention and interviewing (see Ch. 1.2). In contrast, the pioneering 
work of Irving and Hilgendorf (Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981; Irving and Hilgendorf, 
1980) places suspects and their experiences at centre-stage. Based on an extensive 
review of the relevant psychological literature, they conclude that, whilst police 
interviews vary greatly (see Ch. 1.2), nevertheless, they all share a common 
characteristic. Inevitably, they always involve: 
`a running series of decision tasks for the suspect' (Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980, 
p. 13). 
Since suspects also have to make (albeit less complex) decisions during the period 
preceding an interview (for example, choosing whether or not to exercise the legal 
rights), this conclusion also applies to detention. In the context of this thesis, Irving and 
Hilgendorf s (ibid. ) work is very important: conceptualising suspects as active decision- 
makers encourages consideration of the factors, including the psychological factors, 
which may influence what they choose to do or not do. 
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Over the past ten years, Gudjonss©n (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) has developed the 
concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' as a framework through which to examine 
these psychological factors and their possible impact on suspects during police detention 
and interviewing. Since this influential framework provides the theoretical background 
for the exploration, in subsequent chapters, of the putative disadvantages during police 
detention and interviewing of people with learning disabilities, it is presented in detail 
here. 
2.1 `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' AND POLICE 
DETENTION AND INTERVIEWING 
2.1.1 `STATUS' AND `FUNCTIONAL' APPROACHES 
Attempts by psychologists to think about the difficulties which people with a `mental 
disability', such as men and women with learning disabilities, may experience, 
compared with their `general population' counterparts, in making everyday decisions 
such as decisions during police detention and interviewing have been dominated by two 
approaches: the `status', or diagnostic, approach and the `functional' approach. 
The `status' approach, which provides the rationale for the `special provision' for people 
with learning disabilities and other `vulnerable' groups under PACE and Code C, 
involves making inferences about individuals' decision-making based on identifying 
them as members of a population which is known, or suspected, to have some 
abnormality or impairment of functioning relative to the general population as a result of 
which clinical treatment or support is needed (see Grisso, 1986; Murphy and Clare, 
1995). It is based on two assumptions: first, that groups sharing the same label or 
diagnosis are homogeneous and, secondly, that all decision-making contexts of a 
particular kind (for example, police interviews) are equally demanding. Neither of these 
assumptions is supported empirically (for example, among people with a `mental 
disability': Grisso and Appelbaum, 1991,1995; Marson, Schmitt, Ingram and Harrell, 
1994; Morris, Niederbuhl and Mahr, 1993; Wong, Clare, Holland, Watson and Gunn, 
2000; see also Ch. 1.2 for a summary of the evidence relating to variations between 
police interviews). Moreover, the approach itself is out of step both with accepted 
clinical `good practice' (British Medical Association/The Law Society, 1995) and 
widely-supported proposals for changes in the English legal system to encourage people 
39 
with a `mental disability' to make decisions for themselves, as far as possible (Law 
Commission (England and Wales), 1995; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999). 
In contrast, there is both clinical and legal, as well as increasing empirical, support for 
the `functional approach', which has developed from pioneering work in the U. S. A. by 
Grisso, Appelbaum, and their colleagues (for example, Grisso, 1986; Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1991,1995,1998; Hoge, Bonnie, Poythress, Monahan, Eisenberg and 
Feucht-Haviar, 1997). Whilst recognising the importance of the disadvantages 
summarised by a diagnosis indicating the presence of a `mental disability', a functional 
approach does not focus only on the person's abnormalities or impairments. Instead, it 
proposes that any individual's ability to make decisions which further his or her 
personal goals reflects an interaction between: 
" the person's `functional abilities' (ibid., p. 15), that is, what he or she understands, 
knows, believes or can do which is directly relevant to a particular context (for 
example, being interviewed as a suspect during police detention rather than as a 
witness in court); and 
" the extent to which these functional abilities meet the demands of a specific 
situation within a given context (for example, within the context of police 
detention and interviewing, being suspected of a minor property offence rather 
than the murder of a vulnerable person). 
The implication is that, if difficulties are experienced, they may be alleviated either by 
by improving the person's relevant functional abilities and/or by simplifying or 
otherwise amending the decision-making situation. 
Despite developing from a different background and using different terminology, 
Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' is, as 
will be seen, positioned within this functional approach. 
2.1.2 THE CONCEPT OF `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' 
Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' 
developed from his experimental studies and his unparalleled clinical experience of 
assessments of men and women who have alleged that they have provided unreliable, 
misleading or self-incriminating information during questioning. The term refers to 
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psychological disadvantages which are likely to be of direct relevance in the context of 
police detention and interviewing in that they may: 
`a) impair suspects' ability to understand their legal rights, 
b) render suspects prone, in certain circumstances, to provide information which 
is unreliable or misleading' (Gudjonsson, 1994, p. 94). 
Whilst it is possible that there may be a whole range of such vulnerabilities, Gudjonsson 
(1994,1999) has proposed a typology of those which, from experimental evidence or on 
clinical grounds, appear most relevant to police detention and interviewing. These are: 
1. Mental Disorder. This is interpreted broadly, as in s. 1 of the Mental Health Act 
1983, but it is suggested that three forms of such disorders are likely to be of 
particular importance: 
(i) `mental illness' (typically, schizophrenia or a serious affective disorder) 
because it places individuals at increased risk of a breakdown in their ability 
to distinguish fact and fantasy (for example, through increasing feelings of 
guilt) and can affect their perception of the significance of a confession; 
(ii) personality disorder, which may, for example, increase the risk of false 
confessions in order to achieve notoriety (as in the cases of David 
MacKenzie, see Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 243 ff., see Ch. 1.5 and Ch. 5.10; 
Judith Ward, Kennedy, 1992; R. v. Ward, 1993, see Ch. 5.1.1) or as part of a 
criminal lifestyle (Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1997); and 
(iii) learning disability, which it is implied, increases the possibility that the 
suspect's psychological resources available will be insufficient to enable him 
or her to cope with the demands of police detention and interviewing. 
2. Abnormal Mental State. This refers to mental states which are subclinical or 
transient and do not fall within the remit of the Mental Health Act 1983 but are 
more likely to be purely psychological: they include high anxiety (as found by 
Gudjonsson et al., 1993; see Ch. 1.2), or, less often (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), 
specific phobias, such as claustrophobia. Intense emotional distress following 
bereavements involving family members (Gudjonsson, 2003) or friends 
(Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1994) can also be relevant. 
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Abnormal mental states may also arise from medical conditions (such as diabetes 
or epilepsy), but perhaps of most importance is illegal drug-taking. Almost a 
quarter (22%, N= 173) of Gudjonsson et al. 's (1993) sample of detained persons 
reported using non-prescribed drugs in the previous twenty-four hours and 7% 
appeared, during the clinical assessment, still to be affected. A subsequent analysis 
indicated that these suspects were more than three times more likely than their 
non-reporting counterparts to confess to alleged offences (Pearse et al., 1998). 
Though there was no evidence, from this sample, to challenge the validity of their 
statements to the police, the findings of other studies suggest that withdrawal from 
opiate drugs is associated with heightened suggestibility (Murakami, Edelman and 
Davis, 1996), and, in some situations, can contribute to a false confession 
(Gudjonsson, 1992a). 
3. Personality Characteristics. These include four characteristics which may be 
inadvertently or intentionally exacerbated or manipulated by the police during 
detention and interviewing: 
(i) acquiescence (a susceptibility to answer questions in the affirmative, 
regardless of their content; Cronbach, 1946); 
(ii) interrogative suggestibility (a tendency to be (mis)led by leading questions 
(Yield) and to give way to interrogative pressure (Shift); Gudjonsson, 1984 et 
seq. ); 
(iii) confabulation (a tendency to replace gaps in memory with material which is 
distorted or fabricated; Baddeley, 1990; Berlyne, 1972; Gudjonsson, 1992a; 
Mercer, Wapner, Gardner and Benson, 1977; Register and Kihlstrom, 1988). 
This may be particularly frequent in people with personality disorder; and 
(iv) compliance ('the tendency of the individual to go along with propositions, 
requests or instructions for some immediate instrumental gain' (Gudjonsson, 
1992a, p. 137) regardless of his or her own preferences (Gudjonsson, 1989a et 
seq. ). 
In the context of police detention and interviewing, each one of these `psychological 
vulnerabilities' may be relevant. Alternatively, they may combine together, in 
association with another of the same class (for example, acquiescence and suggestibility, 
which are theoretically related, Gudjonsson, 1992a), or, most often, with others of 
42 
different classes, so that the detained person is multiply disadvantaged. The case of 
Engin Raghip illustrates how the interaction of a number of `psychological 
vulnerabilities' and the circumstances of detention and interviewing may lead to a 
miscarriage of justice involving an innocent person. 
2.1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' 
In 1987, Engin Raghip, then aged 21 years, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his 
involvement in the murder of P. C. Blakelock during the disturbances at the Broadwater 
Farm Estate, in London, two years earlier (see Gudjonsson, 1992a, pp. 309-313,2003, 
for further details). The only evidence against him was the self-incriminating admissions 
which he had made whilst he was detained and interviewed by the police. He remained 
in prison until 1991, when his conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal. 
Though Mr. Raghip did not have a diagnosis of a `learning disability' or any other 
`mental disability', he had a history of academic difficulties and, during childhood, was 
transferred from mainstream to `special' educational provision; however, he did not 
attend. After leaving school, he moved in with his partner and the couple had a baby. 
His partner provided Mr. Raghip with considerable support in the tasks of everyday life. 
However, shortly before he was arrested by the police, she left him, taking the baby with 
her. Mr. Raghip became distressed and had difficulty sleeping. He was eating poorly and 
was drinking heavily and smoking cannabis. 
When Mr. Raghip was detained by the police, PACE was being piloted but had not been 
introduced formally. He was interviewed on ten separate occasions lasting over fourteen 
hours across five days. Though it was recognised that he was unable to read, he was not 
provided with an Appropriate Adult; he was also refused access to a solicitor. During 
his detention, he complained of feeling unwell and vomiting after meals. He was 
examined on two occasions by a police surgeon and found to have a mild fever and 
enlarged neck glands. On the third day after his arrest, he was taken before a 
Magistrates' Court for permission to prolong his detention. He spoke briefly to a 
solicitor, appearing distressed and saying that he could not cope further. The Magistrates 
recommended that a solicitor should be present during further interviews; this did not 
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happen. Subsequently, he made the admissions which led to the charge of murder and 
his subsequent conviction. 
After Mr. Raghip's conviction, he tried to appeal, but leave was initially refused, in part 
because his tested level of intellectual ability lay above what was then the accepted `cut- 
off' (IQ: 69) for the admissibility of psychological evidence about intellectual 
disadvantage. After the failure of the application for leave to appeal, Mr. Raghip's 
solicitor asked the psychologist who had carried out the pre-trial assessment to comment 
on the discrepancy between the low Shift score on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales 
(Gudjonsson, 1984 et seq., 1997) his client had obtained then and the findings of a 
subsequent assessment, by a different person (Professor Gisli Gudjonsson). The second 
assessment indicated that Mr. Raghip was in fact very susceptible to changing his 
responses under pressure. Actually, the difference was easily explained. In contrast with 
his demeanour during the second assessment, when he was first assessed he had 
appeared `angry and suspicious' (Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 312); anger and suspiciousness 
are among the conditions which reduce suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1989b; see Ch. 
5.5.1). The second assessment also indicated that he was compliant (Gudjonsson, 1989a 
et seq. ), had low self-esteem, and high state and trait anxiety. In addition, through 
interviews with his partner carried out by a third psychologist, it was clear that he 
needed support in all the more complex tasks of everyday life. 
Subsequently, the psychologist who had carried out the first assessment stated publicly 
that he agreed with his colleagues' more recent findings, allowing the defence to make a 
submission to the Home Secretary for a further appeal hearing. The case was eventually 
sent back to the Court of Appeal, and Mr. Raghip was freed. 
The self-incriminating admissions made by Mr. Raghip appear to have reflected long- 
standing `psychological vulnerabilities', including: 
" limited intellectual ability and literacy skills; 
" low self-esteem and high anxiety; 
" marked compliance; 
" susceptibility to challenges to his initial responses to questions; and 
" limited social functioning. 
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The effects of these long-standing disadvantages may have been exacerbated by the 
effects of the transient physical and mental health problems which he experienced just 
before, and during, the period of his detention. It is suggested by Gudjonsson (1992a, 
2003) that these psychological factors interacted with the taxing conditions in which he 
was detained and interviewed (he was held over a long period without access to a 
solicitor or an Appropriate Adult, by officers who were, without doubt, emotionally 
distressed by the murder of their colleague) to undermine Mr. Raghip's ability to 
withstand pressure from the police. 
The events which led to the miscarriage of justice involving Mr. Raghip are, thankfully, 
unusual. Unfortunately, it is often assumed, particularly by defence solicitors, that 
suspects with `psychological vulnerabilities' are inevitably more likely to provide 
information which is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating (Gudj onsson, 1999). 
This assumption is not supported: in the only study which has attempted to relate 
suspects' `psychological vulnerabilities' during police detention to the outcome of their 
interviews, Pearse and his colleagues (Pearse et al., 1998) found that those detained 
persons who had been deemed to be `vulnerable' by clinicians (for details of the 
assessment, see Gudjonsson et al., 1993) were no more likely than their counterparts to 
make self-incriminating admissions. 
The generalisability of these findings is, however, uncertain. First, as already noted (see 
Ch. 1.2), the interviews in these `run-of-the-mill' cases were not particularly demanding 
(Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996), at least from an outsider's perspective. `Psychological 
vulnerabilities' may have more influence in serious cases, where police interviewing is 
generally much more challenging (Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1999). Secondly, the 
majority of the `vulnerable' suspects (70%, N=28) in the study by Pearse and his 
colleagues (Pearse et al., 1998) were supported by a legal adviser. Now that the right to 
silence has been modified, the practical importance of this support (Baldwin, 1992; 
Leng, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1993; Pearse and 
Gudjonsson, 1997) has probably been enhanced (Bucke et al., 2000), even in `routine' 
cases. 
Nevertheless, consistent with the positioning of the concept of `psychological 
vulnerabilities' within a functional, rather than a status, approach to understanding the 
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provision of unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating information by suspects during 
police detention and interviewing, Gudjonsson (1993) concludes that: 
`(w)hat is important is that any psychological and psychiatric findings relevant to 
vulnerabilities must be interpreted and placed within the context of the totality of 
evidence in the case' (ibid., p. 125). 
2.2 `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' AND PEOPLE 
WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 
Gudj onsson's (1994,1999) typology of `psychological vulnerabilities' includes 
`learning disability' as one of the forms of `mental disorder' but he does not specify in 
any detail how the diagnosis, and the disadvantages it summarises (including 
impairments in memory, problem-solving, literacy, comprehension and expression of 
verbal language, abililty to `read' social interactions particularly in conditions where 
there is a marked imbalance of power, and so on; see Murphy and Clare, 1995) may 
affect the ability to cope with the demands of police detention and interviewing. Other 
accounts based on clinical experience and/or analyses of individual cases, including 
proven miscarriages of justice, are no more specific (Ellis and Luckasson, 1985; 
Gudj onsson and MacKeith, 1994; McGee and Menolascino, 1992; Perske, 1994,2001). 
Elsewhere, however, Gudjonsson (1992a) draws on the available experimental literature 
to propose three putative domains in which, because of the developmental delay and the 
impairments of intellectual and social functioning which define the condition, adults 
with learning disabilities may be more likely than their `general population' counterparts 
to have `psychological vulnerabilities' : 
(i) understanding of the caution and legal rights; 
(ii) ability to `use' information to make decisions in interviews; 
(iii) acquiescence, suggestibility, confabulation and compliance. 
Unfortunately, though, Gudjonsson's (1994,1999) accounts of the possible impact of 
these `psychological vulnerabilities' - by impairing suspects' ability to understand their 
legal rights and increasing the likelihood that they will provide information which is 
unreliable or misleading (see Ch. 2.1.2) - are insufficiently detailed. Figure 2.2.1 
presents an expanded version of Gudjonsson's framework which is intended to clarify 
the process through which people with learning disabilities may become `vulnerable' 
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suspects under PACE and its guidelines, `at risk' of providing information which is 
unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating. 
According to this framework, the diagnosis of learning disability is defined by a history 
of developmental delay, together with significant impairments of intellectual and social 
functioning (American Association on Mental Retardation, 2002; British Psychological 
Society, 2001; Emerson et al., 2001). These impairments are disadvantages which, in 
the context of police detention and interviewing, place people with learning disabilities 
at greater risk than their counterparts in the general population of experiencing 
psychological vulnerabilities'. Such `vulnerabilities' may, in certain circumstances, 
lead to behaviours which result, either directly, or indirectly through the limited exercise 
of the caution and legal rights, in the outcome of an increased likelihood of providing 
information which is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating. In turn, this may, on 
occasion, end in a miscarriage of justice involving an innocent person. 
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Figure 2.2.1 An expanded version of Gudjonsson's framework, clarifying the possible 
role of the three `psychological vulnerabilities' explored in this thesis 








2.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The work described in this thesis was prompted by changes in social policy. For much 
of the last century, people with learning disabilities were often placed in institutions and 
alleged offenders rarely came into contact with the criminal justice system. Now that 
social care is normally based within community-based settings, traditional practice is 
changing and it is becoming increasingly recognised that, when an alleged offence has 
taken place, the police should be involved. It is no longer acceptable to ignore the 
alleged offence, or to invoke informal sanctions which may abuse the civil rights of 
alleged perpetrators and may even contravene the Human Rights Act 1998. At the same 
time, the Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act 1999 states a commitment to provide 
access to justice for alleged victims, particularly victims who are themselves 
'vulnerable'. It seems likely, then, that increasing numbers of people with learning 
disabilities will have the experience of being detained and interviewed by the police. 
Many people with learning disabilities, like their counterparts in the `general 
population', engage in behaviour which could constitute a criminal offence. However, a 
crime is not defined simply by a behaviour or its consequences (actus reus). Other 
`ingredients' must be present. One of the most important is a guilty `state of mind' 
(mens rea) relating to the behaviour (such as intention, recklessness and so on). 
Sometimes, it is clear that one or more of these ingredients is missing (see Carson, 
1995). The likelihood both of fulfilling the criteria for a crime and of being involved 
meaningfully in the criminal justice system is much greater for people with mild 
learning disabilities; in any case, they form the overwhelming majority of individuals 
with learning disabilities (Emerson et al., 2001). 
If people with learning disabilities are, indeed, more likely than their `general 
population' counterparts to be `vulnerable' as suspects, then the nature of this 
vulnerability needs to be explored so that strategies can be devised and implemented to 
minimise their impact. The next three chapters of this thesis describe attempts to use 
psychological methods to explore the three putative `psychological vulnerabilities' 
shown in Figure 2.2.1 among people with mild learning disabilities. In each study, the 
performance of the participants with learning disabilities is compared experimentally 
with that of their counterparts in the general population. 
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In Ch. 3, three studies are reported which examine recall and understanding of the 
information (the Notice to Detained Persons) presented to suspects to advise them of the 
caution and legal rights in police detention. To anticipate the results, the findings 
suggest that the material is too complex for people with learning disabilities but, 
worryingly, it is also too difficult even for their counterparts in the general population. 
In Ch. 4, a different `psychological vulnerability' is addressed. The development of an 
innovative experimental methodology is described which is then used to investigate the 
decision-making of people with learning disabilities and to examine the specific 
hypothesis that their perceptions of a police interview differ from those of their `general 
population' counterparts. Next, in Ch. 5, established measures are used to examine 
whether men and women with learning disabilities are more susceptible to acquiescence 
and suggestibility. As expected, they are more acquiescent and more likely to be 
(mis)led by leading questions. However, they are not more likely to change their 
answers in response to interrogative pressure. Then, confabulation is explored: though, 
surprisingly, when distortions and fabrications are considered together, people with 
learning disabilities are not more likely to confabulate, their recall contains 
proportionately more incorrect information. Finally, the potential relevance of 
compliance is reviewed and the importance of developing a methodology to assess this 
personality characteristic is emphasised. 
The findings of these three chapters, then, indicate that, though there are wide variations 
in the responses of the participants with mild learning disabilities, overall they are more 
likely than their peers in the general population to experience each of the three 
`psychological vulnerabilities' considered in this thesis. The implication is that, as 
suspects, they would, as PACE and its accompanying guidelines assert, 
be more likely 
than their `general population' counterparts to provide information during police 
detention and interviewing which is inadvertently unreliable, misleading or self- 
incriminating. 
In Chs. 6 and 7, two practical initiatives to alleviate this `vulnerability' are described. In 
Ch. 6, a series of four studies describes the development and evaluation of an 
experimental version of the Notice to Detained Persons which 
is intended to be more 
accessible to all suspects, including people with 
learning disabilities. Despite results 
which are initially encouraging, a more stringent evaluation shows that the attempt to 
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devise a less complex version of thecaution and legal rights is unsuccessful. In contrast, 
the initiative described in Ch. 7 has a better outcome. A screening questionnaire was 
developed and piloted to enhance the identification of `vulnerable' criminal suspects, 
including people with learning disabilities, by the police. This questionnaire has now 
been introduced as a formal part of the `booking in' procedures at all police stations in 
the Metropolitan Police District. 
Finally, in Ch. 8, the implications of the findings for minimising the likelihood of 
miscarriages of justice involving innocent people with learning disabilities are 
discussed. The theoretical framework provided by Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994, 
1999) concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' is revisited and it is argued that placing 
`psychological vulnerabilities' within a capacity-based approach (Law Commission, 
1995; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999) would encourage the further development 
of Gudjonsson's insights. 
2.4 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.4.1 PARTICIPANTS WITH `LEARNING DISABILTIES' 
Terminology 
In this thesis, `people first' terminology will be used, so that the condition will be 
referred to as a `learning disability' (Department of Health, 1991), and an individual 
who fulfils the criteria for the condition as a `person with a learning disability'; in the 
plural, they will be `people with learning disabilities'). 
`Mental handicap' under PACE and `learning disability' 
So far, `mental handicap', as defined under s. 77(3) of PACE and `learning disability' 
(British Psychological Society, 2001) have been treated as if they were equivalent. 
Indeed, the multi-disciplinary working-party convened by the Home Office (Home 
Office, 1995b) recommended that, the `learning disability' should replace the (now 
obsolete) `mental handicap' in the current Codes of Practice 
(Home Office, 1995a); this 
recommendation was not accepted. 
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However, there are some significant differences in the way the terms are used by the 
courts and in health and social care services. Normally, in health and social care, the 
`significant impairment of intellectual ability' is taken to be an intelligence quotient (IQ) 
score more than two standard deviations below the mean (that is, below 70) on an 
established test (such as, in the past, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised, 
WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981; now, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-HIUK, Wechsler, 
1997). The courts' interpretation of the intellectual functioning `arm' of the definition 
used to be the same: in R. v. Masih 1986, the Lord Chief Justice stated that `mental 
handicap' was defined by a Full Scale I. Q. score of 69 or below. However, in R. v. 
Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip 1991, the Court of Appeal broadened the criteria. It was 
accepted that, notwithstanding that his most recent IQ score was 74 (Borderline), Mr. 
Raghip fulfilled the criterion for a `significant impairment of intellectual functioning'. 
The judges were: 
`not attracted to the concept that submissions... should be governed by which side 
of an arbitrary line, whether 69/70 or elsewhere, the IQ falls' (quoted, from the 
judgement, by Gudjonsson, 1992b, p. 249). 
Subsequent case law (for example, Rv Kenny 1994) has supported this interpretation. 
Indeed, in Rv Long 1995 (cited in Gudjonsson, 2003), `mental handicap' was used by 
the Court of Appeal as grounds for quashing a conviction for murder of a man whose 
intellectual functioning lay in the High Average range but who made self-incriminating 
admissions in the context of a serious depression. 
Whilst the developing approach of the courts is consistent with their discretionary 
powers to exclude evidence under s. 78 of PACE (see Gudjonsson, 2003, for a detailed 
discussion), since the participants in this study were not involved in the criminal justice 
system, the criteria for inclusion were based more closely on those in use in health and 
social care services. 
Criteria for inclusion 
All the participants in the studies reported in this thesis were adults (i. e. at least 18 years 
old), and were verbally fluent in English. 
The participants with a learning disability were selected as an `administrative' sample 
and everyone was attending designated day services. For practical reasons, it was not 
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possible to obtain detailed developmental histories or information about their current 
social functioning. However, `proxy' measures of these criteria were obtained by asking 
prospective participants whether: 
a) they had attended a mainstream secondary school or had any academic 
qualifications; and 
b) they were living independently. 
In addition, intellectual functioning was assessed using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale - Revised (WAIS - R, Wechsler, 1981), which was the standard test at the time 
the studies were carried out. Based on the upward shift in the IQ of populations over 
time (Crawford, Gray and Allen, 1995), a significant impairment of intellectual ability 
was operationalised as a (complete or pro-rated) Full Scale IQ score < 75. To try to 
ensure that participants were people with mild, rather than severe, disabilities, 
individuals who scored zero on one or more of the sub-tests of the WAIS-R were not 
involved further: in practice, this meant that everyone had a Full Scale IQ score >_ 55. In 
summary, then, the participants with learning disabilities: 
" were attending designated day services for people with learning disabilities; 
" had not attended mainstream secondary schools and did not have any academic 
qualifications; 
" lived with their parents or were supported by paid carers; 
" had Full Scale IQ scores < 76 and > 54. 
To fulfil the criteria for inclusion in a `general population' comparison group, used in 
some of the studies, prospective participants had not to be attending day- or residential- 
provision for people with a learning disability and had to have a tested Full Scale IQ 
score of >_ 80 on the WAIS-R. 
2.4.2 PARTICIPANT SELECTION AND RANDOMNESS 
Since different participants sometimes took part in different studies, their details are 
given separately for each study. A summary of the participants' 
involvement in different 
studies is shown as Appendix 2. 
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The participants were a convenienoe sample, comprising men and women who were 
colleagues or acquaintances or attended day or residential services which were willing to 
support the studies; in this sense, the sample was not `truly random'. 
2.4.3 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Ethical approval for each of the studies was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the 
Institute of Psychiatry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUTION AND LEGAL 
RIGHTS PRESENTED IN THE NOTICE TO DETAINED 
PERSONS 
Under PACE, suspects receive oral information about the caution and legal rights. They 
are also offered standardised written information in the form of a `leaflet', Form 3053, 
the Notice to Detained Persons. This was introduced with the Codes of Practice (Home 
Office, 1985b, 1991,1995a, 2002a, b). In 1991, the original version of the leaflet was 
amended slightly, primarily to incorporate the material about the right to legal advice 
previously provided separately by the Law Society. In 1995, the leaflet was amended 
again. This new version reflected the introduction of the new caution but there were no 
other changes to the wording, and the format has remained unchanged since. In the 
written leaflet, the caution is reiterated, as is the basic information about the three rights 
(the right to have someone informed of the arrest, to consult a solicitor, and to consult 
the Codes of Practice), which are then also explained in more detail. The fourth right - 
the right to a copy of the Custody Record - is also outlined and explained. 
The caution and rights are of legal and practical significance. Breaches of Code C of the 
Codes of Practice are often taken seriously by the courts in deciding upon the 
admissibility of evidence (see Ch. 1.5). These legal judgements reflect the practical 
importance to detained persons of the caution and legal rights (Baldwin, 1992; 
Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Leng, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston 
et al., 1993; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998) in protecting them from 
inadvertently making self-incriminating statements. 
According to Gudjonsson (1992a, 1993,1994,1999), one of the `psychological 
vulnerabilities' of people with mild learning disabilities is their impaired understanding 
of the information about the caution and legal rights presented in the Notice to Detained 
Persons. The purpose of this chapter is to report three small experimental studies 
intended to examine this issue. During the course of the investigations, there have been 
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three different versions of the Notice to Detained Persons, each presenting a different 
form of the caution and/or the legal rights. For clarity, these are invariably referred to as: 
1. Original: the version which was introduced in England and Wales on 1st January, 
1986, and remained in use until 31st March, 1991; 
2. Revised: the version which was introduced on 1st April, 1991, and remained in 
use until 31st March, 1995; 
3. Current: the version which was introduced on 1 st April, 1995 and is currently in 
use. This is identical to the Revised version, except that it includes a new form of 
the caution, introduced to accompany the modification of the right to silence. The 
current caution was preceded by a Draft which was proposed but was not 
introduced. 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
3.1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION 
Unless people understand the information given to them about the caution and their 
legal rights, they will not be able to make an informed decision about whether to request 
the safeguards which are intended to protect suspects. Theoretical analyses of the 
abilities involved in making valid legally-significant decisions about the person (such as 
whether to give or withhold consent to a healthcare intervention or a sexual relationship) 
have suggested that understanding of information relating to the decision is necessary, 
though not sufficient (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and Appelbaum, 
1998; Law Commission, 1995). 
However, it has been argued that `understanding' is a term whose `meaning is fuzzy and 
imprecise' (Kintsch, 1998, p. 2). In the past, it has been regarded as comprising both the 
comprehension of information and its relevance to a particular situation (Buchanan and 
Brock, 1989; Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). More recently, however, theoretical 
analyses, supported by both case law and empirical evidence, have made a distinction 
between these two senses of the word (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Glass, 1997; 
Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995; Lord Chancellor's Department, 
1999; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1994). Now, the use of `understanding' is 
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restricted to the ability to `comprehend the fundamental meaning of information' 
(Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988, p. 1636). 
Comprehension of the meaning of information involves complex psychological 
processes. Grisso and Appelbaum (1998) have proposed that: 
`(f)irst the information must be received as presented, a process that is influenced 
not only by sensory integrity, but also by perceptual functions such as attention 
and selective awareness. Whatever is received then undergoes cognitive 
processing and is encoded in a manner consistent with the person's existing fund 
of information and concepts, which in turn influences how, and how well, the 
message is recorded and stored in memory' (ibid., p. 38). 
According to this account, which is supported by others (Keeley, 1995; Coles, Freitas 
and Tweed, 1996), knowledge can be assessed by asking a person simply to reproduce 
information, but the assessment of understanding requires the individual to demonstrate 
that more complex processing has taken place. 
A number of psychological methodologies, drawing from earlier work on the assessment 
of educational achievements, have been devised, particularly by Grisso and his 
colleagues in the U. S. A., for eliciting understanding of information relevant to legally- 
significant decision-making. These methodologies include: 
" paraphrased recall of the information, presented in its entirety and/or as discrete 
elements (Fulero and Everington, 1995; Grisso, 1981; Grisso and Appelbaum, 
1991,1998; Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey and Fletcher, 1995; Gudjonsson, 1990a, 
1991 a; Hoge et al., 1997); 
" paraphrased recall of single key words (Fulero and Everington, 1995; Grisso, 
1981); 
" identification of sentences as the `same' as or `different' from those in the 
information (Grisso, 1981; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1991; Hoge et al., 1997); 
" questionnaires (Gudjonsson et al., 1993); 
" structured and semi-structured interviews (Arscott, Dagnan and Stenfert Kroese, 
1998,1999; Morris et al., 1993), 
" non-verbal demonstration (Wong et al., 2000). 
Each of these methodologies has particular strengths and weaknesses: for example, 
paraphrased recall may underestimate comprehension because of its dependence on 
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skills in verbal expression; in contrast, identifying sentences requires very limited verbal 
skills but does not necessarily require people to understand information. To minimise 
this problem, large research studies, such as those of Grisso and Appelbaum and their 
colleagues (e. g. the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, Grisso et al., 1995; the 
MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study, Hoge et al., 1997) have used multiple 
indicators of the same abilities. For everyday use, however, much less elaborate 
assessment measures have had to be devised (e. g. the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool-Treatment, Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998). 
Grisso and Appelbaum's (1998) summary suggests that understanding involves several 
skills. Individuals whose intellectual functioning has not yet developed fully (children 
and young people) or is impaired, temporarily or permanently, as a result of a mental 
disorder may be at particular risk of impairments in their understanding. A number of 
studies have investigated this hypothesis in relation to the caution and legal rights, or 
their equivalent, in particular jurisdictions. 
3.1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUTION AND 
LEGAL RIGHTS 
The pioneering study of understanding of the legal rights was carried out in the U. S. A. 
by Grisso (1981) who investigated adolescents' waivers of the Miranda rights. The 
Miranda rights take their name from a famous case - Miranda v. Arizona, 384, U. S. 436 
(1966) - in which the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that suspects must be provided with 
certain information before being interviewed formally by the police (and at other stages, 
not of concern here). Though no standardised version has been developed, this 
information must advise suspects of. (i) the right to silence; (ii) the potential use of any 
statement as evidence in court; (iii) the right to legal advice; and also (iv) that this legal 
advice is free of charge. Confessions are only admissible in court if a) the suspect has 
received this information, and b) has `waived', or relinquished, the safeguards which it 
provides `voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently'. 
In contrast with England and Wales, where the suspects must request their legal rights, 
in the U. S. A. it seems to be assumed, following Miranda, that the rights will be 
exercised. It may be surprising, then, that about half of all adult suspects waive their 
right to silence (42%, Seeburger and Wettick, 1967, cited in Grisso, 1986). Based on the 
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criteria adopted by the courts in making decisions about the validity of these waivers, 
Grisso (1981) developed a set of tasks, using well-standardised and operationalised 
methodologies, for assessing understanding and appreciation of the version of the rights 
used in Missouri. 
One of the tasks involved paraphrasing each of four Miranda items, as they were 
presented in turn (the Comprehension of Miranda Rights, CMR; see also Grisso, 1986). 
Grisso (1981) compared the performance on the CMR of adult offenders (aged at least 
17 years), living in rehabilitation hostels, and non-offenders (since there were no 
differences between the groups, their data were combined, N=260) with that of young 
people (N=43 1) held in custody following alleged or proven `felonies' (serious 
offences). Intellectual ability was prorated from the Vocabulary, Similarities, and Block 
Design sub-tests of the adult or child versions of the Wechsler scales (Wechsler, 1955, 
1974): the mean IQ of the two adult groups combined was 89.9 (s. d. 13.0), and 86 (s. d. 
16.3) for the adolescents. 
Two findings are of particular importance here. First, overall, about one quarter (23.1 %) 
of the adults demonstrated inadequate understanding of at least one of the four items, as 
did more than half the adolescents (55.3%). For both groups, understanding was not 
related to experience of arrest. Secondly, at all ages, performance was significantly 
related to intellectual ability. The most intellectually disadvantaged persons (IQ <_ 70) 
demonstrated the poorest level of understanding. The extent of this impairment was very 
striking: the mean scores of the least able adults were no better than those of 10-12 year 
olds of average ability (Grisso, 1981). 
A second task required the same participants to explain the meaning of key words (the 
Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary, CMV, see also Grisso, 1986). Most of the 
words (e. g. `consult', `attorney') are exclusive to the U. S. A. but the word `right' occurs 
in both the Miranda items and the information presented orally and in the `Notice to 
Detained Persons' in England and Wales. This was presented as: 
`Right. You have the right to vote' (Grisso, 1981, p. 238) 
followed by a question in the form: `Can you tell me more about what right means? ' or 
`How do you mean ---? ' (ibid. p. 238). Fewer than half (43.1%) the adults, and only 
one quarter (26.7%) of the juveniles provided adequate definitions: the majority seemed 
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not to understand that it provided a safeguard for them but was merely something which 
was `allowed'. Consistent with the CMR results, understanding of a `right' was 
significantly related to intellectual ability, with the most intellectually disadvantaged 
participants again performing most poorly. 
More recently, the tasks developed by Grisso (1981) have been used by Fulero and 
Everington (1995) to examine understanding of the Miranda rights among two groups 
of adults with learning disabilities. The first group (N=29), the `non-offenders', had all 
received diagnoses of `mild to moderate mental retardation' (ibid., p. 536; no data on 
intellectual ability provided) and were attending specialist day-services; 10 per cent had 
convictions for minor offences. The second group (N=25), the `offenders', had similar 
diagnoses (mean Full Scale IQ scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, 
WALS-R, Wechsler, 1981: 65 (no other details given)) and had all received probation 
orders following a conviction for a criminal offence; 96 per cent had been convicted 
previously. 
As expected, on the measures of understanding described, the performance of both the 
groups of people with learning disabilities was poorer than that of both the adolescents 
and the adults in Grisso's (1981) study. The extent of their impairment was very 
striking. On the Comprehension of Miranda Rights, the overwhelming majority (90%) 
of the `nonoffenders' and two-thirds (68%) of the `offenders' were unable to 
demonstrate adequate understanding of one or more of the rights. Similarly, the majority 
of both the `nonoffenders' (83%) and the `offenders' (56%) were unable to offer any 
reasonable explanation of the `rights' item of the Comprehension of Miranda 
Vocabulary. At odds with Grisso's (1981) original findings, the participants who were 
on probation performed slightly better than their `nonoffender' counterparts. Though 
this might reflect their greater experience of the criminal justice system, an alternative 
explanation, proposed by Fulero and Everington (1995), though without any assessment, 
is that individuals who had proceeded through the criminal justice system were more 
intellectually advantaged. 
Other studies have drawn on Grisso's (1981) methodology to investigate understanding 
of the safeguards for suspects in particular jurisdictions. Cooke and Philip (1998) 
carried out an assessment of the Scottish caution. Though there is no standardised 
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wording in Scotland, legally it must contain the same key elements as the pre-1995 
caution in England and Wales. In other words, suspects should be advised prior to 
interviewing of their right to silence, and the potential for what they say to be used as 
evidence. Understanding of the caution was assessed among 100 young offenders (mean 
age: 18 years, range: 16-21 years), imprisoned following conviction. The mean pro-rated 
IQ of the sample was 87 (range: 64-123). Despite the confidence of the participants 
(89% of whom claimed to understand the caution completely), only one in ten (11 %) 
paraphrased the information correctly when it was presented in its entirety; almost a 
quarter (24%) demonstrated no understanding. Similarly poor levels of understanding 
were shown on tasks which were adapted from those devised by Grisso (1981). Again, 
as expected, understanding throughout correlated with intellectual ability, but not with 
the number of self-reported police interviews or criminal offences. 
Grisso's (1981) tasks have also been adapted to assess the information presented to 
suspects in Canada (the Test of Charter Cautions, Olley and Ogloff, 1993). Though the 
Canadian safeguards are rather different from those of England and Wales (see 
Whittemore and Ogloff, 1994), intellectual ability and education were correlated with 
understanding; experience of the criminal justice system (imprisonment on remand or 
following sentencing) was not. 
The main results of all these studies are consistent. As expected from reports of clinical 
cases (Gudjonsson, 1992a; Stricker, 1985), they indicate that, regardless of experience 
of contact with the criminal justice system, understanding of the caution and rights is 
associated with intellectual ability but cannot be assessed accurately by self-report. The 
implication is that, as Gudjonsson (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) suggested, impaired 
understanding of the caution and the legal rights may be a `psychological vulnerability' 
for people with learning disabilities. 
However, though people who are intellectually disadvantaged appear to have more 
serious difficulties understanding their rights as suspects, their problems need to be seen 
in the context of apparently widespread difficulties among the general population 
participants in Grisso's (1981) study. This suggests that the information on the Miranda 
rights may simply be too difficult. Theoretical analyses of decision-making emphasise 
that a test of understanding is inadequate unless the information relevant to the 
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particular decision has been presented in everyday terms (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988, 
1995; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995, para. 3.18; Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 1999) that is, in `broad terms and simple language' (s. 2 (3), 
draft Bill on Mental Incapacity, Law Commission, 1995). 
In the present context, the implication of the phrase `in broad terms and simple 
language' is that it is not acceptable to provide information in the Notice to Detained 
Persons which is too difficult for people of average intellectual ability. In order to 
develop appropriate strategies to assist people with learning disabilities who come into 
contact with the criminal justice system as suspects, it is important to know whether the 
information itself is too complex. 
The first study to investigate the complexity of the Notice to Detained Persons was 
carried out by Gudjonsson (1990a, 1991a). He examined the original version (Home 
Office, 1985b) in two ways. First, using an objective measure, the Flesch Formula 
(Flesch, 1948), which had been used previously for legal (Sherr, 1986) and medical 
(Ley, 1977) materials, he analysed the `Reading Ease' of the four paragraphs explaining 
the rights in detail (i. e. excluding the caution). Though there was some variation 
between the different paragraphs, overall they appeared very complex, with an average 
score of 50 ('difficult') on a scale from 0 (`very difficult') to 100 ('very easy'). Using 
Ley's (1977) translation of the index, a crude estimate would be that a Full Scale IQ 
score of at least 111 would be needed to understand the original NDP fully. Fewer than 
one person in four of the general adult population would be expected to understand it in 
its entirety. 
Since factors apart from the complexity of the language in which the leaflet is written 
might influence comprehension in everyday life, Gudj onsson (1990a, 1991a) 
supplemented the objective analysis with an exploratory experimental assessment of 
understanding among convicted offenders (N=15; mean Full Scale IQ: 82; range: 63 to 
98). All were attending in-patient or out-patient forensic mental health services and 
none had seen the original version of the NDP before. Understanding was assessed 
using a version of the paraphrased recall developed, independently, by Grisso (1981). It 
has been suggested (Coles et al., 1996) that: 
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`asking people to rephrase or put in their own words a given statement is an 
excellent method of determining whether they understand what was said to them, 
rather than merely knowing or remembering the words spoken to them' (ibid., p. 
189). 
Each sentence was understood by a mean of just over half (59%) of the participants. 
Though apparently `most' (Gudjonsson, 1991 a, p. 93) of the participants understood the 
right to legal advice, only one person (with a Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) of 91 and a specific 
interest in legal materials) demonstrated understanding of all eleven sentences. As 
expected from the studies in other jurisdictions (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Grisso, 1981; 
Olley and Ogloff, 1993), understanding was very significantly correlated with 
intellectual ability. Importantly, given its legal significance, the caution was not 
explained adequately by the two people who were most intellectually disadvantaged 
(FSIQs of 63 and 68 respectively). 
The findings of Gudj onsson's (1990a, 1991 a) study suggested that the information in the 
original NDP was so complex that people with learning disabilities might have difficulty 
using it to safeguard themselves during police detention and interviewing. 
3.2 STUDY 1: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE NOTICE TO DETAINED 
PERSONS 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Though some of the participants in Gudjonsson's (1990a, 1991a) investigation were 
intellectually disadvantaged, none of them was a person with a mild learning disability, 
as defined in Ch. 2.4.1 of this thesis. Whilst there was some clinical case material 
(Gudjonsson, 1992a), no empirical data were available relating to knowledge and 
understanding of the caution ('if you are asked questions about a suspected offence you 
do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you do say may be given 
in evidence') and legal rights among this group of persons. 
Drawing on theoretical analyses (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Coles et al., 1996; 
Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995), in order to understand 
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information relevant to a particular decision, an individual must have that information 
available. Knowledge, assessed through the person's ability to remember what he or she 
has been told, or recall, therefore forms an essential part of understanding. In the present 
context, people will not be able to exercise their rights if they cannot recall them. The 
first aim of this study (which was initially reported as Clare and Gudjonsson, 1991) was 
to compare the effectiveness of access to the material on the second page of the original 
NDP in terms of improving knowledge among people with mild learning disabilities and 
their counterparts in the general population. However, since recall does not require any 
sense of the meaning of the material, it may over-estimate understanding. The second 
aim was to compare understanding of the information. 
Given other studies (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; Grisso, 
1981; Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Olley and Ogloff, 1993), it was expected that: 
(i) compared with their `general population' counterparts, people with mild 
learning disabilities would benefit less from access to the information; and 
(ii) on both knowledge and understanding, the performance of the participants 




The original version of the NDP is shown as Appendix 3a. The wording is repeated in 
the key to Figure 3.2.1. 
Participants 
There were two groups of volunteer participants, all of white British origin, drawn as 
convenience samples: 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised 15 men and 5 women, all of whom 
fulfilled the criteria for inclusion (see Methodological Considerations, Ch. 2.4.1). 
General population: the GP group comprised 11 men and 9 women. All were in paid 
employment, mostly as hospital staff. All had prorated Full Scale IQ scores >_ 80 and 
none was receiving support from learning disabilities services. 
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Though they were not asked directly, as far as was known, none of the participants had 
been arrested by the police since the introduction of PACE or had had any previous 
exposure to the NDP. 
Measures 
1. Intellectual functioning: to minimise the duration of testing, Full Scale IQ was 
prorated from the eight sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised 
(WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981) with the highest correlations with Verbal IQ 
(Information, Vocabulary, Comprehension, Similarities) and Performance IQ 
(Picture Completion, Picture Arrangement, Block Design, Object Assembly), 
respectively. 
2. Reading ability: since people are reluctant to admit to literacy problems (Charnley 
and Jones, 1979), reading ability was assessed using the Neale Analysis of 
Reading Ability (Neale, 1978). Given the complexity of the material, a criterion 
raw Reading Accuracy score of 95/100 (i. e. a reading accuracy age of 12 years 5 
months) was set. This criterion is well above the 9 year level considered adequate 
for functional literacy in the UK (Dalglish, 1982). If participants did not achieve 
this level, the material in the NDP which suspects would normally read for 
themselves (the second page) was read to them. 
3. Knowledge of the caution and legal rights: knowledge of the NDP was assessed 
through recall or paraphrasing of the thirteen items of information contained in the 
headings and explanatory paragraphs of the second page. These items are listed in 
the key to Figure 3.2.1. One point was given for each item which was recalled or 
paraphrased correctly. 
The effectiveness of the NDP was assessed by comparing knowledge before 
(Initial Knowledge) and after (Knowledge After) access to the information. 
4. Understanding of the caution and legal rights: a questionnaire, involving 
`yes'/'no' questions was devised, to be read to the participants after recall. 
Initially, the questionnaire comprised 20 items, balanced to control for 
acquiescence (Heal and Sigelman, 1995; Sigelman, Budd, Spanhel, and 
Schoenrock, 1981a; Sigelman, Budd, Spanhel, and Schoenrock, 1981b; Sigelman, 
Schoenrock, Spanhel, Hromas, Winer, Budd, and Martin, 1980). Informal piloting 
65 
with people with mild learning« disabilities indicated that the questionnaire was too 
long and some of the questions were poorly worded. 
The final questionnaire comprised only eight questions, drawn from the responses 
of the most disadvantaged participants in Gudjonsson's (1990a, 1991a) study and 
the informal piloting. The questions related to the main aspects of the key issues: 
understanding the caution, and the rights of the detained person to have someone 
informed of his/her arrest and to consult a solicitor. Only three could be devised 
which were correctly answered by `no' so it was made clear to participants that a 
`don't know' response was acceptable. The questions, with the correct responses 
in brackets are given below (under Figure 3.2.2). One point was given for each 
question answered correctly. 
Procedure 
Each participant was assessed individually, in a quiet room at his or her place of work or 
day-service. First, the test of reading ability was administered. Next, the participants 
were invited to report whatever they knew of the caution (explained as `what the police 
say to you if you are arrested') and the rights in police detention ('what you are able to 
do if you are arrested and the police make you stay at the police station'). The caution 
and the information which the Custody Officer would normally present orally (the first 
page of the NDP) was then read aloud to each person. Then, participants who fulfilled 
the criterion for reading accuracy were allowed to take as much time as they wished to 
study the material intended for suspects to read for themselves (the second page of the 
NDP). Otherwise, this second page was read aloud to them. 
The assessment of intellectual ability was then begun. Approximately 30 minutes after 
the presentation of the NDP, the participants were asked to recall whatever they could of 
the caution and rights. Then the questions relating to understanding were read and the 




Table 3.2.1 shows the mean scores, standard deviations and ranges for chronological 
age, Full Scale IQ and Reading Accuracy raw scores. The mean scores were compared 
statistically using the t-test (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Whilst the mean chronological ages of the two groups did not differ significantly, the 
mean prorated Full Scale IQ and Reading Accuracy of the `learning disabilities' group 
were, as expected, both significantly lower than those of the `general population' group. 
Table 3.2.1 Characteristics of the `Learning disabilities' and `General 
population' groups 
Learning disabilities General population t-value 
Mean s. d. range Mean s. d. range 
Chronological age 30.3 9.4 18-50 27.5 7.3 20-48 1.1 °. S. 
Full Scale IQ 65.0 5.3 57-75 99.8 7.2 83-111 16.8* 
Reading accuracy 
raw scores 
38.2 31.4 0-98 98.6 1.5 95-100 8.6* 
No. of participants 20 20 
°. S. not significant (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 2-tailed, 
df=38) 
* significant at p<0.001 (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 
1-tailed, df =3 8) 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Effect on knowledge of access to the NDP 
Table 3.2.2 shows the number of participants in each group who recalled each item of 
information after access to the NDP. Performance was compared using the Chi-square 
test (see Appendix 7 for details). All but six items were recalled by significantly fewer 
of the LD group. 
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Figure 3.2.1 shows the percentage of participants in the two groups who correctly 
recalled, or paraphrased, each item of information before, and following, access to the 
NDP. Clearly, the LD group has less baseline knowledge of the information. As 
expected, though, access to the NDP was less effective for this group than their GP 
counterparts. For each item, Initial Knowledge and Knowledge After access were 
compared using Binomial tests (see Appendix 7 for details). For the participants with 
learning disabilities, there were significant improvements on only two items (C and G), 
compared with six items (C, E, F, G, J, L) for the `general population' participants. 
Nevertheless, on more than half the items (54%), access to the NDP did not improve 
knowledge among even the general population group. 
Understanding of the information in the NDP 
Figure 3.2.2 shows the percentage of participants in each group who responded correctly 
to the each of the questions. All but one question (question 6) was answered correctly by 
fewer of the LD participants than their GP counterparts. 
The lower part of Figure 3.2.2 shows the number of participants in each group who 
responded correctly to each question. Responses to each question were compared using 
the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details). Four questions (1,2,4,8) were 
answered correctly by significantly more of the general population participants. With 
two exceptions (questions 1 and 6), the responses of the `general population' group were 
at, or near, `ceiling' . 
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Table 3.2.2 Knowledge of the caution and legal rights after access to the NDP 
No. of 
participants 
who recalled x' value 
Fisher 




A: If you are asked questions about a suspected 7 15 6.46* 
offence you do not have to say anything. 35% 75% 
B: What you say may be given in evidence. 9 18 9.23 
45% 90% 
C: You have the right to have someone 10 20 13.34*** informed of your detention. 50% 100% 
D: You may on request have one person known 0 3 0.12 °. S. 
to you, or who is likely to take an interest in 0% 15% 
your welfare, informed at public expense as 
soon as practicable of your whereabouts. 
E: If the person you nominate cannot be 2 14 15.00*** 
contacted you may choose up to two 10% 70% 
alternatives. 
F: If they (the two alternatives) too cannot be 0 10 13.34*** 
contacted the Custody Officer has discretion 0% 50% 
to allow further attempts until the 
information has been conveyed. 
G: (You have) the right to legal advice. 15 20 0.024* 
75% 100% 
H: You may at any time consult and 1 4 0.17 °. s. 
communicate privately, either in person, in 5% 20% 
writing or on the telephone, with a solicitor. 
I: Under certain circumstances both of the 0 2 0.24 n. s. 
above rights may be suspended for a limited 0% 10% 
period in accordance with the Codes of 
Practice. 
J: A copy of the Codes of Practice governing 1 15 20.45*** 
police procedures will be made available to 5% 75% 
you on reuest. 
K: You do not have to exercise any of the 1 2 0.50 n. s. 
above three rights (i. e. C, G and J) 5% 10% 
immediately. 
L: A record of your detention will be kept by 0 10 13.34*** 
the Custody Officer. When you leave police 0% 50% 
detention or are taken before a Court, you or 
your legal representative shall be supplied 
on request with a copy of the Custody 
Record as soon as practicable. 
M: This entitlement (to the Custody Record) 0 4 0.053 n. s. 
lasts for 12 months after your release from 0% 20% 
prison. 
°. S. not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 Of = 1) 
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Figure 3.2.1: Knowledge of the caution and the rights among each group before 
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Except, for the parts in brackets, the wording is that of the information on the second page of the 
Notice to Detained Persons 
A: If you are asked questions about a suspected offence you do not have to say anything. 
B: What you say may be given in evidence. 
C: You have the right to have someone informed of your detention. 
D: You may on request have one person known to you, or who is likely to take an interest in 
your welfare, informed at public expense as soon as practicable of your whereabouts. 
E: If the person you nominate cannot be contacted you may choose up to two alternatives. 
F: If they (the two alternatives) too cannot be contacted the Custody Officer has discretion to 
allow further attempts until the information has been conveyed. 
G: (You have) the right to legal advice. 
H: You may at any time consult and communicate privately, either in person, in writing or on 
the telephone, with a solicitor. 
I: Under certain circumstances both of the above rights may be suspended for a limited period 
in accordance with the Codes of Practice. 
J: A copy of the Codes of Practice governing police procedures will be made available to you 
on request. 
K: You do not have to exercise any of the above three rights (i. e. C, G and J) immediately. 
L: A record of your detention will be kept by the Custody Officer. When you leave police 
detention or are taken before a Court, you or your legal representative shall be supplied on 
request with a copy of the Custody Record as soon as practicable. 
M: This entitlement (to the Custody Record) lasts for 12 months after your release from police 
detention. 
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Question: 1234 5 6 78 
No. and % of 
partic ipants 
who correctly 2 value 
Fisher 
KEY answered each 
x exact 
The questions were as follows question prob. 
(correct response in brackets): 
LD GP 
n=20 n=20 
1. Does the police caution meant that you 3 14 12.38*** 
have to tell the truth? (No) 15% 70% 
2. Are you allowed to refuse to answer the 12 20 0.0016** 
police questions? (Yes) 60% 100% 
3. If you answer the police questions, can 16 20 0.053 °S 
your answers be used against you in 80% 100% 
court? (Yes) 
4. Do the police generally tell your 8 18 10.99*** 
family/people who care about you where 40% 90% 
you are without you asking them to? (No) 
5. If you do not have any money to pay for 16 20 0.053 "S 
the `phone call, will the police still `phone 80% 100% 
someone to let them know where you are? 
(Yes) 
6. Do you need a solicitor if you are 16 15 0.50 n. s. 
innocent of the crime about which you are 80% 75% 
being questioned? (Yes) 
7. If you do not know the name of a 18 20 0.24 "S 
solicitor, but you ask for someone, will 90% 100% 
the police find a solicitor for you? (Yes) 
8. If a solicitor comes to the police 11 19 8.53** 
station to speak to you, will s/he tell 55% 95% 
the police everything that you have 
said to him/her? (Yes) 
" not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (df = 1) 
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3.2.4 DISCUSSION 
Though it was expected that access to the NDP would have less impact on knowledge 
and understanding of the caution and legal rights of people with mild learning 
disabilities than on their general population counterparts, the extent of their 
`psychological vulnerability' was very striking. 
Having started with extremely limited knowledge of the caution and legal rights, on six 
of the thirteen items their knowledge did not improve at all, or apparently decreased, 
after access to the NDP. Moreover, recall of items which are repeated (such as the 
caution) was no better than those presented on only one occasion. This suggests that the 
material was so complex for people with learning disabilities that simple repetition, 
even under relaxed conditions, was inadequate; it may even have been confusing. The 
only two items on which there were significant improvements (the right to inform 
someone of detention and the right to legal advice, see Fig. 3.2.1) were those which 
were recalled by all the `general population' participants, supporting Gudjonsson's 
(1990a, 1991a) suggestion that some parts of the leaflet were easier than others. 
Nevertheless, one in five of the participants with learning disabilities did not know even 
the bare fact of the right to legal advice. 
The findings of the questionnaire to elicit understanding of the information in the NDP 
need to be treated cautiously. The proportion of participants with mild learning 
disabilities who answered correctly with a negative response was generally low. This 
cast doubt on the group's apparent understanding of the other questions (for example, 
question 6, see Figure 3.2.2). Their responding on these questions may have reflected 
their susceptibility to acquiescence (Heal and Sigelman, 1995; Sigelman et al., 1980; 
Sigelman et al., 1981a, b). The responses of the `general population' participants place 
further doubts on the questionnaire. Theoretically (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988; Coles 
et al., 1996; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Keeley, 1995), it is more cognitively 
demanding to understand the meaning of material than simply to recall it. Yet, despite 
the limited recall of the information, all but two of the questions were answered 
correctly by all, or almost all, the group. It is most likely that the content of the 
questionnaire, much of which corresponded closely with the content of the NDP, 
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required only recognition, an easier-task than reproducing information (Lezak, 1995). 
These problems suggested that the questionnaire needed further development. 
Nevertheless, the results supported Gudjonsson's (1990a, 1991a) study and are 
consistent with both Grisso's (1981) initial study and subsequent investigations of the 
safeguards in other jurisdictions (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; 
Olley and Ogloff, 1993). Knowledge of the information among the participants with 
learning disabilities was very poor, even when the impact of their reading difficulties 
was avoided. However, their difficulties need to be seen in the context of the rather 
limited impact of the NDP on the `general population' group. Few of them recalled all 
the details which suspects would need to understand in order to exercise their rights 
fully (for example, only 10 per cent of the group stated that the first three rights do not 
have to be exercised immediately (Item I on Fig. 3.2.1)). 
These findings suggested that the information presented in the NDP, like the Miranda 
rights in the U. S. A. (Grisso, 1981), may be too complex for its intended purpose. In fact, 
based on Gudjonsson's (1990a, 1991a) study, and before Study 1 was even completed, 
the Home Office announced (Dyer, 1990) that the NDP would be reviewed as part of the 
revision of the Codes of Practice (Home Office, 1991). 
3.3 STUDY 2: UNDERSTANDING OF THE REVISED NOTICE 
TO DETAINED PERSONS 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The revised version of the Notice to Detained Persons was introduced in April, 1991. 
Minor changes were made to the first page, which the Custody Officer would read out: 
the most important of these was that the caution, which was unchanged, was now 
written out in full. More extensive amendments were made to the second page, which 
the suspect would read for him or herself. The page still contained four sections, 
outlining each of the rights, but was expanded from ten to twenty-four sentences. The 
sections were labelled in the same way, with one exception: `The right to legal advice' 
was changed to `Free Legal Advice', and expanded (from two to fourteen sentences) to 
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reflect the amended content which emphasised that legal advice at the police station was 
free of charge. Minor amendments were made to the other three rights so that they 
provided further information. 
Since it was intended that the revised NDP would be easier to understand than the 
original, Gudjonsson repeated his analysis of the complexity of the second page, using 
the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948). Though some sections had been simplified 
considerably (for example, the right to legal advice) others, in particular the right to 
consult a copy of the Codes of Practice, were actually more difficult (Gudjonsson, Clare 
and Cross, 1992). Overall, the revised version was less complex, but only marginally: 
the `Reading Ease' had been improved from 50 to 56. According to Flesch's (1948) 
description, it remained `fairly difficult'. These findings suggested that the information 
was still very complex, particularly for people with mild learning disabilities. 
The second part of the same study (which was initially reported as Gudjonsson, Clare 
and Cross, 1992) was an exploratory investigation to compare understanding of the 
information in both sections of the NDP among people with mild learning disabilities 
and their peers in the general population. It was expected that the performance of the 




The revised NDP is shown as Appendix 3b. The wording is repeated in Table 3.3.3. 
Participants 
There were two groups of volunteer participants, all of white British origin, drawn as 
convenience samples: 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised 8 men and 5 women, all fulfilling the 
criteria for inclusion (see Methodological Considerations, Ch. 2.4). Their Full Scale IQ 
scores were prorated from eight sub-tests of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), as described 
for Study 1. 
74 
General population: 12 men and 5 women formed the GP group. They comprised 
teachers, hospital staff, and people without paid employment. All had prorated Full 
Scale IQ scores _> 
80 and none was receiving support from learning disabilities services. 
All participants were asked whether they had seen the revised Notice to Detained 
Persons; none stated that he or she had done so. 
The chronological ages and Full Scale IQ scores of the two groups are shown in Table 
3.3.1. The mean scores were compared statistically by calculating t values, which are 
given in the last column. There was a significant difference between the Full Scale IQ 
scores, but not the chronological ages, of the two groups. 
Table 3.3.1 Characteristics of the `Learning disabilities' and `General population' 
groups 
Learning disabilities General population t-value 
mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
Chronological age 32.7 9.8 23-50 31.1 10.1 22-58 0.413 ns 
FSIQ 64.7 4.1 57-73 98.6 11.2 88-128 10.04 
No. of participants 13 17 
°. S. not significant (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 2-tailed, 
df = 28) 
* significant at p<0.001 (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 
1-tailed, df = 28) 
Measures 
Two measures of understanding were used: 
1. Paraphrased recall of the caution and legal rights as discrete elements: the entire 
revised NDP was read aloud to the participants, who were also able to study their 
own copy. This enabled those taking part to become familiar with the material. 
They were then asked to explain the meaning of each sentence in turn as it was 
read out to them. This method avoids the confounding effects of reading 
difficulties to which, Study 1 suggested, participants are reluctant to admit. It also 
avoids the problems in verbal memory (Gudjonsson, 1988a; Martin, West, Cull 
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and Adams, 2000) experienced by people who are intellectually disadvantaged. As 
it was, all participants had the maximum possible exposure to the information. 
2. Questionnaire: an eight-item `yes'/'no' questionnaire was devised. Given the 
problems described in the previous study, the items were changed. Though still 
focussed primarily on the caution and the right to legal advice, an attempt was 
made to (i) simplify the structure of the questions; (ii) improve the accuracy of the 
questions (for example, the police can tell the Court anything which is said to 
them by a suspect, not simply, as in the version in Study 1, the answer to 
questions); (iii) remove complex legal terminology, such as `innocent' and 
`caution'; (iv) delete other words which appeared too difficult (such as `refuse'); 
and (v) limit the number of items correctly answered by `yes' in order to address 
the apparent tendency to acquiescence of people who are intellectually 
disadvantaged (Heal and Sigelman, 1995; Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 
1981 a, b). The questionnaire is shown in the bottom part of Figure 3.3.1. 
Procedure 
Participants were seen individually in a quiet room at their place of work, home or day- 
service. Most of the participants in the `general population' group were assessed by Ms. 
Philippa Cross, who was funded as a Research Assistant by the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, and whom I trained in the use of the tests. I assessed the remaining 
participants in this group, and all those in the LD group. 
The assessment of intellectual ability was carried out first. Then, the paraphrased recall 
task of understanding was carried out. All the participants attempted to carry out the task 
and the responses were written down verbatim. Finally, the questionnaire was presented 
orally. 
Scoring 
Typed transcripts of the responses were prepared. A three-point scoring system was 
devised, based on the Vocabulary sub-test of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981) and the 
Comprehension of Miranda Rights (Grisso, 1981). Two points were given for a 
response demonstrating understanding of all the ideas in a particular sentence; one point 
was given where understanding was partial; no point was given where there was no 
evidence of understanding. The responses were scored independently, by me (Rater A), 
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and by Professor Gudjonsson (Rater B) who had not been involved in the testing. 
Examples of the scoring are given in Table 3.3.2 below. 
Since partial explanation of a sentence (i. e. a 1-point response) did not seem to indicate 
understanding of the meaning of a particular sentence, the 0 and 1 point scores were 
combined into a single category ('no understanding'). For the calculation of inter-rater 
reliability, therefore, unweighted Kappa coefficients (Bartko and Carpenter, 1976) were 
used. This stringent, chance-corrected, measure provided an average Kappa coefficient 
of 0.862 (s. d. 0.08; range: 0.72-1.00). Arguably (Streiner and Norman, 1995), a Kappa 
coefficient of this magnitude is `almost perfect' (Landis and Koch, 1977). Given the 
very high level of inter-rater agreement, participants were treated as having understood a 
sentence if either rater gave a 2-point score. 
Table 3.3.2 Examples of the scoring by Rater A and Rater B of participants' 
paraphrased recall (possible scores: 0,1 or 2 points, depending on the 
adequacy of the explanation) 
Sentence Participant's response 
Rater A Rater B 
score score 
1. Evidence, yeah. It means you must not give 
evidence unless you are spoken to by the 0 0 
police. 
6. You're allowed to speak to a solicitor 24 
hours a day. 2 2 
15. They might have to question you without a 
solicitor. 1 1 
21. For example, if you, say, name a person 
and they're not there, you can tell them to 2 2 
ask person b or c. 
26. If you do give samples, they have them 
back as quickly as possible. 0 0 
27. When you're brought into the station, all 
records on you will be kept. 1 1 
29. The Custody Record only lasts 12 months 
after your release. 0 1 
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3.3.3 RESULTS 
Two analyses were carried out. 
Paraphrased recall 
Table 3.3.3 shows the percentage of participants in each group who were judged, by one 
or both raters, to have demonstrated understanding of each sentence by paraphrasing or 
explaining its meaning correctly. 
As expected, understanding of the revised NDP was much poorer among the 
participants with learning disabilities than their general population counterparts. 
Performance was compared using the Chi-square test or the Fisher Exact test, as 
appropriate (see Appendix 7 for details). On 21 of the 29 sentences (72%), 
understanding was demonstrated by significantly fewer of the LD group than their GP 
counterparts. There was very considerable variation in understanding of different 
sentences. However, again, the GP group also found much of the information hard to 
paraphrase. Indeed, not one single sentence was explained correctly by all the group. 
Questionnaire 
Figure 3.3.1 shows the number and percentage of participants in each group who 
responded correctly to each question. 
Performance was compared using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details). Three 
questions (3,4,7) were answered correctly by significantly more of the `general 
population' participants. Nevertheless, there were only four items to which all the GP 
group responded correctly. 
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Table 3.3.3 The number and percentage of LD and GP participants who 
understood each sentence fully (i. e. were allocated a2 point response 
by Rater A or Rater B) 






1. If you are asked questions about a 1 12 11.87*** 
suspected offence, you do not 8% 71% 
have to say anything unless you 
wish to do so, but what you say 
may be given in evidence. 
2. You have the right to speak to an 1 9 0.011 
independent solicitor free of 8% 53% 
charge. 
3. You have the right to have 2 11 7.30** 
someone told that you have been 15% 65% 
arrested. 
4. You have the right to consult the 0 9 0.0017** 
Codes of Practice covering police 0% 53% 
powers and procedures. 
5. You may do any of these things 1 10 0.0049** 
now, but if you do not, you may 8% 59% 
do so at any time whilst detained 
at the police station. 
6. You can speak to a solicitor at the 3 9 2.74 °7 
police station at any time, day or 23% 53% 
night. 
7. It will cost you nothing. 7 14 0.099 °. s. 
54% 82% 
8. Access to legal advice can only 0 8 0.0042** 
be delayed in certain exceptional 0% 47% 
circumstances. 
9. If you do not know a solicitor, or 3 11 5.13 °. S 
cannot contact you own solicitor, 23% 65% 
ask for the duty solicitor. 
10. He or she has nothing to do with 3 15 13.03** 
the police. 23% 88% 
11. Or you can ask to see a list of 3 12 6.65** 
local solicitors. 23% 71% 
12. You can talk to the solicitor in 1 11 9.98** 
private on the telephone and the 8% 65% 
solicitor may come to see you at 
the police station. 
13. If the police want to question 2 12 9.02** 
you, you can ask for the solicitor 15% 71% 
to be there. 
continued ... 
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Table 3.3.3 continued 
14. If there is a delay, ask the police 2 9 0.040 °. S. 
to contact the solicitor again. 15% 53% 
15. Normally, the police must not 2 7 0.13 °. S 
question you until you have 15% 41% 
spoken to the solicitor. 
16. However, there are certain 0 7 0.0096** 
exceptional circumstances in 0% 41% 
which the police may question. 
you without a solicitor being 
present 
17. If you want to see a solicitor, tell 5 13 4.43 °. S. 
the Custody Officer at once. 38% 76% 
18. You can ask for legal advice at 2 10 5.79* 
any time during your detention. 15% 59% 
19. Even if you tell the police you do 5 13 4.43 * 
not want a solicitor at first, you 38% 76% 
can change your mind at any time. 
20. You may on request have one 1 5 0.16 °. S. 
person known to you, or who is 8% 29% 
likely to take an interest in your 
welfare, informed at public 
expense as soon as practicable of 
your whereabouts. 
21. If the person you name cannot be 0 12 15.29*** 
contacted you may choose up to 0% 71% 
two alternatives. 
22. If they too cannot be contacted 0 8 0.0042** 
the Custody Officer has discretion 0% 47% 
to allow further attempts until the 
information has been conveyed. 
23. This right can only be delayed in 0 9 0.0017** 
exceptional circumstances. 0% 53% 
24. The Codes of Practice will be 0 14 20.14*** 
made available to you on request. 0% 82% 
25. These Codes govern police 0 14 20.14*** 
procedures. 0% 82% 
26. The right to consult the Codes of 0 9 0.0017** 
Practice does not entitle you to 0% 53% 
delay unreasonably any necessary 
investigative and administrative 
action, neither does it allow 
procedures under the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 requiring the 
provision of blood or urine 
specimens to be delayed. 
27. A record of your detention will be 2 9 0.040* 
kept by the Custody Officer. 15% 53% 
continued ... 
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Table 3.3.3 continued 
28. When you leave police detention 0 6 0.021 
or are taken before a Court, you 0% 35% 
or your legal representative or the 
appropriate adult shall be 
supplied on request with a copy 
of the Custody Record as soon as 
practicable. 
29. This entitlement lasts for 12 0 11 0.0002*** 
months after your release from 0% 65% 
police detention. 
°. S. not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (df = 1) 
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Figure 3.3.1 Correct responses by each group to the questions about the caution 
and legal rights 
Percentage of 








Question: 1234 5 6 78 
No. and % of 
participants 
who correctly x'` Fisher 
KEY answered value exact 
The questions were as follows (correct each qu estion prob. 
response in brackets): 
LD GP 
n=13 n=17 
1. Do you have to answer the police 10 16 0.201's 
questions even if you don't really want to? 77% 94% 
(No) 
2. If you say anything to the police and your 9 17 0.026* 
case goes to Court, can the police tell the 69% 100% 
Court what you've said to them? (Yes) 
3. Is it true that you only need a solicitor if 5 17 0.0002*** 
you've done the crime you're being 38% 100% 
questioned about (i. e. you're guilty)? (No) 
4. Do you need money in order to have a 8 17 0.009** 
solicitor to help you at the police station? 62% 100% 
(No) 
5. If you ask the police to tell your family or 12 16 0.69 n s. 
someone who cares about you that you're 92% 94% 
at the police station, will they normally 
contact them? (Yes) 
6. Do you have to give the police money 10 17 0.070 n 
.s 
before they'll contact someone who cares 77% 100% 
about you? (No) 
7. If you say anything to the police, do you 2 12 
have to tell them the truth? (No) 15% 71% 9.02** 
8. if you don't want a solicitor to help you or 10 16 0.20 n' 
someone told that you're at the police 77% 94% 
station straightaway, are you allowed to 
change your mind later? (Yes) 




As expected, understanding of the information on the caution and legal rights in the 
revised NDP was much more limited among people with mild learning disabilities than 
their counterparts in the general population. 
The extent of the `psychological vulnerability' of the `learning disabilities' group was 
very striking. Eleven of the twenty-nine (37.9%) sentences were not paraphrased 
correctly by a single participant with learning disabilities (Table 3.3.3). The only 
sentence which was explained correctly by more than half the group (54%) was `it will 
cost you nothing' (sentence 7, Table 3.3.3). Only 8 per cent of the participants provided 
an accurate explanation of the information about the caution which Custody Officers 
would normally present orally (sentence 1). Similarly, only 8 per cent paraphrased 
correctly the right to legal advice (sentence 2). 
Though paraphrased recall is verbally demanding, the poor performance of the 
participants with learning disabilities did not seem simply to reflect the methodology. 
With a single exception (question 5, see Fig. 3.3.1), which was worded so that it was 
answered correctly by a `yes', meaning that acquiescent responding could not be 
excluded, the questionnaire responses were consistent with the paraphrased recall. They 
suggested that even factual items were not well understood (for example, fewer than 
two-thirds (62%) of the `learning disabilities' participants provided a correct answer to 
question 4 (about whether legal advice is free)). The most difficult question was 
question 7, about whether to tell the police the truth; fewer than one in six (15%) of the 
participants with learning disabilities responded correctly to this item. A similar 
question, differently worded, was asked in Study 1 (see question 1, Fig. 3.2.2), and was 
also answered correctly by a low proportion of the group. This suggests that, even when 
people with learning disabilities understand the meaning of information, they may be 
naive about its significance; this issue is returned to in Ch. 4. 
Again, however, the poor performance of the `learning disabilities' group has to be seen 
in the context of the limited understanding of their peers in the general population. 
Though this group included two people whose intellectual ability lay in the Superior 
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range (with Full Scale IQ scores of 125 and 128, respectively, and both university 
graduates), no one paraphrased all 29 sentences correctly. Fewer than three-quarters 
(71%) of the group explained the meaning of the caution satisfactorily; similarly, only 
just over half (53%) demonstrated understanding of the right to a solicitor. Whilst most 
of these participants responded correctly to the `factual' questions about their rights, like 
their counterparts with learning disabilities they experienced difficulty in responding to 
the question requiring some awareness of the functions of the safeguards; fewer than 
71% answered this item correctly (similar to the 70% correct response to an almost 
identical question in Study 1 (Ch. 3.2)). 
These findings were consistent with Gudjonsson's (Gudjonsson et al., 1992) analysis 
using the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948) suggesting that, overall, the second page of the 
revised NDP was only marginally easier than the original version. Indeed, some of the 
sentences in the revised version appeared very difficult to explain (for example, 
sentences 16 and 26, Table 3.3.3), particularly for people with learning disabilities. 
Though this study involved only a small number of participants, it supported 
Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) suggestion that people with learning 
disabilities may be `psychologically vulnerable' because of their limited understanding 
of the information presented orally by Custody Officers and presented in writing in the 
NDP. The only change made to this NDP has been an amendment to reflect the 
introduction of the current caution (Home Office, 1995a). 
3.4 STUDY 3: UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUTION IN THE 
CURRENT NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The final study relates to the current caution which was introduced following the 
modification of the right to silence under the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994. 
A model for a caution which would reflect the modification was already provided by 
Northern Ireland, where the right to silence had been modified in 1988. The version used 
in that jurisdiction reads: 
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`(y)ou do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but I must warn you 
that if you fail to mention any fact which you rely on in your defence in court, your 
failure to take this opportunity to mention it may be treated in court as supporting 
any relevant evidence against you. If you do wish to say anything, what you say may 
be given in evidence' (Justice, 1994, p. 13). 
Research commissioned by Justice (1994) into solicitors' (N=12) perceptions of suspects' 
understanding of this caution led to the following conclusion: 
`(i)t was the unanimous view of the solicitors interviewed that suspects do not 
understand the caution under the Order when it is read out to them by the police and 
that only a small minority, estimated at around 5%, actually appreciate its 
significance. This is despite the fact that clients will usually claim that they have 
understood it when asked' (ibid., p. 14). 
Despite this discouraging conclusion, the draft version of the new caution for England and 
Wales, prepared by the Home Office in 1994, was worded in a similar way to the one 
already in use in Northern Ireland. The draft comprised 60 words and read as follows: 
`(y)ou do not have to say anything. But if you do not mention now something which 
you later use in your defence, the court may decide that your failure to mention it 
now strengthens the case against you. A record will be made of anything you say 
and it may be given in evidence if you are brought to trial' (Bennetto, 1994). 
As part of a larger study, Gudjonsson and Clare (1994) compared understanding of this 
draft among a small group of men and women (n=18) with mild learning disabilities who 
fulfilled the criteria for inclusion in this thesis (mean Full Scale IQ on the WAIS-R: 68; 
s. d.: 5.46; range: 61-75) with that of sixth form students (n=45, aged 17-18 years), 
preparing for two or more `A' levels and thought to be of at least average intellectual 
ability. As expected from the poor understanding of the caution in Study 2 (see Ch. 3.3), 
the draft was extremely difficult for the participants with learning disabilities. Using 
paraphrased recall as a measure of understanding, none of this group explained the caution 
correctly when it was presented in its entirety, as it would be in real 
life. Even when the 
task was simplified by asking participants to explain each sentence as it was read out in 
turn, only 2 (11%) individuals with learning disabilities correctly paraphrased all three 
sentences. However, the `A' level students also found the information problematic. Fewer 
than one in ten (7%) explained the caution in its entirety and only about half the group 
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(58%) demonstrated understanding of all three sentences presented separately. The second 
and third sentences appeared particularly problematic. 
This small study suggested that the draft caution was far too complex, even for people 
who were intellectually able. As was concluded in a comment on the research, the 
`caution must surely win the gobbledegook award of 1994' (Leader, The Guardian, 7th 
December, 1994, p. 23). More importantly, as the Law Society and Bar Council submitted, 
the wording misrepresented the meaning of s. 35 of the Criminal Justice & Public Order 
Act 1994. A refusal to answer questions does not strengthen the prosecution case but 
merely weakens that of the defence (Wasik and Taylor, 1995). Following these concerns, 
the 60-word draft was withdrawn. Subsequently, the Home Office produced a new 
version, the current caution. This is given in the following words: 
(y)ou do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not 
mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything 
you do say may be given in evidence (Home Office, 1995a, C. 10.4). 
Minor variations in the wording are permitted (Home Office, 1995a, C. 10.4). In 
addition, if it appears that a suspect does not understand the caution, police officers are 
enjoined to explain it in their own words (ibid., Note IOC). Detailed guidance is 
available (National Crime Faculty, 1996, pp. 68-69) about the elements to be included in 
such an explanation. 
A study of understanding among the general public (Shepherd, Mortimer and 
Mobasheri, 1995) suggested that the current caution is very complex. Though the report 
is confusing, it appears that, even when the presentation was simplified, less than half (a 
maximum of 40%, N= 109) the participants explained all three sentences correctly. Of 
particular concern, and consistent with the research for Justice (1994), many people 
believed, incorrectly, that they understood its meaning. However, the use of participants 
who were stopped on the street and may not have been concentrating on the task, 
together with the absence of clear criteria for scoring the responses, means that it is 
possible that the findings underestimated the level of understanding. 
Unlike Studies 1 and 2 (see Ch. 3.2 and Ch. 3.3), this study (which was initially reported 
as Clare. Gudjonsson and Harari, 1998) did not involve people with mild 
learning 
disabilities. Developing the findings of Shepherd et al. (1995), the investigation 
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focussed on the adequacy of the caution as a possible safeguard for the `ordinary' 
person. The aims were two-fold: 
(i) investigate understanding of the current caution among three groups: `A' 
level students, adults in the general population, and police officers. From 
previous studies, it was expected that understanding would be better among 
the students, who were intellectually advantaged, than their adult 
counterparts. Since police officers are obliged to explain the caution to 
suspects who seem not to understand the information, their understanding 
was also examined. Given their professional familiarity with the 
information, it was expected that the police officers would perform better 
than both the other groups; 
(ii) to examine whether the current version is less complex than the draft. Since 
the current caution is briefer, and was prepared in response to concern about 
the draft, it was expected that it would be simpler. 
3.4.2 METHOD 
Participants 
There were three groups, all of whom were either of British origin or spoke English 
fluently, recruited as convenience samples: 
Students: this group comprised 72 young people (mean age: 16 years 6 months; range: 
16-19 years), studying for two or more 'A' levels at the same college as the participants 
in Gudj onsson and Clare (1994), though they had not taken part in the previous study. It 
was expected that all the students were of at least average intellectual ability, and most 
expected to attend university. Though, in order not to be intrusive, they were not asked 
about any arrests or convictions, it was expected that they would have, at most, limited 
experience of the criminal justice system. 
General population: the group comprised 15 men and women (mean age: 40 years 2 
months; range: 21-59 years), recruited by advertising, and paid for their participation. 
The three sub-tests (Vocabulary, Comprehension and Picture Completion) of the WAIS- 
R (Wechsler, 1981), used by Gudjonsson et al. (1993), provided an estimate of overall 
intellectual ability. The mean Full Scale IQ of the group was within the Average range 
(94.9; s. d.: 12.5; range: 78-119). Since the group was already very small, two people 
with Full Scale IQ scores below 80 were included. None of the participants had attended 
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a `special' school in childhood or was attending or had attended services for people with 
learning disabilities. Two people volunteered that they had been arrested since April, 
1995, but in neither case had they apparently proceeded to court. 
Police officers: the 21 men and women (mean age: 31 years 6 months; range: 21-50 
years) in this group were attending courses at their county constabulary's training 
college. The mean length of service was 7 years 6 months (range: 1-20 years): six were 
probationer constables, one was the sergeant in charge of the group; the remainder were 
detectives. The caution had been introduced six months earlier and all the participants 
stated that it was familiar. However, it was not known whether any of them had received 
formal training in investigative interviewing (the P. E. A. C. E. course; National Crime 
Faculty, 1996) which should have provided detailed knowledge of its elements. 
Measures and Procedure 
Since the paraphrased recall methodology has already been described (see Ch. 3.3.2), 
the Measures and Procedure are combined here. Understanding of the current caution 
was assessed in two ways: 
1. Entirety: the entire caution was read aloud slowly, and clearly, to the participants. 
The caution was presented to the students in their classes by Mr. Philippe Harari, 
their teacher, whom I had trained and had already been involved in the 
presentation of the draft version (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1994). I presented the 
caution to the police officers (who were seen in their classes) and to the `general 
population' group (who were interviewed individually). Each person was asked to 
explain the meaning of the caution (in writing for the students and police officers; 
orally for the 'general population' group) in his/her own words. 
2. Sentence by sentence (discrete elements): each person was then given a written 
copy of the current caution. Each sentence was read out in turn and participants 
were asked to explain its meaning. Again, the 'student' and 'police officer' groups 
were asked to write down their explanations; those of 'general population' group 
were given orally and written down verbatim. 
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3.4.3 RESULTS 11 
Rating of the responses 
Based on the intended meaning of s. 34 of the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 
1994 (Wasik and Taylor, 1995), which has not been amended by subsequent legislation 
(the Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act 1999), criteria for scoring each of the three 
elements were developed and discussed with Ms. Sheila James, solicitor, at the 
Metropolitan Police Service. Using the guidance for investigative interviewing 
(National Crime Faculty, 1996, pp. 68-69) to assist in the interpretation of the criteria, 
each sentence, or part of each sentence, containing an element of the caution was rated: 
as `correct' if the sense of the element was explained accurately or implied strongly, or 
as `incorrect'. Table 3.4.1 shows examples of my ratings and those made independently 
by the solicitor and Inspector Brian Roberts (Metropolitan Police Service). 
Whilst the two members of the Metropolitan Police Service agreed completely with 
each other, in a very few cases they disagreed with me: invariably, they were less 
generous. The discrepancies were discussed until the interpretation of the criteria was 
agreed. I then rated the complete set of responses again. As a check, the independent 
raters reviewed a small sample; again, their interpretation of the criteria was stricter. 
Since it was important not to underestimate the participants' understanding of the 
caution, they agreed that a more liberal interpretation was acceptable. Where there was a 
disagreement of this sort, the most positive rating was invariably used for analyses. 
Three analyses were carried out. 
Understanding of the current caution when presented in its entirety 
Figure 3.4.1 shows the proportion of participants in each group who correctly explained 
each sentence, and all three sentences, of the caution presented in its entirety. 
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Table 3.4.1 Examples of the rating of participants' explanations of the current 
caution were rated. For each element of the caution, a score of 1 
('correct') or 0 ('incorrect') was given 





You don't have to say anything. Anything you Element 1: 1 Element 1: 1 
say may be used for evidence in court. If you Element 2: 1 Element 2: 1 
don't say something now but you do if your Element 3: 1 Element 3: 1 
case goes to court, then the court may decide 
you should have said and your case may be 
affected by it. 
Although you have the choice to say nothing, Element 1: 1 Element 1: 1 
if you do so and then mention something in Element 2: 1 Element 2: 0 
court, you could harm your defence. Element 3: 0 Element 3: 0 
Don't have to say anything. But there may be Element 1: 1 Element 1: 1 
later implications in a court of law if you Element 2: 0 Element 2: 0 
withhold information Element 3: 0 Element 3: 0 
If you do not wish to say anything you do not Element 1: 1 Element 1: 1 
have to. If I have a recollection or story and I Element 2: 0 Element 2: 0 
don't give it, it could be held against me. If I Element 3: 1 Element 3: 0 
do say anything it's evidence either to my 
good or detriment 
If you are aware of something and you fail to Element 1: 1 Element 1: 1 
mention it, it may be held against you if you Element 2: 0 Element 2: 0 
later appear before a court, but you still need Element 3: 0 Element 3: 0 
not answer any questions. 
As expected, understanding of the caution was most limited among the `general 
population' participants, and least limited among the police officers. Statistical analysis 
using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details) showed that, overall, the `A' level 
students' performance was not significantly different from that of adults in the `general 
population'. The second sentence was the main source of difficulty for both groups. 
Compared with the police officers, very significantly fewer students or `general 
population' participants explained this middle sentence correctly. Nevertheless, only 
two-thirds (67%) of the police provided an adequate explanation of the meaning of the 
second sentence. Overall, only about half (48%) the police officers provided correct 
explanations of all three sentences. Statistical analysis using the Fisher exact test 
indicated that complete explanations were provided by similar proportions of 
probationer constables and more experienced officers. This suggested that length of 
service, of itself, was not helpful in understanding the caution. 
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Understanding of the current caution presented sentence by sentence 
Figure 3.4.2 shows the percentage of participants in each group who correctly explained 
the caution when it was presented sentence by sentence 
When each sentence was presented in turn, demonstrated understanding of the caution 
improved. For all three groups of participants, the first sentence was simple. However, 
the second sentence, in particular, remained difficult for the `general population' 
participants, and their performance was very significantly worse than that of the other 
two groups. More detailed analysis showed that the middle sentence was not explained 
correctly by any of the general population participants of below average intellectual 
ability (i. e. prorated Full Scale IQ score < 90). However, most of the police officers 
demonstrated understanding of all the material. The exception was the middle sentence, 
which three officers (a probationer constable, and two more experienced officers) did 
not explain correctly. 
Comparison with the draft 60-word caution (1994) 
Contrary to expectations, statistical comparison using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 
for details) showed that, when presented in its entirety, the current caution was no easier to 
explain than the draft version: understanding of all three sentences of the draft version was 
demonstrated by 7% of `A' level students (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1994); understanding of 
the current version by 8%. 
Figure 3.4.3 shows the percentage of `A' level students who explained the draft version 
and the current caution when they were presented sentence by sentence. 
Statistical analysis showed that, with the exception of the third sentence, the caution has 
not been simplified. The proportions of participants able to explain all three sentences of 
the draft and current cautions were very similar. 
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Figure 3.4.1 Proportion of participants in each group who correctly explained 










Sentence 1 Sentence 2 Sentence 3 All 3 sentences 
No. and % of participants who 
correctly explained each x2 value 
sentence, and all three 
sentences 
A-level Police 
General A-level Police students officers 
populatio students officers vs. vs. 
nn= 72 n= 21 General A-level 
n= 15 population students 
Sentence 1 4 45 19 6.48* 5.93* 
27% 63% 91% 
Sentence 2 1 13 14 Fisher exact 18.65*** 7% 18% 67% 
p=0.25 n. s. 
Sentence 3 5 48 13 5.79* 0.16 "S 
33% 67% 62% 
All 3 1 
6 10 Fisher exact Fisher exact 
sentences 
7% 8% 48% 
p=0.65 "S p=0.0002*** 
Police officers vs. General population on Sentence 3: x2 = 2.86 ". S. 
". s- not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ** *p<0.00 I (df = 1) 
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Figure 3.4.2 Proportion of participants in each group who correctly explained 
each sentence, and all three sentences, of the caution when it was 
presented sentence by sentence 
Percentage 
of participants 













Sentence 2 Sentence 3 All 3 sentences 
No. and % of participants who 
correctly explained each x2 value 
sentence, and all three 
sentences 
A-level 
General A-level Police students 
populatio students officer vs. 
n n= 72 s General 
n= 15 n= 21 population 
14 70 21 Fisher exact 93% 97% 100% 
p=0.92 °. s. 
2 48 18 14.45*** 
13% 67% 86% 
10 69 21 Fisher exact 67% 96% 100% 
p=0.003** 
2 45 18 12.08** 







p=0.60 ". S. 




Police officers vs. General population on Sentence 1: Fisher Exact p=0.42 "S 
nS. not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (df = 1) 
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Q A-level students   Police officers 
Figure 3.4.3 Percentage of A-level students who explained the proposed 60-word 
caution and the current caution when they were presented sentence 
by sentence 
Percentage 







Sentence 1 Sentence 2 Sentence 3 All 3 sentences 
No. and % of 
participants who 
correctly explained 
each sentence, and all 
three sentences 
Proposed Current x2 value Fisher 
60-word caution exact 
caution n= 72 prob. 
n=45 
Sentence 1 43 70 0.63 °S 
% 6 9 97% 
Sentence 2 2j 67 3.37 "ýSý 
8 o ý0 
Sentence 3 33 69 12.54*** 
73 % 96% 
All 3 sentences 
26 45 0.26 °. S. 
58% 63% 
°. s. not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (df = 1) 
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3.4.4 DISCUSSION 
Consistent with the findings of Shepherd et al. (1995), the results of this small study 
indicated that there are serious problems with the current caution. 
The findings from the police officers highlighted the difficulties. Though, as expected, 
their understanding was better than that of the two groups of `laypersons', nevertheless, 
when the caution was presented in its entirety, only half (48%) explained all three 
sentences correctly. Even when they were able to focus on one sentence at a time, only 
nine in ten (86%) explained it fully. The implication is that, when suspects appear 
unable to understand the caution, police officers will not always be able to provide an 
adequate alternative explanation. 
These problems were even more marked for the other two groups of participants. Under 
conditions offering the maximum opportunity to study the material, the caution was 
explained fully by only six out of ten (63%) of the students and one in ten (13%) of the 
general population participants. Even fewer demonstrated understanding when it was 
presented in its entirety, as would happen in real life. For all three groups, the middle 
sentence, which contains the information about the modification of the right to silence 
and its legal implications, presented most problems. Of particular concern, given that 
many suspects are intellectually disadvantaged (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), none of the 
`general population' participants who were of below Average ability (Full Scale IQ < 
90) explained it correctly. 
Contrary to expectations, the current caution, despite being much more succinct than the 
draft, did not appear any easier overall for the students to understand. Only the third 
sentence is significantly less complex. Admittedly, no formal attempt was made to 
ensure that the student participants matched those who took part previously 
(Gudjonsson and Clare, 1994) but both groups were studying for Psychology `A' level 
and there had been no change in the criteria for entry to the college. 
It seems reasonable 
to assume that the participants in the two studies were similar. The implication is that, 
among people with mild learning disabilities, understanding of the current version 
would be no better than that of the draft. 
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3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, three small experimental studies have been reported, relating to 
understanding of the information about the caution and the legal rights presented in the 
Notice to Detained Persons. Based on Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) 
suggestion that limited understanding of the caution and legal rights is a `psychological 
vulnerability' for people with mild learning disabilities, the purpose was to assess the 
adequacy of this intended safeguard. 
As expected, compared with their counterparts in the general population, people with 
learning disabilities have a lower level of initial knowledge, and access to the 
information has less impact on both their knowledge and their understanding. The 
findings are consistent with other studies in which the performance of people who are 
chronologically young or intellectually disadvantaged has been compared with that of 
their `average' counterparts (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; 
Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993). 
However, from a practical perspective, it is the absolute, rather than the comparative, 
performance of people with mild learning disabilities which is important. The limited 
extent of their knowledge and understanding of the information provided by the Notice 
to Detained Persons and intended to safeguard suspects is disturbing. Assuming that, 
because of their reading difficulties, many such persons would rely on the part presented 
orally by the Custody Officers, the findings suggest that even the basic information 
about the legal rights (the second and third sentences of the NDP, Table 3.3.3) would be 
explained correctly by no more than one in six persons with learning disabilities. It is a 
limitation of Study 3 (Ch. 3.4) that understanding of the current caution among this 
group was not assessed directly. Still, given the positive relationship between 
intellectual ability and understanding of the caution (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and 
Everington, 1995; Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993), and the finding that, even 
when it was presented sentence by sentence, none of the `general population' group 
could understand its meaning fully, it seems likely it would 
be too complex for 
individuals who are significantly intellectually disadvantaged. This is of particular 
concern in the light of evidence (see Ch. 7.1) suggesting that vulnerable 
`suspects', 
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including people with mild learning, disabilities, often do not receive the `Appropriate 
Adult' provision to which they are entitled. 
Consistent with Grisso's (1981) findings in the U. S. A., difficulties in recall and 
understanding of the caution and legal rights are not limited to people with mild learning 
disabilities -a group already, of course, recognised as `vulnerable'. Worryingly, all 
three studies provide evidence that, despite, as expected, some advantage for 
participants who are intellectually able or have special training, the material is still 
problematic for participants in the `general population' (job centre attenders, hospital 
staff and other people in paid employment, `A' level students, police officers). 
Unfortunately, in England and Wales, as in other jurisdictions, there are no agreed 
criteria for the acceptability of legal material (Penny Letts, personal communication, 
1999). However, recent case law and proposed legislation have suggested that 
information relevant to a particular decision should be provided in `broad terms and 
simple language' (Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1994); s. 2(3), draft Bill on 
Mental Incapacity (Law Commission, 1995). Using this standard, Study 1 (Ch. 3.2) 
suggests that, consistent with Gudj onsson's (1990a, 1991a) initial findings, the version 
of the caution and legal rights presented in the original NDP was inadequate for its 
intended purpose of safeguarding suspects. Moreover, and of particular concern, there is 
no evidence that the subsequent revisions have made the material easier. The original 
caution, which was in use until 31St March, 1995, was recalled by at least three-quarters 
(see Fig. 3.2.2) of GP participants, and was paraphrased correctly, following sentence by 
sentence presentation, by more than 2 in 3 of a similar group (71 %, see Table 3.3.3). In 
comparison, barely six in ten (63%) of the `A' level students, who were probably at of at 
least equal intellectually ability, were able to demonstrate understanding of the current 
caution. Similarly, though the use of different methodologies means that only the Flesch 
Formula (Flesch, 1948) analyses are directly comparable, and there are obviously gross 
differences between different sentences of the NDP, the responses to the assessments of 
recall of the original version and understanding of the revised version (Tables 3.2.2 and 
3.3.3) do not suggest, overall, that the accessibility of the material to `general 
population' participants has been improved substantially. 
What is it that makes the information about the caution and the legal rights in the NDP 
so difficult? First, some of the sentences which appear hardest are very long (e. g. 
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sentence 20 in Table 3.3.3 contains, 32 words). Shepherd et al. (1995), discussing the 
current caution, argue that such constructions are simply beyond the limit of working 
memory, which is itself related to intellectual ability, and to verbal functioning, in 
particular (Baddeley, 1990). However, this cannot be the only explanation: comparison 
of the draft and current versions of the caution suggests that, at least when complex 
legal concepts are involved, simply condensing the material is unhelpful (see Figure 
3.4.3). For example, across all three groups in Study 3 (Ch. 3.4), the most common 
errors involved gross misunderstanding of s. 34 of the Criminal Justice & Public Order 
Act 1994 by explaining the middle sentence as a loss of the right to silence (e. g. `if you 
don't (answer questions), your case will look bad in court') or as a warning about the 
possible adverse effects of any inconsistency between explanations given at different 
times. 
Secondly, some of the language used in the NDP seems very hard. Consistent with their 
limited ability to paraphrase some sentences, participants in Study 2 commented 
spontaneously that they were very uncertain about the meaning of specific expressions, 
such as `exceptional circumstances' (sentences 8,16 and 23, Table 3.3.3. ) and 
`investigative and administrative action' (sentence 26, Table 3.3.3). More 
fundamentally, similar to Grisso's (1981) findings on the Comprehension of Miranda 
Rights task, some of the participants, including men and women in the general 
population, reported that they did not understand the meaning of a 'right'. Their requests 
for clarification suggested that they understood the word in its sense of 'correct'. These 
comments indicate that the language used does not reflect the way in which people 
speak in everyday life. Focussing on the word `caution', Rock (1999) has investigated 
this possibility from a forensic linguist's perspective. Based on an analysis of the British 
sections of the COBUILD Bank of English (an enormous database of `naturally 
occurring' oral and written texts), she argues that understanding of the `caution' is 
impaired by common non-legal meanings and usage. In addition, even within legal 
contexts, the word itself is ambiguous: a `caution' also refers to the sanction given by 
the police to detained persons who admit to minor crimes. 
Furthermore, though it was not examined here, the layout of the NDP (Form 3053) itself 
does not appear to have been drafted in accordance with the literature on preparing text 
to maximise its accessibility (e. g. Hartley, 1978 et seq. ). Notwithstanding the reading 
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difficulties of many suspects, perhaps it is not surprising that only a minority of detained 
persons seem to read the leaflet when it is offered by Custody Officers (Gudjonsson et 
al., 1993). 
Whilst adverse inferences are no longer permissible in situations in which the suspect 
has had no access to legal advice (see s. 58 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999), understanding of the caution and legal rights, particularly the right to legal 
advice, has assumed greater importance since the introduction of the modification of the 
right to silence (Bucke et al., 2000; Zander, 1995). Yet the findings suggest that, 
consistent with the suggestion made by Gudjonsson (1992a, 1993,1994,1999), 
comprehension of the material providing the relevant information is very limited, 
particularly among people with mild learning disabilities. They would not be able to 
undertake even this initial step in exercising their rights. In the actual situation of a 
police station, suspects are unlikely to receive any help to overcome their 
comprehension difficulties. The method most often used by the police to assess whether 
a suspect has understood the caution is to ask ('do you understand? '). A series of 
consistent findings (Fenner, Gudjonsson and Clare, 2002; Grisso, 1981; Cooke and 
Philip, 1998; Shepherd et al., 1995) indicate that this strategy is ineffective, though it 
remains unclear whether people are aware of their difficulties but ashamed to admit to 
them (as suggested by one of the police officers interviewed by Bucke et al., ibid., p. 
28), or are simply misguidedly confident. A simple improvement to current practice 
would be for police officers and solicitors to ask suspects to explain the caution in their 
own words prior to any formal interviewing, with standardised measures, making fewer 
demands on verbal ability than the main methods (recall and paraphrasing) used in these 
studies should also be developed to investigate understanding. 
At the same time, since Study 2 (Ch. 3.3) and Study 3 (Ch. 3.4; and subsequent studies 
by Shepherd et at, 1995; Fenner et al., 2002) have shown that understanding of the 
caution is improved when it is presented sentence by sentence, rather than in its entirely, 
this simple and inexpensive change should be implemented. Nevertheless, the 
uncomfortable implication of Study 3 remains: even if individuals did admit to 
problems in understanding, many police officers would be unable to explain the material 
adequately. This aspect of the legal rights is simply too complex. 
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Jackson (1995) contends that legal language has an archival, not a communicative, 
function, implying that the NDP is presented merely to ensure that evidence gained 
during interviews fulfils the criteria for admissibility in court; comprehension of the 
material is irrelevant. Support for this perspective is provided by the lack of progress in 
improving the caution and legal rights, but such cynicism is not helpful in trying to 
devise practical strategies for alleviating the likelihood of miscarriages of justice 
involving people with learning disabilities. Later in this thesis, some of these practical 
strategies will be considered. First, however, another putative `psychological 
vulnerability' will be investigated. Consistent with the naivety about the adversarial 
nature of the criminal justice system displayed by some participants in their responses to 
the questionnaire measures, the possibility is explored that people with mild learning 
disabilities have greater difficulty than their peers in the general population in using 




DECISION-MAKING DURING POLICE DETENTION 
AND INTERVIEWING 
In Ch. 2, it was suggested that, whilst being detained and interviewed by the police is 
inherently stressful (Gudjonsson, 1992a; Hodgson, 1994; McConville et al., 1991; 
Irving, 1987), many suspects remain active decision-makers, attempting to generate, 
implement and evaluate strategies which will protect them from inadvertently making 
unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating statements. 
According to Gudjonsson (1992a, 1993,1994,1999), one of the `psychological 
vulnerabilities' of people with mild learning disabilities is that, compared with their 
counterparts in the general population, they may be impaired in their ability to make 
decisions which safeguard their rights. The studies reported in Ch. 3 indicate that people 
with learning disabilities may have more limited knowledge and understanding of the 
information in the Notice to Detained Persons; other relevant material may also not be 
known about or understood. Moreover, even when they are aware of, and comprehend, 
this information, they may have more difficulties than their `general population' peers in 
using it to minimise the likelihood that they will be involved in miscarriages of justice. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe an exploratory experimental study to 
investigate decision-making during police detention and interviewing by people with 
learning disabilities. 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
4.1.1 THE USE OF INFORMATION IN DECISION-MAKING 
Based on a review of the psychological literature, Irving and Hilgendorf (1980; 
Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981; see Ch. 2) have proposed that police detention and 
interviewing involves suspects in a series of complex and demanding decisions. 
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Theoretical analyses of the abilities involved in valid legally-significant decision- 
making have suggested that, whilst understanding of information relating to the decision 
is necessary (see Ch. 3.1.1), it is not sufficient (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; 
Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995; Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) 1994). Individuals need also to be able to `use' that information in order to 
make a choice. 
What does it mean to `use' information? In the U. S. A., it is now widely accepted that 
two separate abilities are involved (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1998): 
" `appreciating', or believing in, the significance to a particular situation of relevant 
information, and its implications; 
" `reasoning' about, or `weighing up', that information in order to reach a decision. 
Some important case law in England and Wales (Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 
1994; Re MB 1997) has supported a similar approach. In the Government's proposals 
for reform of the legislation relating to decision-making by adults with a `mental 
disability' (such as a learning disability; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999), however, 
appreciation and reasoning have been combined. Following the Law Commission's 
(1995) recommendation, it is proposed that an individual is able to `use' relevant 
information if he or she can `make a decision based on (that) information' (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 1999, para. 1.6). Nevertheless, for analysing the processes 
involved in decision-making, the articulated approach adopted in the U. S. A. 
(Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998), which is supported 
by the empirical evidence (Grisso et al., 1995), seems more helpful. 
Adopting the American framework, then, a suspect who is able to `use' the information 
about legal advice in the Notice to Detained Persons should understand its key points: 
that such advice might be helpful, is free of charge, and is available at any time during a 
period of police detention. More than this, though, he or she should also believe that 
such advice is applicable to his or her particular situation and understand the likely 
consequences of accessing, or not accessing, it. Gudjonsson (1992a, p. 252 ff. ) reports a 
case from the mid-1970s, in the U. S. A., which illustrates well the difference between 
`understanding' information and `using' it to make a decision, and the problems which 
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may ensue when a suspect does not, `appreciate' the significance of information about 
his or her rights. 
Peter Reilly was a suspect of above average intellectual ability, who, after a period of 
intensive interrogation, confessed to the murder of his mother. He was convicted but 
released two years later when it was found that the prosecution had suppressed evidence 
showing that he could not have been the murderer. Before he was interviewed, he had 
made a decision to waive his Miranda rights; after his release he explained why: 
`(b)ecause I hadn't done anything wrong, and this is America, and that's the way I 
thought it was' (Connery, 1977, p. 42., cited in Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 253). 
Mr. Reilly's explanation demonstrates extreme naivety about the potential consequences 
of an interrogation in a criminal justice system where there is strong political pressure to 
identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes. 
Using the same (American) framework, the second aspect of `using' information 
involves `reasoning', or weighing it up to reach a decision. This involves processing the 
information and considering the consequences and benefits of making one choice rather 
than another, so that the decision made is a `rational product' (Jones and Keywood, 
1996) of the person's value system, even if its outcome seems unwise to others. That is, 
the decision should not be based on: 
`a compulsion, the overpowering will of a third party or any other inability to act 
on relevant information' (Law Commission, 1995, para. 3.18). 
A form of `compulsion' which may be particularly relevant to suspects, given that many 
of them are substance abusers (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), is the wish to complete police 
procedures as rapidly as possible in order to alleviate symptoms of opiate withdrawal. 
Two psychological approaches to examining how information is used in decision- 
making are of particular relevance to this thesis. First, based on their theoretical 
analysis, Grisso and his colleagues (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1995; Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1995; Grisso et al., 1995) developed two research measures to investigate 
appreciation and reasoning in treatment decisions by people with mental or physical 
disorders. The first of these, the Perceptions of Disorder (POD), assesses 'appreciation'. 
It comprises a standardised interview based on a vignette relating to the participant's 
particular health problem. The interview can be scored reliably to assess two types of 
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difficulties: (i) acknowledgement of the disorder (the Nonacknowledgement of 
Disorder) and (ii) acknowledgement of the potential for benefiting from treatment (the 
Nonacknowledgement of Treatment Potential). The main part of the second measure, 
which assesses reasoning, Thinking Rationally About Treatment (TRAT), also comprises 
a vignette relevant to the participant's disorder. This is followed by a description of 
three possible treatments and their benefits and risks. Participants are asked to choose 
one treatment; a series of standardised questions is then used to elicit the reasoning 
underlying their choice. The responses are scored according to the extent to which they 
demonstrate operationalised, cognitive abilities including: a) information-seeking; b) 
consequential thinking or evidence of the use of consequences in making a choice; and 
c) the generation of consequences or the ability to think of the real-life impact of the 
risks and benefits of different forms of treatment. These detailed measures were too 
unwieldy for clinical practice and have been simplified considerably to form part of the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (McCAT-T, Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1998). 
The second, and more traditional, psychological approach is based in a different 
framework. `Subjective expected utility maximisation theories' (Luce, 1967, following 
von Neumann and Morganstern, 1947) were originally developed from mathematical 
and economic concepts to try to explain individuals' decisions in situations which are 
`risky' or uncertain (see Baron, 2000, for a detailed account). A shared feature of these 
theories is the assumption that a person uses relevant information to choose the course 
of action which, subjectively, has the 
" most desirable consequences (that is, the highest utility); and 
" highest probability of occurrence (that is, the greatest expected utility). 
Decision-making comprises a `trade-off between the perceived consequences and the 
perceived likelihood that these consequences will occur. These theories have been 
subjected to considerable criticism, primarily on the grounds that they are `normative', 
in that they present an idealised account of behaviour, rather than `descriptive' of 
everyday practice (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988). Certainly, empirical findings based 
on participants' explanations of their decision-making (for example, Baron, Granato, 
Spranca and Teubal, 1983) suggest that the process is not always either rational or 
coherent. Such findings have led to the development of more complex models for 
representing how decisions might be made (Baron, 2000). Nevertheless, it has been 
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argued that subjective expected utility maximisation theories are `essentially correct' 
(Baron, 1994, p. 316). Perhaps surprisingly, then, their application to decision-making 
by people with learning disabilities has been very limited. 
4.1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF DECISION-MAKING AMONG PEOPLE WITH 
LEARNING DISABILITIES 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that, because of the cognitive impairments which 
characterise their condition, people with learning disabilities have difficulty in making 
decisions which lead to successful problem-solving (see review by Ferretti and Cavalier, 
1991). Though based in cognitive tasks which are rather unrelated to everyday life, a 
substantial body of experimental evidence supports this assumption. Compared with 
their counterparts in the general population, people with learning disabilities have 
greater difficulties in both generating novel problem-solving strategies and applying 
previously learned strategies spontaneously (see Ferretti and Cavalier, 1991). Moreover, 
those strategies they do attempt to apply are less likely to result in successful solutions 
(for example, Bray, Saarnio, Borges and Hawk, 1994; Bray, Saarnio and Hawk, 1994; 
Ferretti, 1994). 
Until recently, however, there were few experimental attempts to examine decision- 
making by people with learning disabilities in everyday life. An early study, informed by 
the theoretical and empirical work of Grisso and Appelbaum and their colleagues in the 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988 et seq. ), was 
carried out by Morris et al. (1993). Ability to consent to each of three hypothetical health 
care treatments which were presented through vignettes, was compared, using an 
interview, among two groups with putative `mild' or `moderate' learning disabilities 
(intellectual ability was not tested formally) and their peers in the general population 
(N=15 in each group). Consistent with the studies of understanding of the caution and 
legal rights, or their equivalent (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; 
Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993), the `learning disabilities' groups were much less 
likely than the `general population' group to appear able to give or withhold consent. In 
addition, compared with their peers, people with learning disabilities demonstrated much 
greater understanding of factual information about the interventions (e. g. the procedure) 
than of issues relating to their rights (for example, the possibility of making a free choice, 
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and respect for a refusal of treatment by a competent adult). Indeed, some participants with 
learning disabilities seemed bewildered by the idea that they be allowed autonomy. 
Similar findings have been obtained when the decision has involved a health care 
intervention of clinical significance to the participant (Wong et al., 2000). As expected, 
compared with their counterparts in the general population, significantly fewer of the 
men and women with mild learning disabilities (N=20, pro-rated Verbal IQ: 60.2, s. d. 
8.8, using the WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981) were judged able to give or withhold consent 
to the intervention. Similarly, whilst methodological differences precluded direct 
comparison with their `learning disabilities' counterparts in the earlier study by Morris 
et al. (1993), the pattern of responses indicated that, among this group, understanding of 
factual information (such as the procedure involved) was better than appreciation of its 
significance to the participant's health. 
Despite different methodologies and theoretical frameworks, the findings of the studies 
by Morris et al. (1993) and Wong et al. (2000) are consistent with those of the arcane 
experimental investigations (Bray et al., 1994a, b; Ferretti, 1994; see Ferretti and 
Cavalier, 1991; Jenkinson, 1993): compared with their `general population' peers, 
people with learning disabilities are more likely to have difficulties making decisions. In 
addition, there is substantial evidence that the most intellectually disadvantaged 
participants generally experience the greatest difficulties (Arscott et al., 1998,1999; 
Gudjonsson, Murphy and Clare, 2000; Gunn, Wong, Clare and Holland, 1999; Morris et 
al., 1993). 
All these studies highlight the importance of cognitive abilities in making decisions. 
Consistent with a `descriptive' approach (Bell et al., 1988), affective factors may also be 
relevant, particularly in the process of `using' information (Bursztajn, Harding, Gutheil 
and Brodsky, 1991). As yet, little attention has been paid to their possible role in 
decision-making by people with learning disabilities. 
An exception is a preliminary study by Jenkinson and Nelms (1994) exploring the 
strategies which people with learning disabilities use to cope with the emotional 
demands of decision-making. Ten vignettes were devised involving choices which were 
`major' (e. g. moving in with a partner against the advice of family or friends) or `minor' 
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(e. g. selecting between two enjoyable TV programmes). These were presented to a 
group with putative `mild' or `moderate' learning disabilities (N=25) attending 
designated day-services, and a comparison group of University students (N=14). 
Participants were asked to make decisions and explain their rationales and their 
responses were categorised using an established framework (Janis and Mann, 1977). 
The `learning disabilities' group were significantly less likely to provide a `vigilant' 
response, where relevant information about the options and its consequences was sought 
and considered, particularly when the decision was 'major'. Instead, consistent with the 
findings of Morris et al. (1993), they were significantly more likely to respond with 
`defensive avoidance', characterised by procrastination, attempts to get others to make 
the decision, or ready acceptance of any options offered. 
In a second study, Jenkinson (1999) investigated the impact on decision-making of 
`learned helplessness' (Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1978). 
Though conceptualised in different ways, learned helplessness among human beings 
normally comprises: a) a subjective perception among individuals that they cannot exert 
control over important outcomes, and b) corresponding impairments in these 
individuals' initiation of, and perseveration in, making decisions to solve problems. It is 
a condition which develops when people lose, or are denied, control of their own lives 
and is commonly observed in people with learning disabilities (Weisz, 1999). In 
Jenkinson's (ibid. ) study, the participants (N=48), who were known to have significant 
impairments of both their intellectual and social functioning, completed a brief self- 
report questionnaire derived from existing measures of learned helplessness. Their 
scores were used to allocate them to a `high' or `low' learned helplessness group. Four 
of the decision-making vignettes used previously (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994) were 
then presented. The reasoning given by participants for each of their choices were then 
scored by a panel, using operationalised criteria. The most relevant finding is that, for 
three of the four vignettes (the fourth seemed easy for everyone), participants in the 
`high' learned helplessness group were significantly less likely than their low-scoring 
counterparts to consider the consequences of their decisions or to seek further 
information; in Janis and Mann's (1977) terminology, they demonstrated less evidence 
of 'vigilance'. 
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Exploration of the impact of learned-helplessness on the types of decisions which adults 
may have to make in everyday life has barely started; even less is known about the 
possible effect of other affective factors. Still, Jenkinson's two studies (Jenkinson, 1999; 
Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994) and the study by Morris et al. (1993) suggest that decision- 
making involves more than cognitive abilities, particularly when it is likely to have 
major consequences and/or be legally significant. 
4.1.3 DECISION-MAKING DURING POLICE DETENTION AND 
INTERVIEWING 
Though theories of `subjective expected utility maximisation' (Luce, 1967) have not 
been used to inform studies of decision-making in everyday life by people with learning 
disabilities, they have been influential in understanding suspects' decision-making 
during police detention and interviewing. Based on their review of the psychological 
literature, Hilgendorf and Irving (1981) suggested that detained persons are in a 
situation which requires a complex series of decisions, including: 
" whether or not to seek legal advice; 
" whether to speak or remain silent; 
" whether or not to tell the truth; 
" whether to tell the whole or a part of the truth; 
" whether or not to make self-incriminating admissions including a confession. 
At each point, they suggest, the suspect's decision depends on his or her perceptions, 
however unrealistic, of a) the situation, and b) the adverse and beneficial consequences, 
for the self and/or others, of strategies for coping with this situation. 
Other frameworks for understanding decision-making during police detention and 
interviewing have also emphasised the importance of suspects' perceptions of their 
situation and its consequences. For example, the `Reid' model (Inbau, Reid and Buckley, 
1986; and see Gudjonsson, 1992a), developed in the U. S. A. by a former police officer, 
uses psychological principles to: 
" decrease the perceived adverse consequences of admissions, whether `real' (e. g. 
being charged, imprisoned) and/or `personal' (e. g. reduced self-esteem); and 
" increase the perceived benefits of denial 
in order to encourage detained persons to make self-incriminating admissions. Though 
they formed the basis of a police training manual, these techniques are essentially 
108 
coercive. Under PACE, their use now leads to confession evidence being ruled 
inadmissible (for example, in R v. Mason (Carl) 1988, s. 78 was used to appeal 
successfully against conviction on the grounds that the strength of the forensic evidence 
had been misrepresented to the suspect and his solicitor). 
Whilst the `Reid' model focusses on influencing suspects' decision-making by external 
methods, traditional psychodynamic theories (e. g. Reik, 1959; Berggren, 1975; see 
Gudjonsson, 1992a) highlight the role of internally-generated pressures. It is suggested 
that suspects make self-incriminating admissions to resolve intrapsychic conflicts between 
the perceived `costs' and `benefits' of acknowledging their behaviour. Though there are 
case reports supporting this account (Cordess and Cox, 1996), such theories do not attempt 
to explain, for example, the impact of external pressures and safeguards in facilitating and 
inhibiting self-incriminating admissions. 
Focussing specifically on the process of interviewing during police detention, Moston and 
his colleagues (Moston et al., 1992; Moston, 1996) have also drawn attention to the role of 
suspects' perceptions in their decision-making. They suggest that the range of positions 
(denial, non-committal, admitting) adopted by suspects at the start of interviews reflects 
their subjective view of the interaction between two main groups of factors, relating to (i) 
background (e. g. the type and severity of the alleged offence, the age and sex of the 
suspect); and (ii) context (e. g. the presence of legal advice, the strength of evidence). 
These factors also influence the initial strategy used by interviewers. As the interview 
develops, suspects' perceptions may change, leading to an amendment of their initial 
positions. This model, which highlights the `dynamic' (McConville et al., 1991) nature of 
an interview, has empirical support (Baldwin, 1993,1994; McConville and Hodgson, 
1993; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996). It is, however, based on questionnaires completed by 
police officers and analyses of audio-tapes of interviews (see also the work of Pearse, 
1997; Pearse et al., 1998), not directly on the accounts of men and women who have been 
interviewed. 
In contrast, suspects' accounts form the basis of Gudjonsson's (1992a) model, which 
also focusses on interviews. He suggests that suspects' self-incriminating admissions 
can be understood by examining their perceptions of its antecedents and immediate and 
long-term consequences. Expanding Hilgendorf and Irving's (1981) suggestion that a 
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range of factors is involved, both antecedents and consequences are conceptualised 
broadly, to include emotional, cognitive, physiological, social and situational events. 
This broad model incorporates the essential features of many of the other theories: for 
example, emotional events parallel the intrapsychic conflicts proposed by 
psychodynamic theorists, whilst situational events can include the external pressures 
highlighted by the Reid model. The framework has been found to be useful in 
understanding individual cases, including a proven false confession to a double murder 
(Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1994). 
Surprisingly, few empirical attempts have been made to draw directly on the accounts of 
suspects in developing models of decision-making during police detention and 
interviewing. The most important exception is a series of studies using a standardised 
questionnaire, later developed into the Gudjonsson Confession Questionnaire (GCQ, 
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1994). The GCQ has been used to examine, retrospectively, 
the decision-making of convicted prisoners who, at some time, have confessed to a crime 
(Gudjonsson and Bownes, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Sigurdsson and 
Gudjonsson, 1994,1996a, b). The data suggest that, for each suspect, the decision is likely 
to reflect an idiosyncratic combination of. 
facilitative factors: 
" external pressure (for example, fear of being locked up); 
" internal pressure (guilt, feelings of wanting help); and 
" perceived proof (the strength of evidence against the person); 
and resistance or inhibitory factors: 
" avoidance of the `real' and `personal' consequences of an admission (going 
through the criminal justice system, difficulties in self-acceptance). 
Based on Irving and Hilgendorf's model (Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981; Irving and 
Hilgendorf, 1980), the balance, for any particular suspect, between these factors is 
likely, in part, to be influenced by the impact of `individual differences' on his or her 
perceptions of police detention and interviewing. Several relevant differences have been 
identified empirically. These include: 
" demographic factors, such as age (Baldwin and McConville, 1980; Gudjonsson and 
Petursson, 1991; Soffley et al., 1980; but c. f. Moston et al., 1992); 
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" life experiences, including prev'ious convictions (Moston et al., 1992; Softley et al., 
1980; but c. f. Baldwin and McConville, 1980) and experience of custody (Pearse et 
al., 1998); and 
" personality factors, such as the extent to which societal values have been internalised 
(Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b), 
suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1984 et seq. ), and compliance (Gudjonsson, 1989a et 
seq. ). 
Though evidence from both experimental (Bray et al., 1994a; Bray et al., 1994; Ferretti, 
1994; Ferretti and Cavalier, 1991) and everyday (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et 
al., 1993; Wong et al., 2000) tasks suggests strongly that the presence of a learning 
disability may affect decision-making, its possible relevance to police detention and 
interviewing has not, so far, been investigated. 
The study reported in this chapter (see Ch. 4.3) is the only published experimental 
investigation of Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) suggestion that, compared 
with their `general population' counterparts, people with learning disabilities may be 
impaired in their ability to make decisions which safeguard their rights during police 
detention and interviewing; because of this uniqueness, it is reported in detail. First, 
however, a methodology had to be developed; this is described in the following study. 
4.2 STUDY 4: DEVELOPING AN EXPERIMENTAL 
METHODOLOGY TO EXPLORE DECISION-MAKING 
4.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Drawing on theoretical analyses (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), 1994), 
individuals need not only to understand relevant information but need also to be able to 
use it if they are to engage in valid decision-making. The framework established in the 
U. S. A. (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998) suggests 
that, in part, `using' information requires appreciating its significance of the information 
for the situation and its implications. Focussing specifically on decisions during police 
detention and interviewing, Irving and Hilgendorfls influential model (Hilgendorf and 
Irving, 1981; Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980) also emphasises the importance of 
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`appreciation'. From its background in `subjective utility maximisation theories', 
however, it is conceptualised in terms of the suspect's `perception' of the situation and 
the consequences of different coping strategies. 
A number of studies have tried to access the perceptions during police detention and 
interviewing of suspects or former suspects, using, for example: 
" audio-tapes (Moston et al., 1992; Pearse, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998); 
" interviews (Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1994); and/or 
" questionnaires (Gudjonsson and Bownes, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; 
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1994,1996a, b; Moston et a1., 1992). 
None of these studies, though, has involved experimental participants. In contrast, 
studies of everyday and/or legally-significant decisions have involved such participants. 
Mostly, they are interviewed following a (usually hypothetical) decision based on 
information presented as a vignette (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1995; Grisso et al., 1995; 
Jenkinson, 1999; Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et al., 1993). 
For present purposes, this methodology is problematic. First, vignettes, even when they 
are presented orally to minimise the impact of literacy problems, may be cognitively and 
imaginatively demanding, especially for people with learning disabilities who are more 
likely to have limited working memories (Baddeley, 1990). In addition, particularly 
when the situation is unfamiliar to participants (Morris et al., 1993), vignettes may lack 
the emotional salience of real-life decision-making (Bursztajn et al., 1991; Jenkinson, 
1999; Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994). Secondly, the focus on a single decision does not 
seem appropriate. Though a substantial empirical literature has developed round the 
issue of whether or not to make self-incriminating admissions (Baldwin and 
McConville, 1980; Gudjonsson, 1992a; Gudjonsson and Bownes, 1992; Gudjonsson 
and Petursson, 1991; Inbau et al., 1986; Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980; Moston, 1996; 
Moston et al., 1992; Pearse et al., 1998; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b; Softley et 
al., 1980), police detention and interviewing involves much more. Suspects have to 
make a series of decisions, often in rapid succession, and, especially during an 
interview, in the context of an unequal social interaction with one or more other people 
(Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981; Moston, 1996; Moston et al., 1992). 
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The purpose of this study (initially' reported as Clare and Gudjonsson, 1995) was to 
develop an experimental methodology which could be used to compare the perceptions 
during police detention and interviewing of people with mild learning disabilities and 
their `general population' counterparts. 
4.2.2 METHOD 
Developing the methodology 
Since it is `the principal investigative strategy employed by the police' (McConville et 
al., 1991, p. 56), an interview was chosen as the `event'. Ethical and practical reasons 
precluded the use of an actual police interview; material from a TV programme or 
cinema film was also excluded because it may already have been familiar to some 
participants. Finally, a decision was made to use a fictional film, specially made for this 
study. 
Initially, the `think aloud' method (van Someren, Barnard and Sandberg, 1994), an 
established means of using verbal protocols to study on-going mental processes, was 
selected as a measure of the process of decision-making. Unfortunately, informal piloting 
with people with mild learning disabilities suggested that, because it requires the ability to 
provide detailed reports of thoughts and feelings, it was too complex (see Stenfert Kroese, 
1997). Instead, a standardised, semi-structured, interview schedule was devised to present 
to participants during the film. 
Preparation of the materials 
Film: since case studies (for example, that of Peter Reilly, see Ch. 4.1.1. ) have suggested 
that detained persons' perceptions may be affected by whether or not they have committed 
an alleged offence, the film involved a true and a false confession. From discussions with 
Detective Inspector John Pearse, of the Metropolitan Police Service, and with assistance 
from a student film-maker, Mr. Dominic Harari, a `story-board' of the content was 
developed. This format was chosen because it allows detailed guidance to be given to 
actors whilst maximising their spontaneity. 
The interviewer was played by D. I. Pearse, a serving police officer with many years' 
experience of conducting interviews with suspects. The `suspect' was Mr. Robin Walton, 
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a semi-professional actor who has appeared in soap-operas and other TV programmes. He 
was recruited through a local college where he was studying drama, and paid for his 
participation. For the part, he was dressed in a paper suit of the type routinely given to 
suspects when their clothes have been removed for forensic examination. 
After permission had been obtained from the station's senior officer, the film was 
rehearsed and shot in an interview room at Greenwich Police Station, in South London. 
It was `directed' by Mr. Harari using 8 mm. professional film and two cameras to 
enhance its realism. With technical assistance from Mr. Tony Barnett, at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, and using professional equipment, it was edited onto video-tape to make it 
easier to use. Pauses were incorporated where the film was to be stopped to allow 
presentation of the interview schedule. At the end, there was a short de-briefing 
procedure (including the actors `de-roling'). The duration of the entire film was just 
over 9 minutes. 
Interview schedule: initially, items were devised in five sections, relating to the 
decisions believed to be of most importance to suspects: (i) exercising the caution and 
(ii) the legal rights; and making (iii) a true, and then (iv) a false, self-incriminating 
admission. To address concerns (see Ch. 3.2 and 3.3) about acquiescence (Heal and 
Sigelman, 1995; Sigelman et al., 1980,1981 a, b), open-ended responses were asked 
first, followed by increasingly specific questions (Brown, Egan-Sage, Barry and McKay, 
1996). Just before the de-briefing, a question was asked to establish the ecological 
validity of the film. 
Informal piloting of the film and the interview schedule was carried out with men and 
women with mild learning disabilities and challenging behaviours who were hospital in- 
patients. The findings indicated that when all the items were included, the duration of 
the pauses was too long; as a result, participants were not able to retain a clear 
understanding of the plot. In addition, the number of self-contradicting responses 
indicated that some of the questions were poorly worded. The schedule was therefore 
simplified markedly by reducing the number of items in most of the sections. Further 
informal piloting suggested that this resulted in improvements in both retention of the 
plot and the level of apparently meaningful responding. 
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4.2.3 RESULTS 
Final version of the film 
A copy of the transcript of the final version is shown as Appendix 4a. The film was 
introduced by verbal information about its context: it shows the first interview (at 
`Thamestown' police station) by a police officer ('D. I. Keith Speed') of a suspect 
('Martin James'). It is explained that the suspect has broken into a house and stolen 
some money; the interviewing officer believes that he also killed the householder. It is 
stated that this is not, in fact, true: until he was arrested, the suspect knew nothing about 
the man's death. 
As the film opens, the police officer reminds the suspect of his right to legal advice 
(which he waives) and presents the caution (the pre-1995 caution) then in use. The main 
section of the film relates to the alleged offences. Initially, the suspect denies the 
burglary but admits to it ('true confession') after he is confronted by eye-witness evidence 
of his involvement. The police officer continues by suggesting that he `knows when 
people are telling the truth' and that what the suspect has reported is `half the story'. The 
officer then reassures the suspect that he will feel `greatly relieved' when he `gets it off 
(his) chest'. In response, the suspect admits to killing the householder ('false confession'). 
Since he is distressed, the police officer terminates the interview to enable him to recover 
his composure and obtain legal advice. 
Final version of the interview schedule 
The final version of the interview schedule is shown as Appendix 4b. It contains two 
types of items: 
" factual, intended to examine participants' understanding of the situation in the film, 
and relevant information, such as the caution and right to legal advice; and 
" subjective, to examine participants' use of information through accessing their 
perceptions of the situation and its likely consequences. 
4.2.4 DISCUSSION 
Using an `iterative process' (Wright, 1988), an experimental methodology, comprising 
an interview schedule presented during pauses in a fictional film, was developed to 
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examine participants' perceptions of a police interview and the consequences of 
different coping strategies. 
Though it used a psychological approach and attempted a high level of ecological 
validity, the methodology was limited. Most importantly, the `think aloud' 
methodology (van Someren et al., 1994) originally planned for accessing participants' 
thoughts and feelings was not feasible; nor could a detailed interview be used. 
Compared with research measures, such as the POD and the TRAT (Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1995; Grisso et al., 1995), the final version of the interview schedule was 
unsophisticated. Nor, in contrast with these research measures (ibid. ), was any attempt 
made to assess its psychometric properties. At the same time, though, it remained quite 
complex. The multiple-choice verbal format of many of the items made heavy demands 
on the participants' working memories. In addition, the pilot participants seemed 
confused by the wording of some of the items. Unexpectedly, given that they seemed to 
understand `most' (as in `which of these is most likely', see for example, items 3.4,5.3, 
Appendix 4b), and the two concepts are acquired at a similar developmental age (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1969), `least' appeared particularly problematic. A possible explanation is 
that the ordering of the items, immediately after each other, was too complex. Again, 
with hindsight, pictorial aids to understanding seriation could have been used. 
Nevertheless, the findings were encouraging. Though no formal pilot study was carried 
out, informal piloting among a group of in-patients with mild learning disabilities and 
challenging behaviours, most of whom had experienced contact with the criminal justice 
system, suggested that the film was generally believed to be an actual interview. 
Moreover, some of their spontaneous remarks (for example `I wouldn't like to be him 
(the suspect)'; `he (the suspect) has got himself in a lot of trouble, hasn't he? ') indicated 
that it was emotionally salient (Bursztajn et al., 1991; Jenkinson, 1999; Jenkinson and 
Nelms, 1994; Wong et al., 2000). At the same time, their responses to the factual items 
of the interview schedule suggested that they understood the situation as it developed 
during the interaction between the suspect and the police officer. With the exception of 
the items relating to the `least' likely consequence, their responses seemed meaningful, 
suggesting that the schedule provided some access to the participants' perceptions of the 
available options and the consequences of those options. The materials seemed `good 
enough', then, to pursue the exploratory experimental study. 
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4.3 STUDY 5: PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INTERVIEWING AND 
ITS CONSEQUENCES 
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst there is now substantial evidence that, at least in some circumstances, individual 
differences may affect suspects' perceptions of police interviews (Baldwin and 
McConville, 1980; Gudjonsson, 1984 et seq.; Gudjonsson, 1989a et seq.; Gudjonsson and 
Petursson, 1991; Moston et al., 1992; Pearse et al., 1998; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 
1996b; Softley et al., 1980), so far, none of the studies has involved people with learning 
disabilities. However, their naive responses to questionnaire items about information 
available to detained persons (see Figs. 3.2.2 and 3.3.1, and Ch. 3.3.4), suggest that, even 
when men and women with learning disabilities understand relevant information, their 
perceptions of its importance in safeguarding their rights during police detention and 
interviewing may be impaired. 
Using the methodology developed in the previous study (Study 4), a preliminary 
investigation was carried out to explore perceptions of a police interview. From the 
studies (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et al., 1993) suggesting that people with 
learning disabilities may not view themselves as autonomous adults, responsible for 
their own decision-making, it was expected that, compared with their peers in the 
general population, they would be less likely to perceive the situation depicted in the 




The materials comprised the video-taped film (see Appendix 4a for copy of the transcript) 
and the interview schedule (shown as Appendix 4b), described 
in Study 4 (Ch. 4.2). 
However, given the findings of Study 4 (Ch. 4.2), items 3.5,4.3,5.4,6.3 and 8.3, asking 
participants which of the outcomes was `least likely' to take place, were omitted. 
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Participants 
Two groups of paid participants were drawn as convenience samples. Intellectual 
functioning was assessed using the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981). All the participants in the 
LD group and 12 of those in the GP group completed all the sub-tests. The remaining 
`general population' participants had been involved a previous study (see Ch. 3.3), so the 
pro-rated Full Scale IQ scores they had obtained at that time (from the eight sub-tests 
described in Ch. 3.2) were used. 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised 14 men and 7 women fulfilling the criteria 
for inclusion (see Methodological Considerations, Ch. 2.4.1). In contrast with the sample 
used for the informal piloting (see Study 4, Ch. 4.2), all of the participants lived in the 
community; none was a hospital in-patient. All except one person, who described herself 
as Asian British, were of White British origin. 
General population: the GP group comprised 8 men and 12 women, all of whom were of 
White British origin. All the participants in this group were in full-time paid employment, 
mainly as nursing staff or support workers in a hospital-based service for people with 
learning disabilities. 
Though they were not questioned directly, as far as was known none of the participants 
had been detained for interviewing by the police. 
Procedure 
Participants were seen individually in a quiet, familiar, setting, using the same video-tape 
and television equipment throughout. The WAIS-R was carried out to provide the Full 
Scale IQ of the thirty-three participants whose intellectual ability was unknown. They were 
asked to watch the video-taped film of a police interview. The film and questionnaire were 
introduced, and their understanding of the situation presented in the film was checked. The 
film was shown, with pauses for the questions. It ended with the de-briefing scene. 
Detailed notes (in most cases, verbatim) were made of the participants' responses. 
Payment was offered to all participants, though it was not accepted by any of those in the 
`general population' group. 
Since the responses to the questions about the schedule could only be valid if 
participants had understood the context of the interview, their responses to these items 
were analysed. All but one person (in the `learning disabilities' group) understood from 
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the start that the interview involved a suspect who had committed a burglary but had not 
killed the householder. Since this participant seemed to understand the situation after 
further explanation, his responses were also included. 
4.3.3 RESULTS 
Participant characteristics 
Table 4.3.1 shows the mean scores, standard deviations and ranges for chronological age 
and Full Scale IQ of the two groups. The mean scores were compared statistically by 
calculating t values, which are given in the last column. 
There was a significant difference between the Full Scale IQ scores, but not the 
chronological ages, of the two groups. 
Table 4.3.1 Characteristics of the `Learning disabilities' and `General 
population' groups 
Learning disabilities General population t-value 
mean s. d. Range mean s. d. range 
Chronological age 33 7.9 34-47 32 9.1 23-52 0.4 °. S. 
Full Scale IQ 68 5.2 60-75 102 9.0 90-118 14.4* 
No. of participants 21 20 
°. S. not significant (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 2-tailed, df 
= 39) 
* significant at p<0.001 (t-test for independent samples with equal variance, 1- 
tailed, df = 39) 
Ecological validity of the interview 
In order to assess its ecological validity, thirty-nine of the participants (by mistake, two of 
the `general population' group were omitted) were asked just before the de-briefing 
procedure about the possible origin of the film: twenty-four (62%) believed the film to be 
a video-tape of an actual interview. Compared with their `general population' peers, men 
and women with learning disabilities were significantly more likely to believe that the film 
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was real (76% of the LD group; 44%' of the GP group; x2 = 4.13, p<0.05 (2-tailed, df--1); 
see Appendix 7 for details). 
When the fifteen participants who did not believe the event to be real were asked to 
explain their responses, they reported that they: 
" thought the police officer was not sufficiently aggressive; and/or 
" believed (incorrectly) that interviews are always carried out by two officers, and/or, 
though this applied only to `general population' participants; 
" realised that ethical problems would preclude the use of an actual interview. 
No one reported that they found the actors unconvincing. 
Three analyses were carried out to examine the hypothesis underlying the study: 
" the perceived need for legal advice at different stages in the interview: at the start, 
if the suspect had not committed any crime; after the `true' confession; after the 
`false' confession; 
9 the perceived consequences of a confession to a serious crime, both immediately 
and following a conviction; 
" the perceived consequences of a false confession, in terms of the possibility of 
retracting the confession immediately, and being convicted if it was maintained in 
court. 
Perceived need for legal advice 
Table 4.3.2 shows the number of participants in each group who understood the caution 
fully (pre-1995 version; scored in the way described in Ch. 3.2). Performance was 
compared using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details). As expected from the 
findings of Study 1 and Study 2 (see Ch. 3.2 and 3.3), the caution was understood by 
significantly fewer of the participants with learning disabilities. Worryingly, of the sixteen 
participants in this group who did not understand it, only three recognised their problems 
(for example, by saying `not sure'). 
Table 4.3.2 also shows the number of participants in each group who understood that legal 
advice might be helpful during a police interview. Again, performance was compared 
using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details). Contrary to expectations 
based on 
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the previous studies (see Ch. 3.2 and Ch. 3.3), the `learning disabilities' group did not 
have a significantly poorer understanding of the benefits of legal advice. 
Table 4.3.2 Understanding of the caution and need for legal advice 
No. and % of 
participants 





Caution 5 15 * 8.79 
24% 75% 
Legal advice 
14 19 3.58 n. s. 
67% 95% 
°. S. not significant; * p<0.01 (1-tailed, df = 1) 
Figure 4.3.1 shows the number of participants in each group who thought the suspect in 
the film should have legal advice at the start of the police interview, even if he had not, in 
fact, committed any crime. Statistical analysis of the responses, using the Chi-square test 
(see Appendix 7 for details), showed that, as expected from the general hypothesis, 
significantly fewer of the `learning disabilities' group perceived a need for legal advice at 
this stage. 
However, the responses of the `LD' group who thought it unnecessary to have legal advice 
at the beginning of an interview did not suggest a lack of awareness of the right. Seven 
(64%) understood that it would be free of charge, and nine (82%; the remaining two 
people were unsure) seemed to understand its benefits, stating , 
for example: 
the police would shout at you less in an interview with a solicitor'; 
`to help him (the suspect) get out of trouble... give him some advice'. 
Their responses, though, typically: 
`not if he didn't do a crime'; or, as three participants said: 
`only if he's done a crime' 
indicated that legal advice was not required by a suspect who was being questioned about 
an offence he had not committed. 
Figure 4.3.1 also shows the proportions of participants in the LD and GP groups who 
thought that the suspect should seek legal advice after, first, making a true confession to 
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the burglary, and, then, a false confession to killing the householder. Whilst there were no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups, the pattern of responses 
differed slightly. There was a very small increase in the percentage of GP participants who 
perceived the need for legal advice after the suspect had confessed to killing the 
householder, but there was a small decrease among the LD group. 
Three participants with learning disabilities who reported that the suspect should have 
legal advice after the true confession changed their minds. Unfortunately, only one of the 
three could give an account of his response. He explained that: 
`he doesn't need a solicitor because he's making it all up about the killing'. 
Figure 4.3.1 Perceived need for legal advice for the suspect at different stages of 









  LD QGP 
No. and % of 
participants 




11 18 5.30 
Start of interview: no crime 52% 90% 
20 19 nS 
After true confession 95% 95% 
17 20 2.34 ". S. 
After false confession 81% 100% 
". s. not significant; * p<0.05 (1-tailed, df = 1) 
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Start of interview; After true After false 
no crime confession confession 
Perceived consequences of confessing to a serious crime 
Figure 4.3.2 shows the percentage of participants in each group who selected each of the 
possible outcomes as the `most likely' consequence of the suspect's (false) confession to 
killing the householder. 
Figure 4.3.2 Each group's choice of the most likely' consequence of 
maintaining a (false) confession to ki lling the householder 
Percentage 
of participants 







Allowed Remanded in Allowed home Imprisoned Some other 
home until prison until and the police without trial outcome 
trial trial 'dropping the 
case' 
No. and % of 
participants 




Allowed home until trial 8 1 4.76* 
38% 5% 
Remanded in prison until trial 10 19 8.94* * 
48% 95% 
Allowed home and the police `dropping the 1 0 ". S. 
case' 5% 0% 
Imprisoned without trial 2 0 °S 
10% 0% 
Some other outcome 0 0 n. s. 
0% 0% 
"-s- not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 (1-tailed, df = 1) 
Responses were compared statistically using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for 
details). Importantly, as expected from the general hypothesis, significantly fewer of the 
LD group thought the suspect would be remanded in prison. Conversely, significantly 
more of this group thought that, though that the suspect would have to appear in court at a 
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later date, he would be allowed home in the intervening period; more than one third (38%) 
expressed this view. 
What of the consequences of maintaining the confession and subsequently being 
convicted? Figure 4.3.3 shows the percentage of participants in each group who selected 
each of the outcomes as the `most likely' consequence for the suspect of being (falsely) 
convicted of killing the householder. 
Figure 4.3.3 Each group's choice of the most likely' consequences of a (false) 
conviction to killing the householder 
Percentage 
of participants 






Sent to prison Fined Sent to hospital Allowed home Some other 
outome 
No. and % of 
participants 




Sent to prison 18 20 1.33 "s. 
86% 100% 
Fined 1 0 °S 
5% 0% 
Sent to hospital 2 0 °S 
10% 0% 
Allowed home 0 0 ° S. 
0% 0% 
Some other outcome 0 01 °. S. 
0% 0% 
1 _j 
ns- not significant (1-tailed, df = 1) 
Contrary to expectations, almost all the participants with learning disabilities thought it 
most likely that, if convicted by a court, the suspect in the interview would be sent to 
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prison. With one exception, the remaining participants chose `being sent to hospital', a 
possibility which is realistic for people with learning disabilities (under Part III the Mental 
Health Act 1983), and demonstrates awareness that a conviction for such a serious offence 
would have major implications for the person's life. 
Perceived consequences of a false confession 
First, the likely response to a retraction of the false confession was examined. Table 4.3.3 
shows the number of participants in each group who perceived that the police officer 
would believe the suspect if he immediately retracted his confession. 
Table 4.3.3 Perceived response to immediate retraction of a false confession 
No. and % of 
participants 




Unsure 2 3 0.29 °. S. 
10% 15% 
Police officer would believe retraction 
5 1 2.90 °. S. 
24% 5% 
°. S. not significant 
In each group, similar proportions expressed uncertainty about the response. However, 
whilst the difference was not statistically significant, the LD group, as expected, were 
more likely than their counterparts in the general population to think that the suspect's 
retraction would be believed by the interviewing officer (LD group: 24%; GP group: 5%). 
Of the four participants with learning disabilities who were able to explain why they 
thought the retraction would be believed, two suggested that the police officer would not 
have been convinced by the initial confession; the remaining two indicated that it would 
be convincing because it reflected what had actually happened, that is, that the suspect 
`didn't do it'. 
Secondly, the likelihood was examined of the court being convinced by a false confession 
which was maintained. Again, similar proportions of each group reported that they were 
uncertain whether or not the suspect would be found guilty if he stated his false confession 
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in court (LD group: 19%; GP group: 20%). The most frequent explanation of this response 
was that the outcome would depend on the strength of the other evidence against him. 
However, though the difference was not statistically significant, as expected more of the 
participants in the `learning disabilities' group (29%) than of their `general population' 
counterparts (10%) reported that the court would acquit him. 
Of the six participants with learning disabilities who believed that the court would not be 
convinced by the suspect's false confession, only one person's explanation (that the 
suspect was clearly a liar because he had denied and then admitted the burglary during the 
audio-taped interview) drew on evidence which might be available during a trial. The 
other participants implied that the court had access to special knowledge, stating, for 
example, that: 
`the court would see in his face'; 
`the court would know' ; 
`they (the court) would know (he) had got confused and said something that came 
out wrong'. 
4.3.4 DISCUSSION 
Unexpectedly, the participants with learning disabilities recognised as well as their 
`general population' peers that a suspect who was guilty of a crime, and had made a 
confession to the police, might benefit from legal advice, and that a custodial sentence 
would be the most likely consequence of a conviction for a serious offence. Nevertheless, 
consistent with the hypothesis underlying the study (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris 
et al., 1993), the findings suggested that men and women with learning disabilities were 
much more sanguine about the significance and consequences of making a confession to a 
serious offence. Compared with their `general population' counterparts, they were less 
likely to believe that a suspect who maintained he had killed someone in the course of a 
burglary would be remanded in prison until his trial; conversely, they were more likely to 
think he would be allowed home. In addition, consistent with the suggestion from previous 
studies (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et al., 1993) that people with learning 
disabilities may not see themselves as autonomous adults, they were at somewhat 
increased risk both of thinking that the suspect would be believed if he retracted a false 
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confession later in the interview and, incredibly, that it would not be perceived as evidence 
of guilt even if he repeated it in court. 
The perceptions of the participants with learning disabilities were held in the context of 
very limited understanding of the caution and the right to legal advice. As expected (see 
Ch. 3), they were less likely than their peers to comprehend the pre-1995 version of the 
caution. Strikingly, however, less than one-quarter even demonstrated knowledge of this 
material. Similarly, whilst, unexpectedly, their understanding of legal advice did not differ 
from that of their peers, only two-thirds could recall any information, even in the most 
general terms, about its benefits. Arguably, people do not need to know or understand this 
material if they comprehend its practical importance in minimizing the risk of self- 
incriminating admissions (Baldwin, 1992; Leng, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; 
Moston et al., 1992; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998) and seek to 
exercise this right at the earliest possible opportunity. Unfortunately, only half (52%) of 
the participants with learning disabilities thought legal advice was needed from the start of 
the interview, even if the suspect was innocent of the crime about which he (in this case) 
was being questioned. Worryingly, only four out of five (81 %) thought this necessary after 
a false confession to a very serious offence. 
Despite the encouraging findings from the previous study (see Ch. 4.2), the methodology 
remained flawed. Reflecting their misperceptions of the nature of police interviews, only 
half the experimental participants believed the film to be realistic. More importantly, 
perhaps, only a small minority felt so emotionally involved that they asked what happened 
to the suspect after the end of the interview. Moreover, though it may affect decision- 
making (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994), for ethical reasons there was no sense for 
participants of personal threat. Arguably, then, this study shared the short-comings of 
other investigations involving hypothetical, rather than real-life, legally-significant 
decision-making (Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et al., 1993; cf. Arscott et al., 1998; 
Grisso et al., 1995, Wong et al., 2000). 
The interview schedule was also limited. Despite simplification during piloting, it 
remained complex. With hindsight, more attention should have been given to the 
possibility of simplifying the items and their presentation by using pictorial material (see 
Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994), such as, for example, some of the illustrations from the 
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books for suspects and defendants with learning disabilities (Hollins, Clare, Murphy and 
Webb, 1996; Hollins, Murphy, Clare and Webb, 1996; see Ch. 7). On some occasions, 
participants needed considerable assistance to clarify their responses. Unfortunately, 
however, no audio-tapes were made so that it was not possible to carry out any analysis of 
the extent to which the responses may have reflected the interviewer's expectations (c. f. 
Clare and Murphy, 1993). 
Still, the findings suggested that the perceptions of police interviewing and its 
consequences among people with learning disabilities may differ from those of their 
`general population' counterparts so that they would be disadvantaged in protecting 
themselves from making self-incriminating statements. 
4.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, a methodology was developed and used in an exploratory investigation 
of Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) suggestion that impaired decision-making is 
one of the `psychological vulnerabilities' of people with mild learning disabilities 
during police detention and interviewing. 
From other experimental studies (Bray et al., 1994a; Bray et al., 1994; Ferretti, 1994; 
Ferretti and Cavalier, 1991; Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994; Morris et al., 1993; Wong et 
al., 2000), it appears that the disadvantages in decision-making which people with 
learning disabilities experience reflect a wide range of factors; the study described here 
has focussed on just one. Its findings suggest that men and women with learning 
disabilities perceive a police interview and its implications differently from their 
`general population' counterparts. Perhaps because of the methodological limitations of 
the interview schedule, some of the participants with learning disabilities were unable to 
explain their responses. From those who were able to give an account, however, it seemed 
that their perceptions were most influenced by whether or not the suspect had actually 
committed the alleged offence. Indeed, it seemed that they thought that the suspect's actual 
guilt or innocence would be evident to other people, with the implication that, if he were 
innocent, he would be protected from the impact of his own admissions. How might these 
findings be explained? 
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There are at least two, overlapping, -possibilities. The first reflects the impairments of 
intellectual and social functioning which form part of the definition of a `learning 
disability'. The assumption that the truth about the suspect's (lack of) involvement in the 
house-holder's death would be self-evident to another person suggests that some 
participants had difficulties reasoning about others' mental states, that is, they had an 
impaired `theory of mind' (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; see Baron-Cohen, 
Tager-Flusberg and Cohen, 2000). It used to be thought that impairments in the 
development of a `theory of mind' (ToM) are only found among people with autistic 
spectrum disorders (Astington, 1993); clinically, none of the participants appeared to be a 
person with this condition. However, several experimental studies have now suggested 
that performance on ToM tasks is often more limited among people with learning 
disabilities than other individuals of similar `mental age' (Benson, Abbeduto, Short, 
Bibbler Nuccio, and Maas, 1993; Sodian and Frith, 1992; Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi, 
Shulman, and Pilowsky, 1996). Whilst there are methodological problems which have not 
yet been resolved (Charman and Campbell, 1997), these studies point to the importance of 
non-cognitive factors, such as the limited opportunities for social interaction available to 
people with learning disabilities in childhood and beyond (Baumeister and Kupstas, 1990; 
Koscielak, 1996; Nunkoosing and John, 1997; Richardson, 1981); further investigation of 
the impact of these factors is needed. 
The second possibility also involves non-cognitive factors. The `learning disabilities' 
participants may have experienced the learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975; Abramson 
et al., 1978), which is apparently often observed among this population (Weisz, 1999), 
and is associated with inefficient decision-making strategies (Jenkinson, 1999; Morris et 
al., 1993), such as `defensive avoidance' (Janis and Mann, 1977; see Jenkinson and 
Nelms, 1994). As a result, they may have viewed themselves as individuals with limited 
credibility, whose statements - whether truthful or not - are rarely taken seriously unless 
ratified by a more powerful person. From this perspective, the suspect's false confession 
would be of little significance: the consequences would depend on the evidence and 
decisions of `competent' others who would somehow know the truth of the situation. 
Though this explanation is consistent with the participants' comments, it does not fit 
easily with the findings of experimental problem-solving tasks (Bray et al., 1994a, b; 
Ferretti, 1994) suggesting that people with learning disabilities actively attempt to 
devise strategies, albeit ones which are ineffective. Whether such inconsistencies are 
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simply a function of different methodologies and, in particular, the extent to which they 
reflect everyday life, or of the participants involved in different studies, is, at present, 
uncertain. 
Unfortunately, despite continuing clinical and empirical interest in miscarriages of justice 
involving false self-incriminating admissions during police detention and interviewing 
(see Gudjonsson, 2001,2003), the experimental approach reported in this chapter has not 
been replicated or developed to explore further the decision-making of people with mild 
learning disabilities. Admittedly, there are methodological problems that have to be 
resolved. First, an `event' needs to be found which participants find realistic and involving 
but is ethically acceptable; this is no easy matter. Secondly, the theoretical basis of any 
measure designed to elicit participants' thinking or feeling should be coherent. It was 
intended that the items in the interview schedule should be based on Irving and 
Hilgendorfl s (1980; Hilgendorf and Irving, 1981) proposal, based in theories of 
subjective utility maximization, that suspects' decision-making reflects their perception 
of the situation and its consequences. Some items appeared consistent with this model 
(for example, those relating to the perceived consequences of the suspect being 
convicted of killing the householder). Others, however, such as the questions about the 
relevance of legal advice at different points in the interview, did not. Instead, 
unintentionally, they elicited the participants' `appreciation' of relevant information 
which, according to theoretical analyses (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso 
and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995; re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 
1994), is necessary for making valid legally-significant decisions. In designing any 
future experimental investigations, much more attention needs to be given to both the 
validity of the psychological measure used to assess participants (Anastasi and Urbina, 
1997) and the theoretical framework in which the measure is based. 
Meanwhile, until further empirical evidence becomes available, the uncomfortable 
implication of the findings is that, even when they understand the caution and the legal 
rights, people with mild learning disabilities are more likely than their counterparts in 
the general population to make decisions during police detention which do not serve to 
protect their rights (e. g. they would not ask for legal advice, would not remain silent) and 
may increase the possibility that they would provide information which was unreliable, 
misleading or self-incriminating. Moreover, consistent with the low 
level (38%, N=20) of 
correct answers by the participants with mild learning disabilities to one of the questions 
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about the caution and legal rights reported in Ch. 3 ('is it true that you only need a solicitor 
if you've done the crime you're being questioned about?, see qu. 3, Figure 3.3.1), the 
responses to the exploratory study described here suggest that individuals who are 
completely innocent of the offence for which they have been arrested may be most at risk. 
In terms of minimising the likelihood that impaired decision-making may lead to 
miscarriages of justice, legal advice is probably of most practical value. Though Code C of 
the Codes of Practice would need to be revised, no legislative changes would be required 
to amend the `special provision' under PACE so that vulnerable suspects could not be 
interviewed formally unless a solicitor or other legal representative, as well as an 
Appropriate Adult, were present. However, findings from within the Metropolitan Police 
Service (Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse, 2000) indicate that support from an AA is 
provided to fewer than half (40%) of the adult suspects whose Custody Records contain 
evidence of vulnerability. Whilst training, particularly for Custody Officers, may be 
helpful in improving this situation, given the heterogeneity of the population of men and 
women with learning disabilities, any attempt to make safeguards for vulnerable suspects 
dependent on their identification by police officers is likely to be of limited value. An 
alternative, and much more controversial, strategy would be the introduction of mandatory 
legal advice for all suspects; as far as is known, though, this has never seriously been 
considered in England and Wales. Later in this thesis, the possibility of another approach, 
that of encouraging self-identification by `vulnerable' suspects, including men and women 
with learning disabilities who have been detained by the police, is explored. Before 
considering this, and other practical suggestions, a third putative source of 
`psychological vulnerability' is considered, that of increased susceptibility to 
acquiescence, suggestibility, confabulation and compliance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF POLICE DETENTION AND INTERVIEWING 
The findings reported in the two previous chapters (Chs. 3 and 4) suggest that people 
with learning disabilities are more likely than their `general population' peers to have 
`psychological vulnerabilities' (Gudjonsson, 1992a, 1993,1994,1999) which increase 
the likelihood that, as suspects, they will inadvertently provide information which is 
misleading, unreliable or self-incriminating. First, they may have more limited 
knowledge and understanding of the information about the caution and legal rights 
presented in the Notice to Detained Persons (see Ch. 3). Secondly, because of 
impairments in their decision-making, it may be more difficult for them to use that 
information to safeguard their rights (see Ch. 4). 
According to Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) framework, a third putative 
source of `vulnerability' during police detention and interviewing arises from the 
increased susceptibility of people with learning disabilities to certain personality 
characteristics, or patterns of responding. The purpose of this chapter is to examine four 
characteristics - acquiescence, interrogative suggestibility, confabulation and 
compliance - which have been of legal and practical importance in analyses of disputed 
confessions (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
5.1.1 PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS IN DECISION-MAKING 
As discussed in previous chapters, theoretical analyses of the abilities involved in 
making valid legally-significant decisions suggest that is it not sufficient for individuals 
to understand relevant information; they must also be able to use it to reach a decision, 
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and communicate their choice (Appelbaum and Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and 
Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1994). 
Whilst, the literature has focussed primarily on cognitive abilities, other factors may 
also be relevant, particularly in `using' the information (see Chapter 4). 
Though, so far, no research has been carried out with people with learning disabilities, 
there has been increasing recognition that, among their counterparts in the general 
population, decision-making ability may be affected by personality factors, including the 
pervasive psychological disturbance which defines, and is associated with, a diagnosis 
of `personality disorder'. Recently, for example, the High Court ruled, inter alia, that 
Ian Brady, who was convicted for the so-called Moors Murders, was not able to make a 
valid decision to kill himself by refusing food. The court accepted the argument that Mr. 
Brady's ability to reason about, or weigh up, the information about the risks and benefits 
of food refusal was compromised by his paranoid personality disorder (R. v Ashworth 
Hospital ex parte Brady 2000). In a forensic context, the landmark case is that of Judith 
Ward. In 1974, during police detention and interviewing, Ms. Ward confessed to serious 
terrorist offences, including the M62 coach bombing in which twelve people were killed 
and, subsequently, she was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. However, in 
1992, after hearing psychological and psychiatric evidence, the Court of Appeal quashed 
her conviction, ruling that, at the time of her confessions, she: 
`was suffering from a personality disorder so severe and deep-rooted that no 
reliance could be placed on any statement of fact made by her' (R. v. Ward [1993] 
96 Cr. App. Rep., p. 22). 
Since then, personality disorder has been important in other successful appeals against 
convictions based on self-incriminating admissions or confessions, both, occasionally, 
in the U. S. A. (Gudjonsson, 1999), and, more frequently, in England and Wales (R. v. 
MacKenzie 1993, see Ch. 1.5; R. v. O'Brien, Hall and Sherwood 2000; R. v. Fell 2001; 
see Gudjonsson, 2003, for further details of all three cases). Still, as the English Court of 
Appeal emphasised in its judgment of Mr. Hall in R. v. Hall, `personality disorder' is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the exclusion of confession evidence; like other 
`psychological vulnerabilities', its relevance to a particular case has to be demonstrated. 
Even when a diagnosis of `personality disorder' is not appropriate, however, 
individuals may have psychological characteristics which may, in certain circumstances, 
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compromise their ability to make decisions which minimise the likelihood of providing 
information to the police which is misleading, unreliable or inadvertently self- 
incriminating. Many such characteristics may be relevant, including: 
" impulsivity, poor planning, and other indicators of dysexecutive functioning 
(Russell, 1997); 
" high anxiety (Gudjonsson et al., 1993; Santilla, Alkiora, Ekholm and Niemi, 
1999); 
" low self-esteem (as in the case of Engin Raghip, see Ch. 2.1.3; and Gudjonsson, 
1992a, 2003); 
" need for attention (see Gudjonsson, 2003, for discussion in relation to the false 
confession to murder of Andrew Evans, a man with `memory distrust syndrome' 
which was, initially, misdiagnosed as psychogenic amnesia); 
" susceptibility to questioning about private matters (as in the case of lain Hay 
Gordon, who made a false confession to murder in the context of coercive 
questioning about his sexual interests; see Gudjonsson, 2003, for further 
discussion). 
However, this chapter focusses only on the four characteristics which, to date, have been 
explored in most detail: acquiescence, suggestibility, and confabulation. For clarity, 
initially, each of these characteristics is examined separately. 
5.2 ACQUIESCENCE 
5.2.1 THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF ACQUIESCENCE 
Whilst it has sometimes been understood more broadly, as submissiveness (e. g. Rosen, 
Floor and Zistein, 1974), in recent years acquiescence has been defined predominantly 
as the tendency of individuals either to answer closed `yes'/'no' questions affirmatively 
(by saying `yes') regardless of their content (Cronbach, 1946), or to agree with 
`true'/'false' statements (by saying `true'; see, for example, Gudjonsson, 1990b; 
Gudjonsson et al., 2000; Winkler et al., 1982; but c. f. Finlay and Lyons, 2002). `Nay- 
saying', or the tendency to respond `no' or `false', results in inconsistency but not 
acquiescence (Gudjonsson, 1992a). Inconsistency may be well be relevant to interviews 
with witnesses. However, since, so far, there is no evidence that it is of practical 
importance in relation to suspects, it will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
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1. 
During police detention and interviewing, acquiescence is potentially important in two 
ways. First, through a series of affirmative responses to questions, suspects may provide 
accounts which are unreliable, misleading, or self-incriminating. Consistent with this 
suggestion, Gudjonsson (1990b) found that a `general population' group (N=63) who 
alleged that they had made false confessions during police interviews were more 
acquiescent than their counterparts of similar intellectual ability (N=22). Secondly, and 
very importantly given the number of people involved and its legal relevance, suspects 
may reply `yes' unthinkingly to police officers' questions about whether they have 
understood the meaning of the caution and the other legal rights. Experimental evidence 
(Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fenner et al., 2002; Grisso, 1981; Shepherd et al., 1995; see 
Chapter 3) indicates that, at least in relation to the caution, the tendency to respond 
affirmatively to the question `do you understand? ' provides a misleading over-estimate 
of the extent of comprehension. 
It has been proposed (Gudjonsson, 1986) that acquiescent responding occurs in response 
to the decrease in self-esteem generated in individuals by uncertainty. The uncertainty 
itself is created by a question or statement which has not been understood, either 
because it has not been attended to sufficiently (because, for example, of emotional or 
cognitive difficulties) or because it contains words, concepts or meanings which are too 
complex. In response, the individual attempts to answer in a way which both minimises 
the likelihood of challenge by others, with the possibility of further threats to his or her 
self-esteem, and is more easily incorporated into recollection, alleviating the subjective 
perception of uncertainty. Recently, based on a review of the literature, Finlay and 
Lyons (2002) have suggested that acquiescence may also occur as a `default' response 
by men and women who comprehend what they are being asked about but are simply 
not sure how to answer. Alternatively, interviewees may not recognize that they have 
not understood the material fully and simply respond to it as they perceive it. 
Nevertheless, Finlay and Lyons (ibid. ) conclude that Gudjonsson's (ibid. ) account 
provides a `powerful explanation' (ibid., p. 22) of acquiescence and his explanation 
remains very influential. 
Subsequent analyses (Finlay and Lyons, 2002; Rapley and Antaki, 1996) have drawn 
particularly on Gudjonsson's (1986) suggestion that, consistent with the functional 
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approach of his concept of `psychological vulnerabilities', the subjective feeling of 
uncertainty arises from three sources, all of which may interact: 
(i) the characteristics of the specific interviewing situation; 
(ii) the properties of the questions or statements to which an individual is asked to 
respond; and 
(iii) the characteristics of the respondent. 
The emphasis placed on each of these sources has differed. Rapley and Antaki (ibid. ), 
for example, have examined the way in which acquiescence may arise in situations in 
which the interviewer holds much greater power than the person being interviewed. In 
contrast, Finlay and Lyons (ibid. ) have drawn attention to the importance of a detailed 
examination of the material to which an individual is asked to respond. 
From an `individual differences' perspective, which focuses primarily on the 
characteristics of the respondents, acquiescence has been measured formally in a 
number of ways, using: 
"a set of one or more nonsense items where `no' is the correct response (Kishi, 
Teelucksingh, Zollers, Park-Lee and Meyer, 1988; Sigelman et al., 1981 a); 
" balanced scales, where half the items have been reworded to require a `no' 
response (Ray and Lovejoy, 1983; Wehmeyer, 1994); 
" item-reversal, with matched pairs of logically opposite questions or statements 
(Gudjonsson, 1986; Gudjonsson, Murphy and Clare, 2000; Sigelman et al., 1980; 
Sigelman et al., 1981 a, b; Winkler, Kanouse and Ware, 1982). 
Though item-reversals are difficult to devise (Block, 1965), Gudjonsson (1992a) 
proposes that they provide the best measure. Acquiescence is assessed by the number of 
pairs of items to which the individual responds by saying `yes' or 'true'. 
5.2.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF ACQUIESCENCE 
From Gudjonsson's (1986) analysis, it would be expected that acquiescence would be 
related to factors which may increase respondents' uncertainty. Consistent with this 
suggestion, Winkler et al., (1982), using an adult North American sample (N=1351), 
and an attitude measure comprising twelve matched pairs of items, found a strong 
negative relationship between acquiescence and years of completed formal education. 
Acquiescence was also affected by (female) gender, (older) age, and (minority) ethnic 
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status. Similarly, Gudjonsson (1990b), using the same measure, found a significant 
negative correlation between acquiescence and Full Scale IQ on the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 
1981). It might be expected, then, that because of the impairments which define their 
diagnosis and the social disadvantages which they often experience as a consequence, 
people with learning disabilities would be particularly susceptible to acquiescence. 
Acquiescence among people with learning disabilities was first examined in detail in a 
series of studies by Sigelman and her colleagues (see review by Heal and Sigelman, 
1995; Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981a, b) which have become `a widely 
cited corpus' (Rapley and Antaki, 1996, p. 209). Each study used the same three 
samples of participants with learning disabilities: adolescents, aged 12-16 years, living 
in institutions or community placements, and adults (mean age c. 25 years), living in 
institutions. Each sample was sub-divided into three groups (IQ ranges: 25-39; 40-54; 
55-69) based on the most recent assessment of intellectual ability in each person's case 
notes. In the first study, Sigelman et al. (1980) compared the two groups of adolescents 
(N=52, living in institutions; N=57, from community placements) and the adults 
(N=58), using one pair of logically inconsistent questions: `Are you usually happy? ' vs. 
`Are you usually sad? '. These questions were inserted into a schedule about the 
participants' life experiences. Overall, acquiescence was very high, with about half the 
participants in each group (44.7% of the 42 adults who were able to respond) answering 
`yes' to both questions. There was no effect of age or the participants' residential 
setting, but intellectual ability did have an impact: within each sample, the most 
intellectually able group was least acquiescent. A high rate of acquiescence was also 
found in two further studies (Sigelman et al., 1981a, b), both of which involved an 
additional pair of item-reversal questions ('Are you usually by yourself? ' vs. `Are you 
usually with other people? '). Again, acquiescent responding was most marked among 
the most severely intellectually disadvantaged group (Sigelman et al., 1981b), though 
only for the `happy'/'sad' pair of items. 
The findings of Sigelman and her colleagues (Sigelman et al., 1980, Sigelman et al., 
1981 a, b) have been widely cited as evidence of the susceptibility to acquiescence 
during interviewing of people with learning disabilities. Unfortunately, the studies on 
which the findings are based are methodologically problematic. First, the assessment of 
acquiescence, using, for the most part, only one or two pairs of item-reversal questions, 
137 
is very limited. Secondly, the validity of the allocation of the participants to groups 
according to their reported level of intellectual ability is uncertain. Not all the tests used 
were well-established (Sigelman et al., 1981a) and no information is provided about 
how recently they were been carried out. 
Thirdly, the sample size of the adults with `mild learning disabilities' was very small, 
comprising only seven or eight adults (no further details available, see Sigelman et al., 
1980), all of whom were receiving institutional social care. Fourthly, the findings have 
not been supported by more recent studies. Neither Matikka and Vesala (1997) nor 
Gudjonsson et al. (2000) found that intellectual ability and acquiescence were related in 
participants identified administratively as men and women with learning disabilities. 
However, whilst Matikka and Vesala's (ibid. ) study comprised a large sample 
(N=6161), intellectual ability was only crudely estimated from documents and staff 
views; the validity of the scores is, therefore, uncertain. In contrast, intellectual ability 
was assessed carefully by Gudjonsson and his colleagues (ibid., N=33), using the 
WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), but, perhaps because items on the test of acquiescence were 
deliberately devised to be `simple' (ibid., p. 309), most of the participants obtained low 
scores. Finally, and of importance in the context of this thesis, none of these studies has 
involved a direct comparison between people with learning disabilities and their 
`general population' counterparts. 
5.3 STUDY 6: SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ACQUIESCENCE 
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding recent data (Gudjonsson et al., 2000; Mattika and Vesala, 1997), it is 
generally assumed, based on findings of studies involving participants in the general 
population (Gudjonsson, 1990b; Winkler et al., 1981) and a superficial reading of the 
work of Sigelman and her colleagues (Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981 a, b), 
that people with learning disabilities are more likely than their peers in the general 
population to be susceptible to acquiescence. However, until a preliminary 
investigation 
was carried out (reported in Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993), this assumption 
had not been 
examined directly. 
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In their study, Clare and Gudj onssorr (1993) used the matched-pairs measure devised by 
Winkler et al. (1982). This is well-standardised, and involves pairs of statements which 
have been successfully reversed (Finlay and Lyons, 2002). As expected (Gudjonsson, 
1990b; Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981a, b; Winkler et al., 1981), the 
`learning disabilities' group (N=20; mean Full Scale IQ: 65; s. d. 5.3) were significantly 
(p <_ 0.01) more acquiescent than their `general population' peers (N= 21; mean Full 
Scale IQ: 99; s. d. 7.2). Unfortunately, none of the subsequent studies involve a direct 
comparison of people with learning disabilities and their counterparts in the general 
population. Given the concerns about the `received wisdom' of acquiescence among 
men and women with learning disabilities (Finlay and Lyons, 2002; Rapley and Antaki, 
1996), it seemed worthwhile, in the context of this thesis, to extend the data base of the 
preliminary study. In addition, given more recent findings (Gudjonsson et al., 2000; 
Matikka and Vesala, 1997), it seemed pertinent to examine the assumed relationship 
between acquiescence and intellectual functioning. 
The aims of this study, then, were two-fold: 
(i) to extend the findings of Clare and Gudjonsson's (1993) preliminary comparison 
of acquiescence among people with mild learning disabilities and their peers in 
the general population. It was expected that, compared with their `general 
population' counterparts, the `learning disabilities' group would be more 
acquiescent; 
(ii) to explore the relationship between intellectual ability and acquiescence. It was 
expected that, within each group, acquiescence scores would be inversely 
correlated with intellectual ability. 
5.3.2 METHOD 
Participants 
There were two groups of volunteer participants, drawn as convenience samples. All the 
participants were fluent in English: 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised 35 men and 22 women. Twenty of these 
participants had already taken part in Study 1 (Ch. 3.2.2) and the preliminary 
investigation (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993); they were not retested. The additional 
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participants all fulfilled the criteria for inclusion (see Methodological Considerations, 
Ch. 2.4). 
General population: the GP group comprised 37 men and 22 women. Twenty of these 
participants had already taken part in Study 1 (Ch. 3.2.2) and the preliminary investigation 
(Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993); they were not retested. To obtain a more representative 
sample of the general population, further participants were recruited through `job-finder' 
and work-experience centres or basic skills clubs. Since many of them reported that they 
had attended schools for pupils with `special' needs, their intellectual functioning was 
assessed. 
Measures 
1. Intellectual functioning: the majority (N=76) of the participants completed all eleven 
sub-tests of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981). For practical reasons, the remaining 40 
participants, who had already taken part in Study 1 (Chapter 3.2.2), completed 
only eight sub-tests (four verbal, and four non-verbal; see Ch. 3.2.2); their scores 
were used to prorate Full Scale IQ. 
2. Acquiescence: The test devised by Winkler et al. (1982) was used. A copy is 
shown as Appendix 5. It comprises 24 `true'/'false' sentences relating to 
medication, physicians, and health care, which are arranged so that each of the 
first twelve items is logically opposite to each of the remaining items (i. e. there is 
a contradiction between sentences 1 and 13,2 and 14, and so on). Following the 
conventional scoring (ibid., p. 557), one point was allocated on each occasion on 
which a participant stated `true' to both one of the first twelve items and its logical 
opposite. Acquiescence scores can range from 0-12, with a higher score indicating 
increased acquiescence. 
Procedure and scoring 
Participants were seen individually, in a quiet room, at their place of work or 
centre/club, or at day-services or residential placements for people with learning 
disabilities. The forty participants involved in the preliminary study were assessed by 
me. The remaining seventy-six participants were recruited and assessed by Ms. Philippa 
Cross, the Research Assistant who was funded by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice and trained by me in the administration of the tests (see Study 2, Ch. 3.3). The 
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same procedure was used for all the participants. First, each person completed the 
assessment of intellectual functioning. Then, the test of acquiescence was presented. 
Participants were encouraged to follow the text whilst each item was read out in turn. 
Both measures were scored entirely by me. 
5.3.3 RESULTS 
Participant characteristics 
Table 5.3.1 shows the chronological ages and Full Scale IQ scores of the two groups. 
The mean scores were compared statistically by calculating t values. The test values are 
shown in the last column (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Table 5.3.1 Characteristics of the `Learning disabilities' and `General population' 
groups 
Learning disabilities General population 
t-value 
mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
Chronological age 30.8 9.2 17-64 34.2 10.6 20-69 t=1.83 °. S. 
Full Scale IQ 66.1 5.5 53-75 96.4 12.2 80-128 t= 17.26 
No. of participants 57 59 
°. S. not significant (t-test for independent samples with equal variances, 2-tailed, df 
=114) 
* significant at p<0.001 (t-test for independent samples with unequal variances, 1- 
tailed, df =113 ) 
Whilst the mean chronological ages of the two groups did not differ significantly, as 
expected the mean Full Scale IQ score of the `learning disabilities' (LD) group was 
significantly lower than that of the `general population' (GP) group. 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Comparison of the acquiescence scores 
Table 5.3.2 shows the mean scores, standard deviations, and ranges of the acquiescence 
scores of the two groups. 
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Table 5.3.2 Acquiescence scores for the two groups 
Learning disabilities General population Test value 
mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
Acquiescence test 6.5 3.1 0 -12 2.9 2.3 0 -12 U= 548 
No. of participants 57 59 
* significant at p<0.01 (Mann-Whitney U test, 1-tailed) 
Since the acquiescence scores did not approximate to the Normal distribution, the 
medians were compared statistically by calculating Mann-Whitney's U (see Appendix 7 
for details). As expected, the participants with learning disabilities were significantly 
more acquiescent. However, as Figure 5.3.1 shows, there was an overlap between the 
scores of the two groups. 
Figure 5.3.1 Distribution of acquiescence scores among the `Learning disabilities' 
and `General population' groups 
Number of 
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Relationships between acquiescence and intellectual functioning 
The correlations between the acquiescence and Full Scale I. Q. scores were calculated for 
each group separately. For the LD group, the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was calculated (see Appendix 7 for details). Unexpectedly, acquiescence and 
intellectual functioning did not correlate significantly (r = -0.08,1-tailed). Similar 
analyses were carried out to examine the relationships between acquiescence and Verbal 
I. Q. and Performance I. Q. separately: again, no significant correlations were found. 
Since the data for the GP group did not approximate to the Normal distribution, 
Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient was used (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Among these participants there was a significant negative correlation between 
acquiescence and Full Scale I. Q. scores (p = -0.43; p<0.001,1-tailed), and both Verbal 
I. Q. (p = -0.37; p<0.01,1-tailed) and Performance I. Q. (p = -0.32; p<0.01,1-tailed). 
5.3.4 DISCUSSION 
Extending the preliminary investigation carried out by Clare and Gudjonsson (1993), 
acquiescence was compared among people with learning disabilities and their `general 
population' counterparts. 
As expected, and consistent with the findings of previous studies using fewer item- 
reversal pairs (Gudjonsson et al., 2000; Matikka and Vesala, 1997; Sigelman et al., 
1980; Sigelman et al., 1981 a, b), the LD group were much more likely to be acquiescent 
than their `general population' counterparts. As expected, and consistent with previous 
findings (Gudjonsson, 1990b; Winkler et al., 1982), acquiescence and intellectual 
functioning were inversely related in the GP group. Rather surprisingly, though, and in 
contrast with previous investigations (Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981 a, b), 
whilst the results were in the expected direction, there was no statistical evidence of a 
relationship between intellectual functioning and acquiescence in the LD group. The 
most likely explanation lies in the restricted range of I. Q. scores of these participants. 
The overlap between the scores of the LD group and their `general population' 
counterparts demonstrates that assumptions about individuals based on their status as 
people with learning disabilities are unwarranted. Nevertheless, the findings of this 
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study appear to provide convincing support for Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) 
suggestion that acquiescence is a `psychological vulnerability' for this population. 
5.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ACQUIESCENCE 
The results of this study suggest that people with learning disabilities are more likely 
than their peers in the general population to be acquiescent because they agree with 
`true'/'false' statements. These findings have practical implications for police detention 
and interviewing. The theoretical implications of the study, though, are limited. With 
hindsight, not enough attention was paid to the other sources - the specific situation and 
the properties of the material to which participants were asked to respond - which, 
according to Gudjonsson (1986), contribute to the feelings of uncertainty which underlie 
acquiescence. When the data were collected, the most satisfactory formal measure 
appeared to be that of Winkler et al. (1982). This is well-established (Gudjonsson, 
1990b; Winkler et al., 1982) and, in contrast with other tests (for example, Sigelman et 
al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981a, b; Gudjonsson et al., 2000), comprises a large number 
of items, providing a range of scores. In accordance with the approach recommended by 
Gudjonsson (1992a), the material is arranged into matched pairs of logically opposite 
statements, using a successful (Finlay and Lyons, 2002) item-reversal method. 
Moreover, the range of scores (from 0-12) of the participants in the preliminary study 
(Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) suggested that the measure could be used with people 
with learning disabilities. 
However, more detailed analysis of the material suggests that the test devised by 
Winkler et al. (1992) has some limitations. Using the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948), the 
complexity of the twenty-four statements was analysed. The `Reading Ease' is 66.5 
('standard'; on a scale from 0 `very difficult' to 100 `very easy'), which translates (Ley, 
1977) into a crude estimate that a Full Scale I. Q. score of 90 or more would be needed 
to understand the material fully. Looking at the measure in more detail, several of the 
items comprise long sentences (for example, item 19: `When there is an important 
medical decision to make regarding any treatment, I want to be given enough 
information so that I can help make that decision'). This places a high level of demand 
on the working memory of participants with limited reading skills. In addition, some of 
the statements contain polysyllabic words (such as `specific' (item 21); `unnecessary' 
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(item 22)) and, on occasion, unusual, -constructions (for example, item 23: `Doctors don't 
always explain to their patients the risks involved in certain treatments'). Moreover, as 
the findings of Sigelman et al. (1981b) suggested, the content of the material may be 
relevant. The statements devised by Winkler et al. (1982) relate to an area (health care) 
in which men and women with learning disabilities may have had few opportunities to 
make autonomous decisions (Morris et al., 1993; see Chapter 4.1.2). Such items may be 
associated with an increase in acquiescent responding. Certainly, when the item content 
is very familiar (as in the material of the measure devised by Gudjonsson et al., 2000), 
acquiescence may be minimal. 
This analysis suggests that the experimental situation may not have been experienced in 
the same way by the participants with learning disabilities and their `general population' 
counterparts. Objectively, it appears that the `learning disabilities' group were at greater 
risk of uncertainty. Whether or not, though, they were more likely to experience the 
subjective feelings of uncertainty which, according to Gudjonsson (1986), are crucial to 
acquiescent responding, is unclear. As Finlay and Lyons (2002) have pointed out, and is 
supported by the empirical findings relating to the caution (Cooke and Philip, 1998; 
Fenner et al., 2002; Gudjonsson, 1992a; Shepherd et al., 1995), problems in 
understanding the material are not necessarily recognised by respondents. Unfortunately, 
no attempt was made to investigate this possibility. However, the range of scores of the 
`learning disabilities' participants indicates that not all of them were aware of their 
(putatively) limited comprehension of the test. This suggests that Gudjonsson's (1986) 
account of acquiescence needs to be explored further. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the overlap between their scores and those of their 
`general population' counterparts, the increased risk of acquiescence, even within an 
experimental situation, among people with learning disabilities indicates that practical 
measures for minimising this `psychological vulnerability' should be adopted. These 
suggestions are considered at the end of the chapter. First, however, the possibility that 
men and women with learning disabilities are at greater risk than their peers in the 
general population of other personality characteristics which may increase the likelihood 
that, as suspects, they will inadvertently provide misleading, unreliable or self- 
incriminating information during police detention and interviewing is examined. 
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5.5 INTERROGATIVE SUGGESTIBILITY 
5.5.1 THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF INTERROGATIVE 
SUGGESTIBILITY 
In the context of police detention and interviewing, the personality characteristic which 
has been explored in most detail is that of interrogative suggestibility. This is, arguably 
(Gudjonsson, 1987,1992a; Register and Kihlstrom, 1988; but c. f. Linton and Sheehan, 
1994), a distinct form of suggestibility which relates to the extent to which factors 
associated with interviewing may impact on an individual's encoding, storage, retrieval 
and/or reporting of events (Milne and Bull, 1999). 
Though interrogative suggestibility (hereafter, suggestibility) has been explored from 
different perspectives (Milne and Bull, 1999; Schooler and Loftus, 1986), the most 
influential approach, in relation to the information provided by suspects, has been that 
of Gudjonsson (1984 et seq. ) and his colleagues. According to the model devised by 
Gudjonsson and Clark (1986), suggestibility is defined as: 
`the extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people come to accept 
(my italics) messages communicated during formal questioning, as a result of 
which their behavioural response is affected' (Gudjonsson and Clark, 1986, p. 84), 
and reflects an individual's ability to devise and implement effective cognitive and 
behavioural strategies to cope with the demands of being interviewed. 
The potential importance of suggestibility during police detention and interviewing is 
supported by two types of evidence. First, analyses of both proven false confessions 
(Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1990; Santilla et al., 1999) and successful appeals against 
conviction (David MacKenzie (R. v. MacKenzie 1993; see Ch. 1.5); Engin Raghip (R. v. 
Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip 1991; see Ch. 2.3.1); Judith Ward (R. v. Ward 1993; see 
Ch. 5.1.1)) have shown that many of those involved were unusually suggestible (see 
Gudjonsson, 2003). Secondly, empirical studies of people charged with criminal 
offences who allege they made false confessions during police interviewing (`false 
confessors') have indicated that they are more suggestible than either their counterparts 
who maintain their confessions (Gudjonsson, 1992a) or `resisters' who, despite adverse 
forensic evidence, deny their involvement (Gudjonsson, 1991b, 1992a). Similarly, in a 
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survey of convicted adult prisoners in Iceland who were self-reported `false confessors', 
Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1996b) found that, compared with their peers (N=48), 
those who reported that they had, at some point, believed in their admission were more 
suggestible. 
Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) propose that an individual's suggestibility comprises two 
distinct aspects: 
(i) a tendency to be (mis)led by leading questions; and 
(ii) a tendency to change initial responses following negative feedback (see 
Gudjonsson, 1992a, for a full review). 
During police interviewing, the presentation of (mis)leading or false alternative 
questions creates feelings of uncertainty in suspects as they struggle to know how to 
answer correctly. This uncertainty can be alleviated by accepting the premises contained 
in the questions and responding as if the question were straightforward. It is much more 
likely that suspects will adopt this strategy if, first, they have interpersonal trust in the 
interviewing officer, and are not suspicious or hostile (Gudjonsson, 1989b), and 
secondly have an expectation that they should be able to answer correctly, rather than 
simply admit that they `don't know' (Boon and Baxter, 2000; Gudjonsson and Hilton, 
1989; Hansdottir, Thorsteinsson, Kristinsdottir and Ragnarsson, 1990). However, their 
initial responses may be not be accepted by the police and may, instead, be challenged 
through negative feedback. Then, often, the questions will be repeated. This process of 
repeated questioning, particularly if it is accompanied by critical feedback (Boon and 
Baxter, 2000; Tata and Gudjonsson, 1990) may also influence suspects to accept what 
they believe is being communicated by the interviewer. 
The implication of Gudjonsson and Clark's (1986) model is that suggestibility may be 
influenced by a range of `individual differences' which affect interviewees' feelings of 
uncertainty, interpersonal trust, and expectations, and their responses to negative 
feedback. Consistent with this model, it has been found that suggestibility is affected by 
individual characteristics including: 
" demographic factors, such as age (adolescence vs. adulthood: Richardson, 
Gudjonsson and Kelly, 1995; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1992; Warren, Hulse-Trotter 
and Tubbs, 1991); 
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" life experiences, including the number of previous convictions (Sharrock and 
Gudjonsson, 1993); 
" cognitive factors such as intellectual disadvantage and memory impairments 
(Gudjonsson, 1983; Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995; Sharrock and Gudjonsson, 
1993), though both are subject to range effects (Gudjonsson, 1988a); 
" substance misuse (Gudjonsson, 2003; Murakami et al., 1996); 
" affective factors including lack of assertiveness (Gudjonsson, 1988b); low self- 
esteem (Gudjonsson and Singh, 1984); state (Gudjonsson, 1988b) and trait 
(Gudjonsson, Rutter and Clare, 1995) anxiety; enhanced fear of negative 
evaluation (Gudjonsson, 1988b); suspiciousness and anger (Gudjonsson, 1989b); 
style of coping with demands (Gudjonsson, 1988b); feelings of powerlessness (in 
men, Gudjonsson and Lister, 1984). 
These different factors may not affect the two aspects of suggestibility in the same way. 
Gudjonsson (1988a, 1992a) proposes that cognitive factors, particularly memory, mainly 
affect the tendency to `give in' to `leading questions'; in contrast, responses to 
`interrogative pressure' primarily reflect affective factors. 
Despite their `individual difference' perspective on suggestibility, Gudjonsson and 
Clark (1986) do not reject the importance of other factors. Indeed, consistent with the 
functional approach of his concept of `psychological vulnerabilities', Gudjonsson 
(1992a) proposes that, like acquiescence (see Ch. 5.2.1), suggestibility arises in the 
context of three sources, all of which may interact: 
(i) the characteristics of the individual interviewee; 
(ii) the specific interaction, including the other participants; and 
(iii) the properties of the questions or statements to which an individual is asked to 
respond. 
The extent to which each of these sources has been emphasised by different 
investigators has varied. Whilst Gudjonsson (1984 et seq. ) has been concerned primarily 
with the characteristics of individual interviewees and their interactions with different 
situations, others have focussed more on the questions asked, examining the: 
" impact of the wording (Milne, Bull, Kohnken and Memon, 1995; Milne and Bull, 
1999); 
" modality and other aspects of the presentation (Beail, 2002; Cardone and Dent, 
1996; Milne, Clare and Bull, 2002; Schooler and Loftus, 1986); and the 
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" interactions between the material and the individual characteristics of interviewees 
(Gudjonsson and Gunn, 1982; Henry and Gudjonsson, 1999; Papierno, 
Hembrooke and Ceci, 1998). 
At the same time, research in the `experimental' tradition (Loftus, 1979; Schooler and 
Loftus, 1986), which, using mainly University students as participants, attempts to 
identify the cognitive psychological mechanisms underlying suggestibility, continues 
(see Milne and Bull, 1999, for further details). Nevertheless, it has been concluded that 
Gudjonsson and Clark's (ibid. ) model is: 
`a formidable attempt to make sense of a multi-faceted phenomenon' (Schooler 
and Loftus, 1986, p. 107). 
The two putative aspects of suggestibility in Gudjonsson and Clark's (1986) model are 
measured formally using a behavioural test (Gudjonsson, 1997) presented during an 
interview. The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, Forms 1 (GSS 1, Gudjonsson, 1984, 
1997) and 2 (GSS 2, Gudjonsson, 1987,1997) are interchangeable (Gudjonsson, 1997) 
and employ an identical format: a story is used to obtain measures of Immediate and 
Delayed free recall. Suggestibility is assessed through a set of standardized questions: 
five of these refer to material in the story and are inserted to conceal the purpose of the 
test. The remaining fifteen introduce material which is not mentioned. Though they are 
referred to collectively as `leading questions' (Gudjonsson, 1997, p. 8), they are actually 
of three types: (i) `leading' in that they either create an expectation of a certain type of 
answer; (ii) `affirmative' in that they generate uncertainty; or (iii) present `false 
alternatives'. The extent to which the person `gives in' to these questions before, and 
then after, negative feedback is scored as `Yield 1' and `Yield 2', respectively. Any 
change in responding on any of the twenty questions following feedback constitutes a 
`Shift'. Total Suggestibility comprises the sum of Yield 1 (the tendency to be (mis)led 
by leading questions) and Shift (the tendency to change initial responses following 
negative feedback). The scoring of the Scales is non-discretionary (Grisso, 1986), 
leading to high inter-rater reliability for both the GSS 1 (Richardson and Smith, 1993) 
and the GSS 2 (Clare, Gudjonsson, Rutter and Cross, 1994). 
Since, at present, the GSS 1 and 2 provide the only standard measure of suggestibility 
(Beail, 2002), it is fortunate that the Scales of which they form the major part have been 
described, independently, as: 
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the best examples of forensic assessment instruments that have been developed in 
the United Kingdom' (Cooke and Carlin, 1998, p. 62). 
5.5.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SUGGESTIBILITY 
It would be expected that, because of the impaired intellectual and social functioning 
which defines the diagnosis, and their social disadvantage, people with learning 
disabilities would be at greater risk of suggestibility than their `general population' 
peers. Surprisingly, though, whilst assertions about the suggestibility of people with 
learning disabilities have often been made (Craft, 1984; Ellis and Luckasson, 1995; 
Perske, 1994), this issue has rarely been examined experimentally. 
In a pioneering study, Tully and Cahill (1984) asked participants to provide eye-witness 
accounts of a dramatic staged incident involving damage to some plants. Total memory 
(Immediate and Delayed Recall combined) and Total Suggestibility scores on the GSS 1 
were compared among two groups (N=15, in each) of people with learning disabilities 
attending special day facilities (Full Scale IQ scores: 67-90; 66-<50) with those of 
participants (N=15) recruited from a job-centre (Full Scale IQ scores: >90). Consistent 
with the findings from the general population (Gudjonsson, 1983,1988a; Gudjonsson 
and Clare, 1995; Sharrock and Gudjonsson, 1993), suggestibility was negatively 
correlated with both intellectual functioning and memory. 
Tully and Cahill's (1984) study provides useful preliminary data but it is 
methodologically problematic. First, since only Total Suggestibility scores are given, it 
is not possible to know whether the high scores of the `learning disabilities' groups 
reflected susceptibility to leading questions, to interrogative pressure, or both. Secondly, 
the participants with learning disabilities were selected `administratively', on the 
grounds that they were attending designated day-facilities. In fact, though, four of the 
fifteen participants in the `more able' `learning disabilities' group obtained overall IQ 
scores within the Average or Low Average ranges. Given the negative relationship 
between intellectual functioning and suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1988b; Sharrock and 
Gudjonsson, 1993), it cannot be assumed that the scores of these participants are 
representative of those of people with learning disabilities. Thirdly, and relatedly, the 
validity of the assessments of intellectual ability is uncertain. Though the test scores 
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were apparently standardised so that they were equivalent to the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Revised (Tully and Cahill, 1984, p. 12), no details are given. 
Whilst Tully and Cahill (1984) considered only Total Suggestibility, rather than each 
aspect separately, Perlman and her colleagues (Perlman, Ericson, Esses and Isaacs, 
1994), in Canada, examined only the impact of misleading questions and statements; 
they did not look at interrogative pressure. Compared with their peers (N=30), most of 
whom were University students, participants attending designated `learning disabilities' 
services (with IQ scores from 55-80; no further details given) recalled far less material 
about a film they had just seen and, during interviewing, were much more likely to 
'yield'. Unfortunately, the `learning disabilities' group is problematic: case notes were 
used to establish their intellectual functioning (as in the acquiescence studies of 
Sigelman et al., 1980; Sigelman et al., 1981a, b) so, again, the validity of the 
assessments is uncertain. Moreover, the range of scores indicates that at least one 
participant was of Low Average ability. 
Everington and Fulero (1999), however, examined both aspects of suggestibility, using 
an Americanised and abbreviated version of the GSS 1 with convicted offenders serving 
Probation Orders. Compared with their `general population' counterparts (N=30; 
presumed to be of `average' intellectual ability), the participants with learning 
disabilities (N=18; mean Full Scale IQ score for fifteen participants: 68; range: 59-75; 
no further details available) recalled less of the story, and were then significantly more 
suggestible: they were more likely to be misled by the leading questions and, like young 
people (Richardson et al., 1995; Warren et al., 1991), they were much more likely to 
change their initial responses following negative feedback. 
Unfortunately, the data provided by Everington and Fulero (1999) about intellectual 
ability are again unsatisfactory and the rationale for amending, rather than simply 
translating, the GSS 1 is uncertain. Moreover, their findings have not been supported. 
Cardone and Dent (1996) and Milne, Clare and Bull (2002) both found that whilst, 
compared with the `general population' counterparts, people with mild learning 
disabilities were more suggestible, in both studies this was due to their increased 
susceptibility to leading questions; they were not more likely than their peers to change 
their responses following the negative feedback. The finding that Shift is no more 
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marked in people with mild learning disabilities is, as Clare and Gudjonsson (1995) 
have pointed out, potentially important. Having been misled by the initial questions, this 
group of persons may simply repeat their first answers subsequently, giving an 
(incorrect) impression that it is safe to rely on what they have said. However, to 
complicate matters, both studies are methodologically limited: Cardone and Dent (ibid. ) 
did not directly compare people with learning disabilities with their `general population' 
peers, whilst the use by Milne et al. (ibid. ) of a `learning disabilities' sample identified 
administratively means that it is possible that not all their participants fulfilled the 
criteria for the diagnosis. 
None of these studies then, involves a direct comparison of the suggestibility of people 
with learning disabilities and their `general population' peers in which a) all the 
measures of an accepted test, such as the GSS, have been examined; and b) all the 
participants have had their intellectual functioning tested carefully. 




Consistent with Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1993,1999) suggestion, it seems that, 
compared with their counterparts in the general population, people with mild learning 
disabilities are more likely to be susceptible to suggestibility (Cardone and Dent, 1996; 
Everington and Fulero, 1999; Milne et al., 2002; Perlman et at, 1994; Tully and Cahill, 
1984). Moreover, it seems that the most intellectually disadvantaged men and women 
are most at risk (Gudjonsson, 1984,1988b; Tully and Cahill, ibid. ). However, though it 
is of potential importance (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1995), it is uncertain whether this 
susceptibility reflects only the impact of leading questions (Cardone and Dent, 1996; 
Milne et al., 2002) or, also, of interrogative pressure (Everington and Fulero, 1999). 
In a preliminary study, Clare and Gudjonsson (first reported in Clare and Gudjonsson, 
1993) compared the suggestibility of people with learning disabilities and their `general 
population' peers, selected accorded to the criteria used throughout this thesis (see 
Methodological Considerations, Ch. 2.4.1). The GSS 2 (Gudjonsson, 1987, Gudjonsson, 
1997), rather than the GSS 1, was used as the measure of suggestibility because, first, 
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though the two forms are interchangeable, analysis of the complexity of the two stories, 
using the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948), indicated that, whilst the GSS 1 has a 
`Reading Ease' score of 64 ('standard'), the score for the GSS 2 is 75 (`fairly easy'). 
This suggests that it is more appropriate for people with learning disabilities. Secondly, 
the GS S2 has higher internal consistencies for Yield 1, Yield 2 and Shift (Gudjonsson, 
1992b), suggesting that it is more homogeneous (Anastasi and Urbina, 1997). Thirdly, 
the inter-rater reliability of the GSS 2 has been examined more thoroughly, using a 
larger number of raters and a more stringent measure of agreement (Clare et al., 1994). 
As expected, it was found (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) that the `learning disabilities' 
group (N=20; mean Full Scale IQ on the WAIS-R: 65; s. d. 5.3) were significantly (p 
<_0.01) more suggestible than their `general population' peers (N=20; mean Full Scale 
IQ: 99; s. d. 7.2). Again, as expected, they obtained lower memory scores and were more 
susceptible to leading questions, both initially and after the negative feedback (p 
<_0.001). However, their response to interrogative pressure was no different from that of 
their general population counterparts. 
Given the debate about the response of people with mild learning disabilities to 
interrogative pressure (Cardone and Dent, 1996; Everington and Fulero, 1999; Milne et 
al., 2002), it seemed worthwhile, in the context of this thesis, to extend the data base of 
the preliminary investigation in order to address this issue. Further, since the issue has 
been neglected by more recent studies involving participants with learning disabilities, it 
also seemed pertinent to examine further Tully and Cahill's (1984) findings regarding 
the relationships between suggestibility, memory and intellectual ability. 
The aims of the study, then, were two-fold: 
(i) to extend the findings of Clare and Gudjonsson's (1993) preliminary study of 
suggestibility among people with mild learning disabilities and their peers in the 
general population. It was expected that compared with their `general 
population' counterparts 
9 the `learning disabilities' group would have poorer memories and be more 
suggestible; and 
" would be more susceptible to Yield but not to Shift; 
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(ii) to explore the relationships', between suggestibility, memory, and intellectual 
ability. Whilst it was expected that, within both groups, suggestibility would be 
negatively related to memory and intellectual functioning, it was believed that 
the relationships would be stronger in the LD group. 
5.6.2 METHOD 
Participants 
There were two groups of volunteer participants, drawn as convenience samples. All the 
participants were fluent in English: 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised the 35 men and 22 women who had 
taken part in Study 6 (Ch. 5.3). Twenty of them had also participated in the preliminary 
study (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) and had also been involved in Study 1 (see Ch. 
3.2); they were not retested. 
General population: the GP group comprised the 37 men and 22 women who had taken 
part in Study 6 (see Ch. 5.3). Again, twenty of them had already participated in the 
preliminary study (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) and Study 1 (Ch. 3.2); they were not 
retested. 
Measures 
1. Intellectual functioning: the majority (N=76) of the participants completed all eleven 
sub-tests of the WALS-R (Wechsler, 1981). For practical reasons, the participants 
who had first been involved in Study 1 completed only eight sub-tests (four 
verbal, and four non-verbal; see Ch. 3.2); their scores were used to prorate Full 
Scale IQ. 
2. Suggestibility: the parallel form of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS 2, 
Gudjonsson 1987,1997) was used to assess responses to leading questions (Yield) 
and interrogative pressure (Shift). The GSS 2 comprises a fictitious story, which is 
read to participants, about a boy who is saved from having a bicycle accident. It is 
followed by two recall procedures and a set of specific questions which are asked 
both before and after negative feedback. The GSS 2 provides data on memory and 
suggestibility which, following Gudjonsson (1997), were scored as follows: 
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a) Memory recall: The participant's recall of the ideas in the story, immediately 
after it is read to him or her (Immediate Recall (IR)) and after a delay of about 
fifty minutes (Delayed Recall (DR)), is scored: a point is given for each distinct 
idea, with a half-point for each idea which is recalled incompletely. For each 
recall, the participant can obtain a maximum of 40 points. 
b) Suggestibility: 
" Yield 1 (Y l) - Each of the fifteen leading questions which is answered 
affirmatively, or for which a false alternative is chosen, prior to the negative 
feedback, is scored. Scores on Yield 1 can range from 0-15. 
" Yield 2 (Y2) - This is similar to Yield 1, but it refers to the answers given 
after the negative feedback. It indicates whether the feedback makes the 
participants more or less susceptible to the leading questions. Again, scores 
on Yield 2 can range from 0-15 . 
" Shift (S) -A distinct change in response to any of the twenty questions 
following the negative feedback is scored. The range of possible Shift 
scores is therefore 0-20. 
The range of possible scores for Total Suggestibility (TS, the sum of Yield 1 
and Shift) is 0-35, with a high score indicating greater suggestibility. 
Procedure and scoring 
Participants were seen individually, in a quiet room, at their place of work or 
centre/club, or at day-services for people with learning disabilities. Again, I had assessed 
the forty participants involved in the preliminary study; the remaining seventy-six 
participants were recruited and assessed by Ms. Philippa Cross (see Study 2, Ch. 3; 
Study 6, Ch. 5.3). The same procedure was used for all the participants. First, each 
person completed the assessment of intellectual functioning. Then, the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale Form 2 (GSS 2, Gudjonsson, 1987,1997) was presented in the 
normal way and scored according to the Manual (Gudjonsson, 1997). Since it had 
already been established that I was a reliable scorer (Clare et al., 1994), I scored all the 
data for this study. 
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5.6.3 RESULTS 
The chronological ages and Full Scale IQ scores of the two groups are shown in Table 
5.3.1 (Ch. 5.3.3. ). As reported in the Results for Study 6 (see Ch. 5.3.3), the mean 
chronological ages of the two groups did not differ significantly. However, as expected 
the mean Full Scale IQ score of the `learning disabilities' (LD) group was significantly 
lower than that of the `general population' (GP) group. 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Comparison of the suggestibility scores 
Table 5.6.1 shows the mean scores, standard deviations, and ranges of the memory and 
suggestibility scores of the two groups. 
Table 5.6.1 Suggestibility for the two groups 
Learning disabilities General population 
N=57 N=59 t value 
mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
Immediate recall (IR) 8.0 4.8 0-23 17.0 6.3 2-31 8.67* 
Delayed recall (DR) 5.8 5.0 0-24 16.1 6.2 3-29 9.87* 
Yield 1 (Y 1) 9.8 3.7 0-15 6.1 3.6 0-12 5.44* 
Yield 2 (Y2) 9.5 3.6 1- 15 6.7 4.3 0- 15 3.83* 
Shift (S) 4.8 3.0 0-13 4.4 3.5 0-17 0.66 °. S. 
Total suggestibility (TS) 14.6 4.7 1-25 10.5 5.8 0-22 4.15* 
°. S. not significant (t-test for independent samples with equal variances, 2-tailed, 
df--114) 
* sig. at p<0.001 (t-test for independent samples with equal variances, 1-tailed, 
df--114) 
Statistical comparisons, using t-tests (see Appendix 7 for details), showed that the LD 
group recalled significantly fewer details of the story both immediately, and after a delay 
than the GP group. Though, as Figure 5.6.1 shows, there was an overlap between the 
Total Suggestibility scores of the GP and LD groups, nevertheless, as expected, the 
participants with learning disabilities were significantly more suggestible. 
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Figure 5.6.1 Distribution of Total Suggestibility scores among the 'Learning 
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Moreover, again as expected, the difference in Total Suggestibility reflected the LD 
group's significantly greater susceptibility to `leading questions' (Yield 1); there was no 
significant difference between the groups in their responses to `negative feedback' 
(Shift). 
Relationships between suggestibility, memory and intellectual functioning 
Table 5.6.2 shows the correlations between Total Suggestibility, Immediate and Delayed 
Recall, and Full Scale IQ, for the LD and GP groups separately; since the differences 
between the groups for Yield 1 and Shift were so marked, for clarity they were excluded 
from this analysis. 
Table 5.6.2 Correlations between intellectual ability, memory and suggestibility 





FSIQ and Total 
Suggestibility (TS) 
-0.44** -0.04 "S 
Immediate recall and TS -0.31 * -0.18"' 
Delayed recall and TS -0.04 ns -0.17 "S 
"s not significant 
* significant at p<0.01 (t-test for the significance of Pearson's Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient. 1-tailed) 
** significant at p<0.001 (t-test for the significance of Pearson's Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient. 1-tailed) 
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The correlations were calculated using Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation 
Coefficients (see Appendix 7 for details). Surprisingly, within the LD group, 
suggestibility did not correlate significantly with delayed memory; nor did suggestibility 
correlate with memory or intellectual ability within the GP group. However, as 
expected, within the LD group both immediate memory and intellectual functioning 
were significantly negatively correlated with suggestibility. Whilst it appeared that 
intellectual functioning made more impact than immediate memory, statistical analysis, 
using a t-test for non-independent correlation coefficients (see Appendix 7 for details), 
showed that the difference was not significant (t = 0.89, df = 54,2-tailed). 
5.6.4 DISCUSSION 
Extending the preliminary investigation by Clare and Gudjonsson (1993), suggestibility 
was compared among people with learning disabilities and their `general population' 
counterparts. 
Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Cardone and Dent, 1996; Everington 
and Fulero, 1999; Milne et al., 2002; Tully and Cahill, 1984), the LD group had poorer 
memories for the material and were much more likely to be suggestible than their peers 
in the general population. This suggestibility reflected their susceptibility to the `leading 
questions' from which Yield 1 is scored. In contrast, their response to the `negative 
feedback' was no different from that of the control group. Whilst the possible impact of 
`ceiling' effects on the GSS which limit the extent to which people who are very 
vulnerable to the initial questions can alter their responses to the feedback (Gudj onsson, 
1990c) needs to be taken into account, nevertheless, the pattern of findings was 
consistent with those of both Cardone and Dent (ibid. ) and Milne et al. (ibid. ). The 
explanation of the apparent contradiction with the results obtained by Everington and 
Fulero (ibid. ) may lie in the characteristics of the participants involved in the different 
investigations. In contrast with other studies involving people with learning disabilities, 
Everington and Fulero (ibid. ) included a high proportion (55%, N=40) of African 
Americans. Whilst much more exploration is needed, empirical data from the U. K. 
(Gudjonsson et al., 1993; Gudjonsson et al., 1995) have suggested that there may be 
ethnic differences in suggestibility. 
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Though the results were all in the expected direction, rather surprisingly there was no 
statistical evidence of a relationship between suggestibility and memory or intellectual 
ability in the GP group. The most likely explanation lies in the `range' effects identified 
by Gudjonsson (1988a): the mean Full Scale IQ score of the GP group was close to the 
`cut-off of 100 above which memory, and in particular, intellectual functioning, no 
longer seem relevant to suggestibility, at least as measured by the GSS 2. In contrast 
with this explanation, the absesnce of the expected relationships between suggestibility 
and delayed memory in the LD group is rather puzzling. Importantly, though, and 
consistent with the study by Tully and Cahill (1984), both immediate memory and 
intellectual functioning were significantly inversely related to suggestibility. The 
implication is that susceptibility to suggestibility would be most marked among the most 
cognitively disadvantaged participants because of their vulnerability to the `leading 
questions'. 
Again, as with acquiescence, the overlap between the scores of the LD group and their 
`general population' counterparts demonstrates that assumptions about individuals 
based on their status as people with learning disabilities are unwarranted. Nevertheless, 
the findings provide convincing support for Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) 
indication that suggestibility is another `psychological vulnerability' for people with 
learning disabilities. 
5.7 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SUGGESTIBILITY 
Despite the overlap in the scores of the two groups, the findings indicated that, 
consistent with the results of other studies (Cardone and Dent, 1996; Milne et al., 2002; 
Tully and Cahill, 1984), people with learning disabilities are more likely to be 
suggestible than their `general population' peers. Though they are no more likely than 
their `general population' counterparts to change their responses following negative 
feedback, they are much more susceptible to `leading' or `affirmative' questions or 
questions which present `false alternatives'. The results are of practical importance for 
police detention and interviewing (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1995). They indicate that is 
not necessarily safe to rely upon information which is repeated after negative 
feedback: 
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an individual may simply be restating an account which was `shaped' earlier by 
questioning containing premises or expectations. 
From a theoretical perspective, the findings are consistent with Gudjonsson's (1988a, 
1992a) proposal that, among adults, the influence of memory impairments and 
intellectual disadvantage is primarily upon `leading questions' (Yield). In terms of 
Gudjonsson and Clark's (1986) model, inadequate recall of the material may exacerbate 
feelings of uncertainty in the interviewee and trust in the integrity of his or her 
interviewer. However, they apparently fit less easily with Gudjonsson's suggestion 
(ibid. ) that interrogative pressure mainly reflects social and personality factors. Given 
the impairments of social functioning which form part of the diagnosis, and the social 
disadvantage which is often experienced by people with learning disabilities, it might be 
expected that, like adolescents (Richardson et al., 1985; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1992; 
Warren et al., 1991), they would also find difficulties in coping with `negative feedback' 
and would obtain high Shift scores. However, it is possible that the subjective 
experiences of the GSS of the two groups may not be similar. Children aged twelve 
years or more in the general population perform at the same level as their adult 
counterparts on the measures of recall and resistance to `leading questions' (Ceci and 
Bruck, 1993). The `negative feedback' may affect their confidence in a `resistant' 
strategy and generate feelings of having disappointed or offended an authority figure. 
Seen in this light, the subsequent changes in responding may reflects adolescents' 
attempts to rectify a perceived interpersonal difficulty. In contrast, it is possible that, for 
people with learning disabilities, the feedback that they have `failed' again merely 
triggers feelings of `learned helplessness' (Weisz, 1999; and see Ch. 4.4) which are 
associated with inefficient decision-making strategies such as `defensive avoidance' 
(Janis and Mann, 1977; see Jenkinson and Nelms, 1994); as a result, they simply repeat 
their initial responses. Alternatively, they may be so used to failure that the `negative 
feedback' makes little impact. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to assess these 
possibilities. 
Though the GSS is a well-established test (Cooke and Carlin, 1998), concerns have been 
raised about its validity (Baxter, 1990; Beail, 2002; Cardone and Dent, 1996). In 
contrast with the narrative passage in the GSS, which is presented in one (auditory) 
modality, crime-related incidents in everyday life normally involve several modalities 
160 
(usually visual and auditory but also; on occasion, others). Such multi-modal input may 
facilitate the encoding and recall of memory traces (Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992), 
resulting in more complete and accurate recall and as Gudjonsson (1988a, 1992a) has 
proposed, increase resistance to `leading questions'. Moreover, the type of information 
which is presented (verbal, rather than visual) is precisely that which appears to be most 
difficult for people with mild learning disabilities (Martin et al., 2000). The implication 
is that the content of the GSS over-estimates suggestibility in men and women in this 
population. Certainly, it does appear that recall of the story can be improved and 
resistance to `leading questions' enhanced by amending the presentation so that it is 
presented visually as well as verbally (Cardone and Dent, ibid. ). Nevertheless, and 
importantly in the context of this thesis, in a preliminary study in which, to an attempt to 
improve its validity, the narrative passage in the GSS was replaced by a short filmed 
incident, it was still found that, compared with their peers in the general population, 
people with learning disabilities recalled fewer correct details and were more easily 
misled by the `leading questions' (Milne et al., 2002). Whilst the generalisability of 
these findings is uncertain (see Ch. 5.5.2), and they need to be replicated with more 
carefully selected groups, they do suggest that the suggestibility of people with learning 
disabilities is not, as, for example, Beail (2002) suggests, simply a reflection of the 
idiosyncracies of the GSS. 
Given that the focus of this thesis is the putative `psychological vulnerability' of people 
with learning disabilities, the analysis of the results has focussed on the differences 
between the performance on the measure of suggestibility of people in this group and 
their counterparts in the general population. Suggestions for minimising the practical 
impact of these differences are made at the end of this chapter Next, though, a third 
personality characteristic, confabulation, which may also be relevant to police detention 
and interviewing is examined. 
5.8 CONFABULATION 
5.8.1 THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF CONFABULATION 
Developing from studies of the difficulties of people with organic amnesias (Kopelman, 
1987; Lezak, 1995) or serious mental health problems (Nathaniel-James and Frith, 
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1996; Sigurdsson, Gudjonsson, Kolbeinsson and Petursson, 1994; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995a), confabulation refers to: 
`problems in memory processing where people replace gaps in their memory with 
imaginary experiences which they believe to be true' (Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 136; 
see also Berlyne, 1972; Mercer et al., 1977). 
Increasingly, however, the potential importance of confabulation during police detention 
and interviewing has been recognised (Gudjonsson, 1992a; Milne and Bull, 1999). 
There are two sources of evidence. First, analyses of successful appeals against 
conviction suggest that, even among individuals who do not have a personality disorder, 
susceptibility to confabulation may lead to the provision of information which is 
inadvertently self-incriminating, including false confessions. In the case of Andrew 
Evans (see Ch. 5.1; and Gudj onsson, 2003, for a detailed account), for example, it 
appears that a man with long-standing psychological problems, experiencing mental 
distress following medical discharge from the army, developed a `memory distrust 
syndrome' (Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1982) after the police challenged him about an 
error in his alibi for a murder. Without any prompting, he then invented details to 
support his feeling that he `must have' been involved in the offence. At his trial in 1973, 
it was argued that the vagueness of his statements to the police and the many factual 
errors they contained reflected a `psychogenic amnesia'. Almost twenty-five years later, 
the Court of Appeal rejected this diagnosis, and accepted that Mr. Evans, who had an 
abnormal tendency to confabulate, and a need for attention, had simply produced 
material which he found exciting and, he thought, made others believe that he was 
important and interesting (for a similar case, in the U. S. A., see Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 
316 ff). 
Secondly, from an `individual differences' perspective, Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson 
(1996b), examining Icelandic convicted prisoners who were alleged `false confessors', 
found that individuals who reported that, at some point they had believed in the truth of 
their confessions (N=9 for this part of the study) confabulated more than their 
counterparts (N=48). In this study, and others adopting a similar approach, the accepted 
formal measure of confabulation is based on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales 
(Gudjonsson, 1997; see Ch. 5.5). Following Gudjonsson (ibid. ), it is scored from 
material which is not presented in the narrative passage but is reported during 
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immediate, and then delayed, free recall. Though much more difficult to score reliably 
than the memory and suggestibility measures, the inter-rater reliability of confabulation 
on the GSS 2 is satisfactory for both Immediate recall (K = 0.803) and for Delayed recall 
(K = 0.724; p<0.01, for each; Clare et al., 1994). 
Theoretically, it has been proposed (Mercer et al., 1977), that confabulation takes place 
when an individual not only has: (i) a memory impairment; but also (ii) an expectation 
that a response should be made; (iii) an overlearned or affectively significant response 
available to him or her; and (iv) an impairment of self-monitoring (that is, impaired 
executive functioning, Baddeley, 1990). It seems, then, that confabulation occurs in 
response to uncertainty. Supporting this account is evidence (Gudjonsson and 
Sigurdsson, 1996; Perlman et al., 1994; Register and Kihlstrom, 1988; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1986; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995a; Tata and Gudjonsson, 1990) that 
memory impairments increase confabulation. Moreover, other findings suggest that 
participants confabulate more when they have been asked misleading questions 
repeatedly (Register and Kihlstrom, ibid. ) or have received severely negative feedback 
(Tata and Gudjonsson, ibid. ). More recently, it has appeared that the concept of 
confabulation may be more complex than was first thought. Kopelman (1987) has 
proposed, based on his investigations of organic amnesias, that there may, in fact, be 
two distinct forms: 
(i) provoked or `momentary' confabulation reflecting a normal response to lapses in 
memory; and 
(ii) spontaneous or `fantastic' confabulation relating to the effects of frontal lobe 
pathology. 
Gudjonsson (1997) has called these two forms distortions (equivalent to the `provoked' 
form) and fabrications (equivalent to the `spontaneous' form). Consistent with 
Kopelman's (ibid. ) distinction, a number of studies suggest they are unrelated 
(Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and 
Sigurdsson, 1996; Smith and Gudjonsson, ibid. ). Indeed, Gudjonsson and Clare's (ibid. ) 
factor analysis indicated that distortions and fabrications load on separate factors. The 
implication is that they reflect different psychological phenomena. 
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5.8.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF CONFABULATION 
Based on Mercer et al. 's (1977) account, it would be expected that confabulation would 
be related to factors which may increase uncertainty. Surprisingly, despite some 
supportive evidence for this account (Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; Register and 
Kihlstrom, 1988; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1986; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995a; Tata and 
Gudjonsson, 1990), other findings suggest that confabulation is not associated with : 
" intellectual ability (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995); 
" memory impairments (Gudjonsson and Clare, ibid.; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 
1996b; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995b; Sigurdsson et al., 1994); 
" low self-esteem (Smith and. Gudjonsson, 1995b); or with 
" compliance (Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995b). 
Nor is there consistent support for Kopelman's (1987) `two form' conceptualisation: for 
example, contrary to expectations given the established association between problems in 
executive functioning and schizophrenia (Joyce, Collinson and Crichton, 1996; Wykes, 
Reeder, Corner, Williams and Everitt, 1999), Smith and Gudjonsson (1995b) found that 
forensic in-patients with this diagnosis (N=16) produced fewer fabrications than their 
counterparts with anti-social personality disorder (N=7). 
Nevertheless, despite these discrepant findings, the potential importance of 
confabulation suggests that it should continue to be explored. Though Gudjonsson and 
Clare (1995, N=145) found that neither distortions nor fabrications correlated 
significantly with intellectual functioning, the results of two eye-witnessing studies 
provide indirect evidence that, compared with their `general population' peers, people 
with learning disabilities may be more susceptible to confabulation. The first study, by 
Perlman and her colleagues (Perlman et al., 1994), used participants attending `learning 
disabilities' services. Compared with their peers (N=30), the intellectually 
disadvantaged participants (N=30) reported significantly more confabulations 
(fabrications and distortions combined) during free recall. Subsequently, Milne et al. 
(1999) also found that men and women with mild learning disabilities (N=47) 
confabulated more than their `general population' peers (N=38). Unfortunately, though, 
in the context of this thesis, the impact of the findings of both studies is limited by the 
identification and sampling of the experimental and comparison groups (see Ch. 5.5.2). 
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5.9 STUDY 8: SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CONFABULATION 
5.9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the conceptualisation of confabulation seems to need further development, 
Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) proposal that it may be a `psychological 
vulnerability' for people with learning disabilities has some experimental support 
(Milne et al., 1999; Perlman et al., 1994, but c. f. Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995). Further 
support was obtained from the findings of a preliminary study (initially reported in Clare 
and Gudjonsson, 1993). 
In their study, Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) examined confabulation on the GSS 2 
(Gudjonsson, 1987,1997). As expected (Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; Milne et 
al., 1999; Perlman et al., 1994; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1995,1996b; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995b; Sigurdsson et al., 1994), at both Immediate and Delayed Recall, the 
`learning disabilities' group (N=20; mean Full Scale IQ: 65; s. d. 5.3) produced 
significantly more (p<0.025) confabulations than their `general population' peers (N= 
21; mean Full Scale IQ: s. d. 7.2). Given the discrepant findings (Gudjonsson and Clare, 
ibid. ), it seemed worthwhile, in the context of this thesis, to extend the data base of the 
preliminary study. In addition, at the time when this study was carried out, confabulation 
was still being treated as a unitary construct. Subsequent developments, indicating that 
there are two distinct forms, distortions and fabrications (Gudjonsson and Clare, ibid.; 
Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995a), suggest that it would also be pertinent to explore the relationship 
between them. 
The aims of the study, then, were: 
(i) to extend the findings of Clare and Gudj onsson's (1993) preliminary comparison 
of confabulation among people with mild learning disabilities and their peers in 
the general population. It was expected that, compared with their `general 
population' counterparts, the `learning disabilities' group would confabulate 
more; 
(ii) to explore the relationships between distortions and fabrications. It was expected 





There were two groups of volunteer participants, drawn as convenience samples. All the 
participants were fluent in English: 
Learning disabilities: the LD group comprised the 35 men and 22 women who had 
taken part in Study 6 (Ch. 5.3) and Study 7 (Ch. 5.6). Twenty of them had also 
participated in the preliminary study (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) and had also been 
involved in Study 1 (Ch. 3.2); they were not retested. 
General population: the GP group comprised the 37 men and 22 women who had taken 
part in Study 6 (see Ch. 5.3) and Study 7 (see Ch. 5.6). Again, twenty of them had already 
participated in the preliminary study (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) and Study 1 (Ch. 3.2); 
they were not retested. 
Measures 
1. Intellectual functioning: the majority (N=76) of the participants completed all eleven 
sub-tests of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981). For practical reasons, the remaining 40 
participants, who had already taken part in Study 1 (Chapter 3.2), completed only 
eight sub-tests (four verbal, and four non-verbal; see Ch. 3.2.2); their scores were 
used to prorate Full Scale IQ. 
2. Confabulation: Following Gudjonsson (1997), confabulations were scored separately 
for immediate and delayed recall of the narrative passage of the GS S2 (Gudj onsson, 
1987,1997). For each, total confabulations was obtained by adding the number of 
distortions and fabrications. A distortion was defined as a change in the details of an 
idea in the story, or the substitution of an idea from one part of the story for another. 
A fabrication was the defined as the introduction of entirely new material which was 
neither mentioned nor implied in the story. 
Procedure and scoring 
Participants were seen individually, in a quiet room, at their place of work or 
centre/club, or at day-services or residential placements for people with learning 
disabilities. I had assessed the forty participants involved in the preliminary study. The 
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remaining seventy-six participants were recruited and assessed by Ms. Philippa Cross, 
the Research Assistant whom I had trained in the administration of the tests (see Study 
2, Ch. 3.3; and Studies 6 and 7, this Chapter). The same procedure was used for all the 
participants. First, each person completed the assessment of intellectual functioning. 
Then, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, Form 2 (the GSS 2, Gudjonsson, 1987, 
1997) was presented, as described in Study 7. Using the guidance provided by 
Gudjonsson (1997), Immediate and Delayed recall for each participant were scored for 
distortions and fabrications, separately. Since it had been established that I was a 
reliable scorer (Clare et al., 1994), 1 carried out all the scoring. 
5.9.3 RESULTS 
The chronological ages and Full Scale IQ scores of the two groups are shown in Table 
5.3.1 (Ch. 5.3.3). As initially reported in the Results for Study 6 (see Ch. 5.3.3), the 
mean chronological ages of the two groups did not differ significantly. However, as 
expected the mean Full Scale IQ score of the `learning disabilities' (LD) group was 
significantly lower than that of the `general population' (GP) group. 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Comparison of the scores for total confabulations, distortions and fabrications 
Table 5.9.1 shows, for Immediate and Delayed Recall, the mean scores, standard 
deviations, and ranges of scores for total confabulations, distortions and fabrications of 
the LD and GP groups. 
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Table 5.9.1 Confabulation scores for the two groups 
Learning disabilities General population Mann-Whitney 
mean s. d. range Mean s. d. range U value 
Immediate recall 
Distortions 1.3 1.2 0-6 0.9 1.1 0-5 U= 1332* 
Fabrications 0.4 0.8 0-4 0.4 0.7 0-2 U= 1635 °. S. 
Confabulations 1.8 1.4 0-6 1.4 1.2 0-6 U= 1401 °. S. 
Delayed recall 
Distortions 1.2 1.1 0-4 1.2 1.0 0-4 U= 1603 °. S. 
Fabrications 0.5 0.9 0-3 0.5 0.7 0-2 U= 1663 °. S. 
Confabulations 1.7 1.4 0-7 1.7 1.2 0-4 U= 1641 °. S. 
N=57 N=59 
°. S. not significant; * sig. at p<0.05 (1 - tailed) 
Since none of the scores approximated to the Normal distribution, the medians were 
compared statistically by calculating Mann-Whitney's U (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Unexpectedly, the participants with learning disabilities did not confabulate 
significantly more than their GP counterparts on either Immediate or Delayed recall; nor 
did they produce more fabrications. The only significant difference between the two 
groups was on Immediate recall, where the `learning disabilities' participants produced 
more distortions. 
Relationships between distortions and fabrications 
The correlations between distortions and fabrications were calculated for each group 
separately. Since neither group's data approximated to the Normal distribution, 
Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficients were used (see Appendix 7 for 
details). As expected, among the LD group, there were no significant correlations 
between distortions and fabrications at Immediate recall (p = -0.05,2-tailed) or at 
Delayed recall (p = 0.04,2-tailed). Similarly, among the GP group, distortions and 
fabrications did not correlate significantly at Immediate recall (p = -0.05,2-tailed) or 
Delayed recall (p = 0.08,2-tailed). 
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5.9.4 DISCUSSION % 
Extending an earlier investigation by Clare and Gudjonsson (1993), confabulation was 
compared among people with mild learning disabilities and their `general population' 
counterparts. Whilst the inter-rater reliability of the scoring was not assessed, it seems 
unlikely (Clare et al., 1994) that this omission was of practical significance. 
Unexpectedly, given the results of the preliminary study (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993) 
and of other investigations (Milne et al., 1999; Perlman et al., 1994; but c. f. Gudjonsson 
and Clare, 1995), and their poorer Immediate and Delayed recall (see Table 5.6.2), the 
participants with learning disabilities did not confabulate significantly more. In fact, 
with the exception of Immediate recall, on which the LD group were more likely to 
report distortions, and which, of itself is probably of limited importance, there were no 
significant differences between the two groups. As expected (Gudjonsson and Clare, 
1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995a), distortions and fabrications were not related in either the LD or the 
GP group. 
Superficially, the findings suggest that assumptions about confabulation based on a 
`status' approach to people with learning disabilities are unwarranted and that, contrary 
to Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) suggestion, overall, despite the increase in 
distortions on Immediate recall, overall, confabulation is not a `psychological 
vulnerability' for people with learning disabilities. Unfortunately, when the proportion 
of confabulations to recall was calculated for each group by dividing the number of 
confabulations at Immediate and then Delayed recall by the sum of the relevant memory 
scores and confabulations, the findings were less encouraging. Compared with their 
counterparts in the general population, the LD group produced twice as much 
confabulated information (LD: 18% for Immediate recall; 23% for Delayed recall; GP: 
8% for Immediate recall; 9% for Delayed recall). This suggests that confabulation may, 
after all, be of practical significance during police detention and interviewing. 
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5.10 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CONFABULATION 
Despite superficially encouraging findings, further analysis indicated that, compared 
with their `general population' counterparts, people with learning disabilities produce 
relatively more distortions and fabrications. In the context of this thesis, this finding is 
of practical significance. 
From a theoretical perspective, the findings provide further support for Kopelman's 
(1987) proposal that there are two distinct forms of confabulation (Gudjonsson and 
Clare, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; 
Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995a). The results are also consistent with the account 
provided by Mercer et al. (1977) which suggests that confabulation reflects feelings of 
uncertainty as a result, in part, of memory impairments (Gudjonsson, 1988a; Martin et 
al., 2000; and see Ch. 5.6. ) and problems in executive functioning (Pennington and 
Bennetto, 1998). Nevertheless, the findings of this study cannot easily be reconciled 
with those of several other investigations, albeit using different participants 
(Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b, Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995b; Sigurdsson et al., 1994). 
The literature on confabulation, which is rather confusing, suggests that it would be 
unwise to place too much confidence in any single study. Though different studies have 
used different methodologies (in particular, the eye-witnessing studies of Milne et al. 
(1999) and Perlman et al. (1994)), it seems unlikely that the discrepancies reflect 
methodological issues. Although clarifications of the definition and scoring of 
confabulation have been carried out over time (Clare et al., 1994), the majority of 
investigations (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1995; 
Register and Kihlstrom, 1988; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1995,1996b; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1986; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995a, b; Sigurdsson et al., 1994; Tata and 
Gudjonsson, 1990) use a similar methodology, or are at least based on the same 
accepted measure (the GSS), and most have been carried out by Professor Gudjonsson 
and his colleagues. Yet as he himself, rather ruefully, concludes from his review, the: 
`findings show the complexity of the nature of confabulation' (Gudjonsson, 1997, 
p. 19). 
How might the discrepancies between different studies be explained? 
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First, much more detailed analysis of distortions and fabrications and their relationships 
with a range of cognitive, affective, and other individual characteristics is needed so that 
the conceptualisation of confabulation can be developed. Secondly, and relatedly, 
though the modest test-retest correlations (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995; Smith and 
Gudjonsson, 1995a) and investigations of the impact of specific manipulations during 
interviewing (Register and Kihlstrom, 1988; Tata and Gudjonsson, 1990), suggest that 
confabulation may be related to situational effects and interact with participants' 
characteristics, so far these have barely been explored empirically. Thirdly, and again 
relatedly, little attention has been paid to the stimulus material, and its impact on 
different participants. The case of David MacKenzie (see Ch. 1.5), who made voluntary 
confessions to some murders which he could not have committed, illustrates this point. 
In contrast with his response to the GSS 2 story, which is not crime-related, he produced 
elaborate confabulations to the story of the GSS 1 which relates to the robbery of `Anna 
Thompson' (Gudjonsson, 1997) and to which a sentence had deliberately been added 
indicating that she was sexually assaulted and killed. Indeed, Mr. MacKenzie 
subsequently claimed that he had been involved in her death (Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 243 
ff. ). The implication is that, in some circumstances, the properties of the material used 
to assess confabulation may interact with an individual's particular psychopathology to 
produce distortions and/or fabrications. Whilst confabulation has been examined almost 
exclusively from an `individual differences' perspective, some of the discrepant findings 
might be resolved through the adoption of a functional approach (as, for example, 
Gudjonsson, 1986, has applied to acquiescence, see Ch. 5.2). 
Nevertheless, though it should be regarded with caution, the findings suggest that 
confabulation is a `psychological vulnerability' for people with learning disabilities, and 
needs to be considered during police detention and interviewing 
5.11 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this Chapter, three experimental studies have been reported to examine Gudjonsson's 
(1992a, 1993,1994,1999) proposal that, compared with their peers in the general 
population, people with learning disabilities are more likely to have the personality 
characteristics of acquiescence, suggestibility and confabulation. Compared with their 
GP counterparts, during unprompted free recall, the LD group provided more limited 
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correct information (Study 7, Ch. 5.6) and a greater proportion of information which 
was incorrect (Study 8, Ch. 5.9). In addition, during questioning, they demonstrated 
much greater readiness to `give in' to questions or statements which contain premises 
based on prior information or assumptions, or expectations which indicated the desired 
response (Study 6, Ch. 5.3; and Study 7, Ch. 5.6), and maintained these responses in the 
face of interrogative pressure (Study 7, Ch. 5.6). 
Relationships between acquiescence, suggestibility and confabulation 
From a theoretical perspective, acquiescence, suggestibility and confabulation are 
conceptually related: they are all strategies, whether conscious or unconscious, for 
coping with uncertainty in response to questions or statements Gudjonsson, 1992a; 
Gudjonsson and Clark, 1986). The findings of empirical studies which do not involve 
participants with learning disabilities, or in which they form only part of the 
experimental sample, suggest that: 
" acquiescence and suggestibility may be related (Gudjonsson, 1986, but c. f. 
Gudjonsson, 1990b). It seems likely that the relationship reflects the impact of 
`leading questions' (Yield) since it is this aspect which correlates with 
acquiescence (Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995); 
" confabulation may be related to the interrogative pressure aspect of suggestibility 
(Shift; Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson, 1996; Smith and Gudjonsson, 1995b) but not 
to Yield (Gudjonsson and Clare, ibid. ); and 
" neither distortions nor fabrications, considered separately, are related to 
acquiescence (Gudjonsson and Clare, ibid. ). 
It seems, then, that acquiescence may be most closely related to intellectual functioning 
whilst confabulation reflects other aspects of personality; interrogative suggestibility lies 
between the two. However, the relationships between the three personality 
characteristics have never been examined within a group comprising only men and 
women with learning disabilities. 
The correlations between acquiescence, suggestibility and confabulation among the LD 
group (N=57) were calculated (using Pearson's Product Moment Correlation 
Coefficients or Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficients, when parametric tests 
were not appropriate, see Appendix 7 for details). Surprisingly, with the exception of the 
Shift aspect of suggestibility and acquiescence, which, contrary to predictions 
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(Gudjonsson and Clare, 1995), were significantly negatively related (r = -0.35; p<0.01, 
1-tailed), none of the relationships were significant. The reasons for these findings are 
uncertain, and the data must be regarded as preliminary. Nevertheless, encouragingly, 
the findings suggest that there are not particular individuals who are at increased risk of 
susceptibility to all three characteristics. 
So far, however, the personality characteristic which is, according to Cooke and Carlin 
(1998), of most relevance to the admissibility of evidence - compliance - has not been 
examined. 
5.11.1 COMPLIANCE 
Whilst the nature of compliance continues to be debated (Gudjonsson, 1992a; Milne and 
Bull, 1999; Rizutto, 1999), it has been defined predominantly as the act of `going along' 
with: 
`propositions, requests or instructions for some immediate instrumental gain' 
(Gudjonsson, 1992a, p. 137). 
Following this definition, a person who acts compliantly abrogates personal 
responsibility for decision-making: regardless of the individual's own views, he or she 
acts in accordance with the perceived wishes of others. 
As already noted (see Ch. 1.2), arguably, the admissibility in English law of 
uncorroborated confession evidence means that detention always has the potential to be 
coercive for the alleged perpetrators of criminal offences and lead them to provide 
information which is unreliable, misleading, or self-incriminating, including false 
confessions. To minimise this potential, there is a long-standing tradition, preserved 
and extended by the introduction of PACE and its accompanying Codes of Practice of 
providing safeguards to suspects (see Ch. 1.4). Unfortunately, though, as Gudjonsson 
(2003) concludes, wrongful convictions based on confession evidence provided by 
compliant detained persons still take place (for example, the case of Stephen Miller (R. 
v. Paris, Abdullahi and Miller 1993; see Ch. 1.5)). 
In contrast with acquiescence, where a functional approach has been adopted 
(Gudjonsson, 1986), in compliance the primary focus of interest has been on the impact 
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of situational factors. These have been studied mainly through (i) analyses of `real life' 
incidents in which people without any apparent psychological difficulties have made 
blatantly false confessions under the duress of a political regime (see Gudjonsson, 
1992a, p. 212 ff. ) or committed atrocities against others (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989); 
and (ii) behavioural experiments, such as the influential series of investigations on 
`obedience to authority' by Milgram (1974). Applying the findings of this work, Irving 
and Hilgendorf (1980) have proposed that police detention and interviewing inherently 
contain a number of situational factors which promote compliance among suspects, 
including: 
" detention in an environment which is unfamiliar, or of limited familiarity; 
9 the threat of harm, including loss of self-esteem, emotional isolation, and, perhaps 
in the longer term, loss of liberty; and 
" subordination to legitimate authority. 
However, as already noted, some suspects seem much more susceptible than others to 
these situational effects (Pearse et al., 1998; see Ch. 4.1.3), suggesting that `individual 
differences' may also be of importance. Two sources of evidence support this 
suggestion. 
First, analyses of English cases where confession evidence has led either to criminal 
charges which have been dropped before trial (Gudjonsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and 
MacKeith, 1994) or convictions which have subsequently been quashed by the Court of 
Appeal (for example, that of Darren Hall in R. v. O'Brien, Hall and Sherwood 2000; see 
Ch. 5.1.1, and Gudjonsson, 2003, for further details) has suggested that many involve 
men and women who, inter alia, seem to be unusually compliant. Similarly, abnormal 
compliance was one of the personality characteristics of Henry Lee Lucas, an American 
man who has confessed, on many occasions blatantly falsely, to approximately six 
hundred murders (Gudjonsson, 1999). Secondly, supporting the findings of an earlier 
study (Gudjonsson, 1989a), Gudjonsson (1991b) found that defendants (N = 20) who 
alleged that they had made one or more false confessions during police interviews were 
significantly more compliant than their `resister' counterparts (N=20), men and women 
who denied their involvement despite forensic evidence against them. More recently, 
similar findings emerged from a large study (N=509) involving convicted adult 
prisoners in Iceland: compared with their peers, men and women who reported that they 
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had made a false confession at some time in their lives (N=62) were significantly more 
compliant (Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b). 
Drawing on previous work, particularly that of Milgram (1974), Gudjonsson (1989a) 
has proposed that individual differences in compliance mainly reflect two, related, 
factors, which interact with the specific situation. These are: 
(i) eagerness to please and concern to protect personal self-esteem (Konoske, Staple 
and Graf, 1979); 
(ii) avoidance of conflict and confrontation and fear of authority (Irving and 
Hilgendorf, 1980). 
How might these factors be assessed? So far, two methods have been used: direct 
observation and self-report. Direct observation was used in the studies carried out by 
Milgram (1974), which involved counting the number of participants prepared to obey 
each stage of the experimenter's increasingly callous instructions. Gudjonsson (1997), 
however, has argued that such complex laboratory tasks are often impractical. 
Moreover, involving people in acts which they might later regret raises serious ethical 
concerns (Baumrind, 1964; Gudjonsson, 1997; Parker, 2000). 
As an alternative, Gudjonsson (1989a) has developed a self-report scale, the Gudjonsson 
Compliance Scale (GCS, Form D). Though not without its critics (Cooke and Carlin, 
1998), the GCS has become widely used as a measure of compliance in a forensic 
context. The GCS comprises twenty `true'/'false' statements, with a high score 
indicating greater susceptibility to compliance. For seventeen of the items, a compliant 
response is given by `true'; for the remaining three, by a `false' response. Consistent 
with the proposed theoretical basis of compliance (Gudjonsson, ibid. ), factor analysis 
suggests that ten of the items reflect difficulties in coping with pressure, with a further 
five comprising eagerness to please. The remaining five items are only modestly related 
and Gudjonsson (ibid. ) remarks that this factor is `rather obscure' (Gudjonsson, ibid., p. 
536). 
Whilst the relationship between the two putative components of compliance and the 
mechanism through which they may exercise their impact remains uncertain, 
Gudjonsson's (1989a) analysis suggests that compliant responding reflects low levels of 
self-esteem and self-efficacy. Consistent with this suggestion, Milgram (1974) found 
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that, compared with their peers, participants whose education was more limited and 
whose employment offered fewer opportunities for autonomous decision-making were 
more likely to obey the experimenter. The results of other studies support Milgram's 
(ibid. ) findings. In Gudjonsson's (1989a) investigation, for example, soldiers and 
prisoners were more compliant than nurses or medical students. In turn, these `carers' 
were more compliant than University students or academic staff. The most compliant 
group comprised the men and women (N=55) who alleged that they had made a false 
confession during police interviewing; the least compliant (N=13), the `resisters', who, 
despite forensic evidence against them, denied any involvement. Similarly, consistent 
with Gudjonsson's (ibid. ) analysis, it appears that compliant responding is related to 
performance on established tests of: 
" guilt (Freedman, Wallington and Bless, 1967; Konoske et al., 1979); 
" anxiety (Gudjonsson and Smith, 1995a); 
" conformity (Gudjonsson, 1989a); 
" social desirability (Gudjonsson, 1989a); 
" neuroticism (Gudjonsson, 1989a; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b); and 
" paranoid thinking (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Brynjolfsdottir and Hreinsdottir, 
2002) 
Though intellectual ability and compliance do not appear to be related (Gudjonsson, 
1989b, 1990b, 1991b; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b), it might be expected that, 
because of their generally low self-esteem and limited sense of self-efficacy (Hodapp 
and Fidler, 1999; see also Weisz, 1999, and Ch. 4), people with learning disabilities 
would be at greater risk of compliant responding than their peers in the general 
population. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the GCS can be used to examine this 
suggestion. According to the Manual: 
`(i)t is not advisable to administer the Scale to subjects whose I. Q. score falls 
below 70. Some of the items contain words, concepts and ideas that are 
complicated... Even some more intellectually able persons may have problems 
understanding some of the items' (Gudjonsson, 1997, p. 13). 
Analysis of the GCS suggests that this caution is warranted. Using the Flesch Formula 
(Flesch, 1948) to analyse the twenty statements indicated that their `Reading Ease' is 
76.5 ('fairly easy' on a scale from 0 `very difficult' to 100 `very easy'). This translates 
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(Ley, 1977) into a crude estimate that a Full Scale I. Q. score of 87 or more would be 
needed to understand the material fully. 
To maximise the use of the GCS for people with learning disabilities, Gudjonsson 
(1997) has devised an alternative form (Form E), to be completed by an informant. 
Whilst it appears useful (Gudjonsson, 1995; Gudjonsson and MacKeith, 1994), the 
items, like those of the original form, are transparent. As Gudjonsson (1997) and others 
(Cooke and Carlin, 1998), have pointed out, they could be easily faked by respondents. 
However, from experience as a clinician, this is not the main problem. Informants who 
are paid carers or partners have rarely known the individual as a child. This means that 
two items (nos. 1 and 5) which relate strongly to the ability to cope with pressure 
(Gudjonsson, 1989b), cannot be completed; instead, the person's score has to be pro- 
rated from the remaining eighteen statements. In addition, paid carers seem to compare 
individuals with learning disabilities with others with the same diagnosis; given the 
variation in scores among different groups (Gudjonsson, 1989a), such a practice may 
lead to an under-estimate of the person's compliance. In theory, parents and other close 
family members may be the most appropriate source of information but the complexity 
of the GCS (Gudjonsson, 1997) means that, on some occasions, they too will be unable 
to respond to the items appropriately. 
Given Gudj onsson's (1997) advice and the subsequent analysis of its complexity, it 
would have been unwise to have tried to use the self-report version of the GCS to 
examine Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) proposal that compliance is a 
`psychological vulnerability' for people with learning disabilities; unfortunately, it was 
not feasible to use the informant version instead. It is an acknowledged limitation of the 
empirical work described in this thesis that no attempt was made to develop an 
appropriate methodology to assess compliance; this very important task still needs to be 
carried out. 
Nevertheless, the findings of the studies reported in this chapter are of practical 
relevance. Though many interviews are brief, routine, affairs (Baldwin, 1994; Moston et 
al., 1992; Pearse, 1997; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996; and see Ch. 1.2), and factors 
internal to suspects may be of limited importance (Pearse et al., 1998), this is not 
inevitable (Baldwin, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Pearse, 1997; Pearse and 
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Gudjonsson, 1996,1999). Under some circumstances, the personality characteristics 
discussed in this chapter, which are a greater `vulnerability' for people with learning 
disabilities than their `general population' counterparts, may compromise individuals' 
ability to make decisions which minimise the likelihood that they will provide 
information which is misleading, unreliable, or inadvertently self-incriminating. How 
might this `vulnerability' be reduced? 
Detailed guidance about interviewing people with learning disabilities is available 
elsewhere (see, for example, excellent discussions by Bull and Cullen, 1992; Finlay and 
Lyons, 2002; Milne and Bull, 1999; and Prosser and Bromley, 1998). In the particular 
context of police detention and interviewing, however, it may be helpful, first, for police 
officers and solicitors to ensure that suspects understand the questions and statements to 
which they are responding. This could be assessed simply by asking detained persons to 
explain material, in their own words, using, for example, paraphrased recall (see Ch. 3; 
and see Ch. 3.5 for a discussion of this point in relation to the caution and other legal 
rights). Secondly, at the beginning of each interview session, suspects should be advised 
strongly that: 
" they might not know the answers to questions, or might be unable to recall 
information accurately, and that it is acceptable to state that they `don't know; 
" if questions are repeated, that does not necessarily mean that their initial response 
has been incorrect; and 
" the questions asked might be (mis)leading since the interviewer is trying to 
reconstruct events at which he or she was not present. 
However, these strategies do not avoid a more fundamental difficulty: compared with 
their peers in the general population, adults with learning disabilities appear to 
experience problems in providing detailed unprompted accounts (Milne, Clare and Bull, 
1999; Perlman et al., 1994; and see Study 7, Ch. 5.6). This means that it is difficult to 
avoid direct questioning. Based on a preliminary study which involved eliciting 
accounts of a film from eye-witness participants, Milne et al. (ibid. ) have suggested that 
the `cognitive interview' (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992) may assist in enhancing recall. 
Approximately one-third (35%) more correct information was obtained during free 
recall from men and women with mild learning disabilities who were interviewed with a 
`cognitive interview' rather than an exemplary `standard' interview (and as Baldwin, 
1994, has commented (see Ch. 1.2), much police interviewing is far from exemplary). 
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Whilst the findings are encouraging, it is not clear whether this approach, which was 
initially developed to assist victims and other non-suspect witnesses to provide 
information, is likely to be effective with alleged perpetrators; much further 
investigation is needed. 
In the meantime, the results of the investigations carried out in this chapter and the two 
previous chapters provide convincing support for Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994, 
1999) proposal that, compared with their `general population' counterparts, people with 
learning disabilities have `psychological vulnerabilities' which place them `at risk' 
during police detention and interviewing. In the next two chapters (Chs. 6 and 7), 




IMPROVING THE ACCESSIBILITY OF THE CAUTION 
AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS PRESENTED IN THE NOTICE 
TO DETAINED PERSONS 
The results of the three studies reported in Ch. 3 indicated that, consistent with the 
suggestion made by Gudjonsson (1992a, 1993,1994,1999), limited understanding of 
the information about the caution and legal rights provided in the Notice to Detained 
Persons is a `psychological vulnerability' for people with mild learning disabilities. 
However, the disadvantages of these men and women need to be seen in the context of 
the difficulties experienced by their `general population' counterparts, including those 
who are intellectually able, or have special training (such as the police). Worryingly, 
Home Office revisions of the material in the NDP do not appear, overall, to have 
improved its accessibility; it remains too complex. 
Whilst it is possible to agree with Jackson's (1995) contention that legal language does 
not have a communicative function, such cynicism is not helpful in trying to improve 
the situation. The caution and legal rights are legally important in decisions about the 
admissibility of evidence (see Ch. 1.5), and are of practical importance to suspects 
(Baldwin, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Leng, 1993; McConville and 
Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1992; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998) 
in protecting them from inadvertently making self-incriminating statements. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe an attempt to devise and evaluate a new version of 
the Notice to Detained Persons which would improve its accessibility and, perhaps, 
minimise the likelihood of miscarriages of justice involving `vulnerable' suspects. 
Four versions of the Notice to Detained Persons are referred to in this chapter, each 
presenting a different form of the caution and/or the legal rights. Adopting the same 
format as Ch. 3, these four versions are invariably referred to as: 
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1. Original: the version which was introduced in England and Wales on 1St January, 
1986, and remained in use until 3 1St March, 1991; 
2. Revised: the version which was introduced on 1St April, 1991, and remained in 
use until 31st March, 1995; 
3. Current: the version which was introduced on 1St April, 1995, and is currently in 
use. It includes the new form of the caution, but is otherwise identical to the 
Revised version; 
4. Experimental: the amended version of the Revised caution and rights (then the 
standard version) whose development and piloting are described in this chapter. 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
6.1.1 ASSESSING THE ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION 
In Ch. 3.1.1, it was argued that the understanding of relevant information is necessary, 
though not sufficient, for making valid legally-significant decisions (Appelbaum and 
Grisso, 1988,1995; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998; Law Commission, 1995). A number 
of psychological methodologies were outlined for eliciting people's understanding of 
relevant information. Mostly, these have been used to compare the performance of 
groups whose characteristics place them at risk of impaired decision-making with that of 
their counterparts in the general population (for example, Clare and Gudjonsson, 1991; 
Wong et al., 2000). An alternative approach (e. g. Shepherd et al., 1995; Fenner et al., 
2002) focusses instead on the information, and examines the extent to which it is 
adequately understood by the target decision-maker(s). Adopting this approach, it is the 
information itself which is treated as potentially problematic. The problems may arise in 
relation to (i) the language used, and (ii) the presentation of that language. 
Though there are no agreed criteria for evaluating the acceptability of legally-significant 
information (Penny Letts, personal communication, 1999), recent case law and proposed 
legislation have suggested that it should be provided in `broad terms and simple 
language' (Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1994); s. 2(3), draft Bill on Mental 
Incapacity (Law Commission, 1995)). Since it is assumed that simpler language is more 
easily understood, a number of strategies have been devised for making language, 
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including legal language (Jackson, " 1995; Lloyd-Bostock, 1988), less complex. Inter 
alia, these strategies involve: 
" using short sentences (if possible, with fewer than 25 words); 
" avoiding embedded clauses; 
" removing archaisms; 
" substituting common words for technical terms; 
" avoiding the use of common words in uncommon ways (such as `caution', Rock, 
1999a); 
" eliminating complex syntax such as negatives (especially double-negatives), 
passives, and nominalisation (the use of an abstract noun for an activity that could 
be expressed by a verb, Asprey, 1991); 
" limiting binomials (a `sequence of two words which belong to the same form- 
class, and which are syntactically co-ordinated and semantically related', 
Gustafsson, 1984, cited in Jackson, 1995, p. 121; as in, for example, the following 
part of the standard witness oath `... the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth'); 
" reducing impersonality and engaging the reader directly. 
Whilst the relationship between understanding oral and written language is not well- 
understood, it seems likely that both of them involve cognitive sub-processes which 
interact to form specific strategies which are adopted in specific situations (Danks and 
End, 1987). Traditionally, the accessibility of written information, including legal 
information, is assessed through readability formulae. Typically, these formulae, which 
were initially devised to quantify and predict the complexity of educational materials, 
combine average sentence-lengths and average word-lengths with a constant, so that 
information appears increasingly difficult as it contains longer sentences and more 
complex vocabulary. Some of the most widely used (now available as part of most 
standard word-processing software packages) are outlined below: 
" the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948), which is the most established method (Scott, 
1996) uses the number of syllables in a word sample and the average number of 
words in each sentence to provide a `Reading Ease' (R. E. ) score and a description 
of style - from 0 ('very difficult') to 100 ('very easy') - and the (U. S. A. ) reading 
grade level. Ley (1977) has translated the scores to produce rough estimates of the 
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level of intellectual ability (Full Scale IQ) required to understand a particular piece 
of written material; 
" the Fog Index (Gunning, 1952) is based on the sum of the average number of 
words in each sentence of a word sample and the number of words with three or 
more syllables in the same sample to calculate the (U. S. A. ) reading grade level; 
" the Fry Readability Scale (Fry, 1968) uses the average number of sentences and 
syllables in three samples, each of 100 words, to calculate the (U. S. A. ) reading 
grade level; 
" the Dale-Chall Formula (Dale and Chall, 1948) is based on the sum of the average 
sentence length in a word sample and the number of words in that sample which 
are not on the Dale List (that is, the 3000 words known to at least 80% of fourth- 
grade (9-year-old) American children). In common with other formulae, the result 
is used to calculate the (U. S. A. ) reading grade level of the material. 
Not surprisingly, given that the different methods involve a very limited range of basic 
linguistic variables (Bormuth, 1966), readability formulae produce broadly similar, 
albeit rough and ready (Hartley, 1994), results. 
The use of readability formulae, and other quantitative measures, has been subjected to 
considerable criticism. Over the past twenty years, cognitive psychologists have 
increasingly moved away from conceiving language as information to be analysed 
syntactically and semantically and then stored in memory. Instead, it is now seen as a set 
of processing instructions for the construction of a mental representation of the 
described situation (see review by Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). In relation to written 
legal information, forensic linguists (that is, people who use linguistics to assist the fact- 
finding processes of the law (Jackson, 1995)), such as Jackson (1995), Owen (1996), 
Scott (1996) and Rock (1999a, b) have argued that measures such as readability 
formulae treat the material ('text' in forensic linguistics) as if it could be isolated: no 
attempt is made to disentangle the complicated interactions between the messages 
(conscious and unconscious) provided by the text-writer, the text itself, and the skills 
and mental models (scripts, scenarios) of the text-reader. Nevertheless, there is a body 
of evidence which suggests that people's understanding of written information, 
including legal information (Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Jackson, 1995; Masson and 
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Waldron, 1994; Sherr, 1986), is often associated with readability (Bormuth, 1966; Ley, 
1977), particularly for less able readers (see Hartley, 1994, p. 172, for a case example). 
In contrast with the extensive consideration given to the use of language in written 
information, issues relating to its presentation have received rather less attention. Still, 
there is evidence from a series of experimental studies, initiated by Hartley (1978 et 
seq. ), on the design of educational materials suggesting that layout affects the ease with 
which information can be understood and retrieved (Hartley, 1994). Traditionally, legal 
material uses only the horizontal dimension of the printed page, through a linear format 
with little punctuation and small print. Bhatia (1993) has suggested that much more 
could be made of the vertical dimension, for example, through flow-charts and tabulated 
presentations. More recently, modem information technology has enabled a third 
dimension, that of `depth' (layers of text), to be used so that alternative versions of the 
same material, designed for different audiences, can be presented in such a way that the 
reader can see how they are related (see Jackson, 1995). These developments have made 
little impact on the presentation of the Notice to Detained Persons. 
Following Grisso's (1981) pioneering study in the U. S. A., indicating worryingly poor 
understanding of the Miranda rights among adolescents remanded in custody following 
alleged or proven `felonies' and both adult `offenders' and their `non-offender' 
counterparts (see Ch. 3.1.2), a small number of studies have attempted to revise the 
wording of the caution and legal rights, or their equivalent. 
6.1.2 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE CAUTION AND LEGAL 
RIGHTS 
Two studies have examined whether simplifying the wording of the Miranda rights 
would improve adolescents' knowledge and understanding. In the first study, by 
Ferguson and Douglas (1970), initial interviews with adolescents in police custody were 
used to reword the rights into `ordinary' language. Performance on the revised and 
standard versions was then compared among ninety young people: `offenders', detained 
in institutions after adjudication (conviction) and `non-offenders' (high school pupils). 
Free recall was used to assess knowledge; understanding was assessed using a series of 
`yes'/'no' questions. Of most importance here, the simplified version was not more 
effective than the standard wording for any of the groups. Similar results were obtained 
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from the second study, by Manoogian (1978, cited in Grisso, 1981), which used Grisso's 
(1981) paraphrasing task (the Comprehension of Miranda Rights, CMR) to measure 
comprehension. Of course, the negative findings of these two studies do not mean that a 
more successful version could not be devised. Nevertheless, little further attention has 
been paid to the possibility of simplifying the Miranda rights in the U. S. A. Rather, as 
Shuy (1997) points out, the focus has been on their interpretation and implementation 
by the police in their everyday practice. 
Elsewhere, a very small number of attempts have been made to revise the caution and 
legal rights or their equivalent. For example, in Australia, Gibbons (1990), an applied 
linguist, has used his experience of assisting defendants from language minorities to 
suggest some revisions to the New South Wales caution. These include rewording the 
sentence: 
`I want you to understand that you are not obliged to say anything unless you wish, 
but whatever you say will be recorded on the typewriter and may be used in 
evidence' 
as: 
You do not have to say anything if you do not want to. We might use your answers 
in court (ibid., p. 236). 
However, not all the sentences were revised. Moreover, no evaluation was carried out of 
the complexity of the amended version. Nearer to home, Cooke and Philip (1998), 
aware of the lack of a standardised Scottish caution, based their study of understanding 
on a version which was asserted to be `simpler than many which are routinely observed 
in transcripts of police interviews' (ibid., p. 23). Again, though, no formal assessment of 
its complexity was carried out. 
Given the legal and practical significance of the caution and legal rights (or their 
equivalent), it is surprising that so few attempts have been made at simplification. 
Discussions of this issue seem to focus on two explanations. First, there may be 
practical difficulties: as Grisso (1981) points out in relation to adolescents, it may be 
very difficult to devise a single rewording which successfully addresses the range of 
cultural, linguistic, and educational backgrounds of the intended audience. Secondly, 
there may be broader issues relating to the purpose of the legal system. Jackson (1995) 
is not alone in his view that legal language does not have a communicative function. In 
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many police training manuals, for example, attempts to help suspects understand their 
legal rights are perceived as a barrier to effective interrogation (Gudjonsson, 1992a) and 
detrimental to the construction of `the case for the prosecution' (McConville et al., 
1991). 
These problems do not mean that no effort should be made to revise the caution and 
legal rights. In the context of the studies described in Ch. 3, Grisso's (1981, p. 197) 
suggestion, in relation to the Miranda warnings, that `simplifying the explanation of 
rights ... surely can 
do no harm' must be an understatement. So far, the series of 
exploratory studies reported in this chapter is the only published attempt to carry out 
such work in England and Wales; because of this uniqueness, it is described in detail. 
6.2 STUDY 9: DEVELOPING AN EXPERIMENTAL VERSION OF 
THE NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS 
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of an experimental version of the NDP (initially reported as Clare and 
Gudjonsson, 1992) was commissioned by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(Runciman, 1993) to inform their review of the protection offered to suspects in police 
detention; they had no specific interest in suspects with learning disabilities. Though 
psychological methodologies had been used previously to evaluate the information, this 
was the first attempt in England and Wales to use such methodologies in its 
development. During the period when the work was carried out, the revised version of 
the caution and legal rights (see Ch. 3.3 and Appendix 3b) was in use; the current 
caution had not yet been introduced. 
Assuming that the information about the caution and legal rights would be more 
accessible if its complexity were reduced, the first task was to rewrite the NDP so that, 
in terms of its `Reading Ease' (Flesch, 1948), it was simpler. Previous studies 
(Ferguson and Douglas, 1970; Gibbons, 1990; Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Gudjonsson 
et al., 1992; see Ch. 3.5) suggested some directions for the development of a new 
version of the NDP. First, the language needed to be changed. Since some of the longest 
sentences appeared most difficult to understand, it was important to reduce average 
sentence length. As has subsequently been shown, however, in relation to the current 
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and draft cautions (see Ch. 3.4), simply condensing the material is not necessarily 
helpful. As far as possible, the material also needed to be translated into the language 
which people use in everyday life, with terminology which was confusing or ambiguous 
(such as `in exceptional circumstances' and `right') removed. Secondly, some attempt 
had to be made to address the evidence that the majority of suspects (66%, N=171) 
reported that they did not read the written information (Gudjonsson et at, 1993). A 
number of reasons, including limited reading skills (Gudjonsson et al., 1993) and other 
psychological disadvantages, such as anxiety (Irving, 1980; Irving and McKenzie, 1989; 
Gudjonsson et al., 1993), might contribute to this finding. However, since presentation 
affects the ease with which material is understood and retrieved from text, particularly 
for less able readers (Hartley, 1994), comments from the participants in Ch. 3 suggesting 
that the revised NDP was both confusing and unattractive indicated the need for a 
change in the format. 
The aims of this study, then, were, first, to devise an experimental version of the NDP 
and, secondly, to evaluate its complexity in terms of its R. E. (Flesch, 1948). It was 
expected that the experimental NDP would be less complex than both the original (see 
Ch. 3.2 and Appendix 3a) and revised (see Ch. 3.3 and Appendix 3b) versions. 
6.2.2 METHOD 
Developing the experimental NDP 
The development of the experimental NDP involved several stages. An initial draft was 
prepared by translating the revised version of the caution (which is worded exactly the 
same as the original caution) and the four rights (see Appendix 3b) into everyday 
language. Instead of statements of the rights, a question format was adopted. It was 
expected that, due to a vulnerability to acquiescence, particularly among people who are 
intellectually disadvantaged (Clare and Gudjonsson, 1993; Heal and Sigelman, 1995; 
Sigelman et al., 1980,1981a, b), suspects would tend to answer `yes' to any question in 
the form 'do you want...? '. A tendency to acquiescence would therefore increase the 
likelihood that a suspect would exercise his/her rights. 
There were two major changes to the format in which the information was presented. 
First, there was a considerable increase in the amount of information to be presented 
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orally to detained persons by Custody Officers. Secondly, based on a comparison of the 
format of Form 3053 and the existing relevant literature on preparing text (Hartley, 
1978,1985,1990; Waller, 1984; Wright, 1988) the layout of the written information 
was changed so that it comprised a further information leaflet and the information card. 
It was intended that a card (which would be easier to understand and more attractive 
than Form 3053) would be given to each suspect before s/he was taken to a cell to await 
interviewing 
An `iterative process' (Waller, 1984) was used to refine the initial draft. This involved 
submission to the Home Office for legal advice about the proposed language, and for 
comments on the proposed format, redrafting, piloting with a small number of `general 
population' participants to obtain a user perspective, further redrafting, and 
resubmission to the Home Office. The material was then submitted for comments to 
Professor James Hartley of the Department of Psychology, University of Keele, an 
expert in the preparation of text. It was then redrafted and resubmitted for a final round 
of comments. 
Assessment of complexity 
Despite the limited number of words, the Flesch Formula (Flesch, 1948) was used to 
provide a `Reading Ease' (R. E. ) score as a `rough and ready' measure of the complexity 
of the two written sections (the further information and the card). No experimental 
literature could be found on the validity of this type of analysis for material intended for 
oral presentation (the oral information). In previous studies, though (Gudjonsson, 
1990a, 1991a; see Ch 3.2 and Ch. 3.3), the R. E. results were consistent with those 
obtained when the written material was read out to participants, suggesting that this 
measure is helpful in predicting participants' difficulties in recalling and understanding 
oral information. The entire experimental NDP was therefore analysed. 
At the time when this work was carried out, no computer software was readily available, 
so the R. E. scores were calculated by hand, using Flesch's (1948) formula: 
R. E. = 206.835 - 0.846 wl -1.015 sl, where 
wl is the average number of syllables in each 100 word sample 
sl is the average sentence length of the samples 
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with adjustments to take into account the limited length of some of the sections. Ley's 
(1977) translation of the scores was then used to provide rough estimates of the level of 
intellectual ability (Full Scale IQ) required for understanding the material and the 
proportion of the population who would therefore be expected to comprehend it. Table 
6.2.1 shows Ley's (1977, p. 20) interpretation of R. E. scores, together with the 
description of style provided by Flesch (1948). 
Table 6.2.1 Ley's (1977) interpretation of Flesch scores 




IQ required for 
comprehension 
91 - 100 Very easy 90% 81+ 
81 - 90 Easy 86% 84+ 
71 - 80 Fairly easy 80% 87+ 
61 - 70 Standard 75% 90+ 
51 - 60 Fairly difficult 40% 104+ 
31 - 50 Difficult 24% 111+ 
0-30 Very difficult 4.5% 126+ 
6.2.3 RESULTS 
Final version of the experimental NDP 
The final version of the experimental Notice to Detained Persons is shown as Appendix 
3c. The wording is repeated in Table 6.4.1. It comprised: 
(i) an extended section for Custody Officers to read out to suspects in police 
detention (the oral information); 
(ii) a laminated card, outlining the main points of the oral information, to be given 
to suspects before they were taken to their cells (the information card); 
(iii) a leaflet to which suspects could refer for more detailed information about the 
rights already described and to find out about the right to a copy of the Custody 
Record (the further information leaflet). 
Complexity of the experimental NDP 
Table 6.2.2 shows the R. E. scores for the caution (presented in the oral information), the 
overall scores for each of the three sections of the experimental NDP, and the scores for 
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each of the four rights in the leaflet. It also shows the scores for the caution in the 
original and revised versions, and for the four rights overall, and separately, in each of 
these versions. 
Table 6.2.2: `Reading Ease' (R. E. ) scores for the experimental NDP, and for the 




" Original and Revised NDP 
(the caution is identical in these two versions) 61 
" Experimental NDP 90 
Sections of the experimental NDP 
" Information card 84 
" Oral information (excluding the caution) 84 
Original NDP 
" Overall 50 
" The right to have someone informed of your detention 48 
" The right to legal advice 40 
"A copy of the Codes of Practice 53 
"A copy of the Custody Record 50 
Revised NDP 
" Overall 56 
" The right to have someone informed of your detention 52 
" Free legal advice 66 
" The right to consult the Codes of Practice 37 
" The right to a copy of the Custody Record 49 
Experimental NDP: further information leaflet 
" Overall 77 
" Telling someone that you are at the police station 75 
" Getting a solicitor to help you 78 
" Looking at the Codes of Practice 88 
" Having the Custody Record 75 
Overall, the R. E. score of the experimental NDP was 80 (`fairly easy', see Table 6.2.1) 
suggesting that, as expected, it was considerably less complex than the original or 
revised versions. Some sections appeared easier than others: the R. E. of the caution was 
90 ('easy', Table 6.2.1). Similarly, the oral information (excluding the caution) and the 
information card, both of which had R. E. scores of 84, were `easy'. According to Ley's 
(1977) estimate, all three would be understood fully by people with a Full Scale of 84 
(Low Average) or above (Table 6.2.1). 
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As Table 6.2.2 shows, the further information leaflet was a little more difficult. As in 
previous versions of the NDP, some parts were more complex than others: for example, 
`Looking at the Codes of Practice' had an R. E. of 88 compared with 75 for `Getting a 
solicitor to help you' and `Having the Custody Record'. The overall score of the further 
information leaflet was 77, suggesting it was `fairly easy' and would be understood fully 
by 80 per cent of the general population (Table 6.2.1). 
6.2.4 DISCUSSION 
Using an `iterative process' (Wright, 1988), an experimental version of the Notice to 
Detained Persons was developed. It was then assessed using a `Reading Ease' analysis 
(Flesch, 1948). Though variation was found within and among the different sections of 
the material, overall, as expected, the experimental version was considerably less 
complex than both the revised version then in use and the original version. According to 
Ley's (1977) interpretation of R. E. scores, it should have been understood in its entirety 
by men and women with a Full Scale IQ score in the Low Average range or above, that 
is, to eight in every ten of the general adult population. Importantly, given that the mean 
level of intellectual ability of suspects in police detention lies within the same range 
(Full Scale I. Q.: 82, Low Average, Gudjonsson et al., 1993), the experimental version 
appeared suitable for the target population. 
These encouraging findings were supported by an analysis of three different sections 
(600 words in all) of a popular daily newspaper ('The Sun'; average R. E.: 69; range: 64- 
73): the experimental NDP was less complex! Nevertheless, some of the sentences 
remained very long (for example, `If the police cannot get in touch with any of the first 
three people you want told that you are at the police station, the Custody Officer (the 
police officer who is in charge of you while you are at the police station) may ask you 
for the names of other people' (sentence 28 in the further information leaflet)). Ideally, 
such sentences should have been reduced but, given the formula's dependence on 
syllables and the need to retain legal terminology (such as `solicitor', `Custody Officer'), 
the scope for further simplification appeared to be limited. 
Whilst the association between the results of readability formulae and people's 
understanding has already been noted (Bormuth, 1966; Jackson, 1995; Ley, 1977; 
Masson and Waldron, 1994; Sherr, 1986; see Ch. 3), the widespread criticisms of these 
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formulae (Jackson, 1995; Owen, 1996; Rock, 1999a, b; Scott, 1996) indicated that 
supplementary data were required. The aim was to provide sufficient information to 
enable the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice to decide whether or not, in terms of 
its overall remit, the experimental version was `good enough' to recommend for further 
development. Three additional exploratory studies, using experimental participants, 
were therefore carried out. 
6.3 STUDY 10: THE EFFECT ON KNOWLEDGE AND 
UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE 
EXPERIMENTAL NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS 
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The experimental version of the NDP comprised three sections (see Appendix 3c). The 
aim of this study was to examine whether these three sections were necessary, or 
whether the format might be simplified. Using the psychological methodologies first 
described in Ch. 3, the impact on knowledge and understanding of the verbal 
information alone was compared with additional access to either or both sections of the 
written material. It was expected that access to the further information leaflet and/or the 
information card would enhance performance. 
6.3.2 METHOD 
Participants 
In order to improve the ecological validity of the experimental studies, efforts were 
made to recruit participants who, like the majority of suspects (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), 
were of below average intellectual ability. A convenience sample of one hundred 
volunteer participants (64 men and 36 women) was found through `job-finder' and 
work-experience centres or basic skills clubs. Though none of the participants was a 
person with Down Syndrome or some other phenotype associated with a learning 
disability and the centres were not specifically designated for people with learning 
disabilities, many of those who took part volunteered information indicating that they 
had attended schools for pupils with `special needs'. All the participants were `adults' in 
terms of the criminal justice system (i. e. aged ? 17 years: mean age: 33.23 years; s. d.: 
10.53; range: 17-69 years) and were fluent in English. 
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Measures 
1. Intellectual functioning: to ensure that the sample included participants who were 
intellectually disadvantaged, Full Scale IQ was assessed using all eleven sub-tests 
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981). 
2. Reading ability: since some of the participants had received `special' education or 
were attending basic skills centres, reading ability was assessed using the Schonell 
Graded Reading Test (Schonell and Goodacre, 1974). 
3. Knowledge of the caution and legal rights: as described fully in Ch. 3.2.2, 
knowledge of the experimental NDP was assessed through recall or paraphrasing 
of each item of the information. The effectiveness of the NDP was examined by 
comparing knowledge before (Initial Knowledge) and after (Knowledge After) 
access to the information. It should be noted that there were sixteen items in the 
experimental version, compared with only thirteen in the original. 
4. Understanding of the caution and legal rights: to assess understanding, the eight- 
item questionnaire, first described in Ch. 3.3.2 (and see the lower part of Figure 
6.3.2) was used. Each item was read, in turn, to the participant, who was asked to 
respond `yes' or 'no'. The number of correct responses was calculated. 
Procedure 
The participants were recruited and assessed by Ms. Philippa Cross, the Research 
Assistant involved in Study 2 (Ch. 3.3.2) and Studies 6 (Ch. 5.3), 7 (Ch. 5.6) and 8 (Ch. 
5.9). At recruitment, each person was allocated randomly to one of four groups and 
tested individually in a quiet room at the centre/club he or she was attending. 
First, the test of reading ability was carried out. Next, Initial Knowledge of the caution 
and legal rights was elicited (using the wording described in Ch. 3.2.2) and written 
down verbatim. Then, the experimental version of the caution, together with the 
information intended for the Custody Officer to present orally (the oral information), 
was read aloud. After this, the procedure differed for each of the four groups of 25 
persons: 
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Group 1- were not offered access to either the information card or the further 
information leaflet, 
Group 2- had the opportunity to read/were read the information card, 
Group 3- had the opportunity to read/were read the further information leaflet, 
Group 4- had the opportunity to read/were read the information card and the 
further information leaflet. 
For Groups 2,3, and 4, a criterion raw score of 74/100 (i. e. a reading accuracy age of 12 
years 5 months) on the GWRT was adopted. This is similar to the reading accuracy age 
criterion adopted in the study of the original NDP (see Ch. 3.2.2). For participants who 
did not achieve this criterion, the written material (the information card or/and the 
further information leaflet) were read out whilst they followed the text; otherwise, they 
read it for themselves. 
After this, the assessment of intellectual ability was begun. Approximately 30 minutes 
after the presentation of the NDP, Knowledge After was elicited (as described in Ch. 
3.2.2), and the responses were again written down verbatim. Then, the questionnaire 
was presented orally (as described in Ch. 3.3.2). Finally, the assessment of intellectual 
ability was completed. 
Scoring 
Typed transcripts of the responses were prepared by Ms. Cross and scored by me. Initial 
Knowledge and Knowledge After were scored by allocating one point to each item 
recalled from the oral information (maximum: 16 points). Regardless of the number of 
times it was reported, each item was scored only once. Understanding was scored by 
counting the number of correct responses (maximum: 8) on the questionnaire. 
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6.3.3 RESULTS 11 
Participant characteristics 
Table 6.3.1 shows the chronological ages, Full Scale IQ scores, and raw reading 
accuracy scores of the four groups (1,2,3,4). The mean scores were compared 
statistically by calculating t-values; these are given in the last column. 
Table 6.3.1: Characteristics of the four groups of participants 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
t* 
mean A. range mean A. range mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
20 17 19 17 
33.0 10.3 
- 





56 69 55 59 
61 80.6 13.1 60 80.4 19.5 5' 78.8 16.6 61 0.71 
78.0 12.9 - - - - 
112 120 128 119 
8 21 23 0 
59.1 33.2 - 64.4 24.9 - 61.2 6.1 - 57.0 30.5 - 0.91 
99 97 100 99 
* t-tests for independent samples with equal variance were carried out on all the 
pairs to compare the means. No values were found to be statistically 
significant (2-tailed, df = 48) 
There were no significant differences on any of the scores, indicating that, at least with 
regard to chronological age, Full Scale IQ, and reading accuracy, the groups were 
homogeneous. 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Effect on knowledge of access to different sections 
Figure 6.3.1 shows the mean number of items paraphrased correctly, or recalled, by each 
of the four groups before, and following, access to one or more sections. 
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Figure 6.3.1: Knowledge of the caution and rights among the four participant 
groups before (Initial Knowledge) and after (Knowledge After) 
access to the experimental NDP 
Mean number of 










1 23 4 
Participant group 
Initial Knowledge Z value* 
Participant group: Knowledge After 
Mean 1.20 4.76 4 17 1. oral information Range 0-3 0-11 . 
2. oral information and Mean 1.76 5.32 99 3 
information card Range 0-4 0-11 . 
3. oral information and Mean 0.80 6.64 4 21 
, 
further information leaflet Range 0-3 0-16 . 
4. oral information, card and Mean 1.52 5.96 4 20 
leaflet Range 0-4 1-16 . 
* The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (for large samples) was used to compare 
Initial Knowledge and Knowledge After for each participant group. All the 
results were significant (p<0.001). 
Statistical analysis using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test (see Appendix 7 for details) 
showed that access to any section of the experimental NDP improved the performance 
of all four groups very significantly. 
Knowledge before access (Initial Knowledge) among the different participant groups 
was compared statistically using the Mann-Whitney test (see Appendix 7 for details). 
Initial Knowledge was lower among Group 3 than Group 2 (U = 182.5, Z=2.63, pS 
0.01); otherwise, there were no significant differences. The Mann-Whitney test was also 
used to compare knowledge among the different participant groups after access to the 
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NDP; all the comparisons were non-significant. Contrary to expectation, therefore, no 
significant benefit was conferred by additional access to the information card and/or the 
information leaflet. 
Effect on understanding of access to different sections 
Figure 6.3.2 shows the mean number of questions answered correctly by each of the 
participant groups. The Mann-Whitney test (see Appendix 7 for details) was used to 
compare the number of correct answers among the different participant groups. Contrary 
to expectation, again there were no significant differences between the four groups. 
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Figure 6.3.2: Mean number of correct responses by the four participant groups to 
the 8-item questionnaire 












1 2 3 4 
oral oral info., oral info., oral info., 
information information 
. 
further info. card, leaflet 
card leaflet 
Mean correct 6.4 6.6 6.1 6.4 
Range 4-8 3-8 4-8 4-8 
The questions were as follows (correct response in brackets): 
1. Do you have to answer the police questions even if you don't really want to? 
(No) 
2. If you say anything to the police and your case goes to Court, can the police 
tell the Court what you've said to them? (Yes) 
3. Is it true that you only need a solicitor if you've done the crime you're being 
questioned about (i. e. you're guilty)? (No) 
4. Do you need money in order to have a solicitor to help you at the police 
station? (No) 
5. If you ask the police to tell your family or someone who cares about you that 
you're at the police station, will they normally contact them? (Yes) 
6. Do you have to give the police money before they'll contact someone who 
cares about you? (No) 
7. If you say anything to the police, do you have to tell them the truth? (No) 
8. If you don't want a solicitor to help you or someone told that you're at the 
police station straightaway, are you allowed to change your mind later? (Yes) 
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6.3.4 DISCUSSION % 
Consistent with the findings of the R. E. analysis (see Ch. 6.2), presentation of the oral 
information alone resulted in a very marked improvement in participants' knowledge of 
the caution and legal rights. Unexpectedly, though, additional access to the information 
card and/or the information leaflet did not enhance performance. 
The implications of this exploratory study seemed clear: the oral information alone 
sufficed. Nevertheless, a decision was made that it would be premature, at this stage, to 
omit the other sections. First, the finding that, despite its relative complexity (see Ch. 
6.2), access to the information leaflet was of some benefit, at least in terms of 
knowledge, suggested that this part merited further investigation. Secondly, particularly 
for people who needed the written sections read to them, the methodology adopted may 
have made overwhelming demands on working memory (Baddeley, 1990). It would 
have been preferable if the possible impact of access to the information card and/or the 
information leaflet on knowledge and understanding had been assessed after exposure to 
each of the relevant sections in turn. Finally, the generalisability of the findings from 
this study was uncertain. In contrast with some of the observed `booking in' procedures 
by Custody Officers (Brown et al., 1992; McConville et al., 1991), the information 
about the caution and legal rights was presented slowly, clearly, and completely. In the 
real-life setting of a police station, written material, expanding and reiterating the main 
points of the oral information, might be helpful - at least for those who can read. 
These considerations suggested that, for the moment, all three sections should be 
retained and developed further. 
6.4 STUDY 11: UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
NDP 
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings of the study reported in Ch. 6.2, based on analysis of its `Reading Ease' 
(Flesch, 1948), suggested that the information about the caution and legal rights 
presented in the experimental Notice to Detained Persons would be understood by 
people who are intellectually disadvantaged, such as suspects (Gudjonsson et al., 1993). 
However, as has already been noted (see Ch. 6.1.1), there has been considerable 
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criticism of measures of readability formulae (Jackson, 1995; Owen, 1996; Rock, 
1999a, b; Scott, 1996), particularly when they are used on their own. To supplement the 
previous study, the experimental participants' understanding of the information was 
assessed using the psychological methodologies described in Ch. 3. From the `R. E. ' 




The participants were the same men and women who had been allocated to one of four 
groups in the previous study; details of each of these groups are given in Table 6.3.1. 
Since there were no significant differences between the chronological ages, Full Scale 
IQ scores, and reading accuracy raw scores of the groups, for the purposes of this study, 
they were treated as a single sample of one hundred persons. The sample had a mean 
Full Scale IQ score on the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981) of 79.5 (s. d.: 15.8) and a mean 
reading accuracy raw score on the Schonell Graded Word Test (Schonell and Goodacre, 
1974) of 60.4 (s. d.: 28.9) 
Measures and Procedure 
Since the paraphrased recall and questionnaire methodology have already described in 
detail (Study 2, Ch. 3.3.2; also Study 10, Ch. 6.3.2), the Measures and Procedure are 
combined here. Participants were seen individually, three to four days after their 
involvement in the previous study. 
Two measures of understanding were used: 
1. Paraphrased recall of the caution and legal rights as discrete elements: each 
person, regardless of his or her reading accuracy score, was given a copy of the 
entire experimental NDP, so that s/he could follow as, first, the oral information 
section was read aloud. Then each sentence was read out in turn and participants 
were asked to explain its meaning. The responses were written down verbatim. 
The same procedure was repeated for the further information leaflet and the 
information card. 




Typed transcripts were prepared by Ms. Cross and scored by me. They indicated that 
some participants were reluctant to paraphrase information they regarded as self- 
explanatory, and needed prompting. Paraphrased recall was scored using a two-point 
system, with one point allocated to each sentence which was demonstrably understood 
(for example, by paraphrasing or providing a well-explained and relevant response to a 
question contained in the sentence). No point was given if a participant simply repeated 
the exact words, refused to paraphrase without providing any indication of 
understanding, or simply answered a sentence containing a question with a one-word 
response. The questionnaire was scored as described in Ch. 6.3.2. 
6.4.3 RESULTS 
Two analyses were then carried out. 
Paraphrased recall among the participants 
Table 6.4.1 shows the percentage of participants who demonstrated understanding of 
each sentence of the experimental version. 
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Table 6.4.1 The percentage of participants who understood each sentence fully 
(N = 100) 
Oral information 
1. You do not have to say anything to the police if you do not want to. 81% 
2. If you do talk to the police, or answer their questions, they can use what 
you have said to help them find out if you or anyone else has done a 
crime. 48% 
3. What you say may also be used in Court. 57% 
4. Do you want a solicitor to help you while you are at the police station? 73% 
5. A solicitor has nothing to do with the police 77% 
6. You do not have to pay money to talk to a solicitor. 89% 
7. The police will help you find a solicitor if you do not know one. 85% 
8. Do you want your family or someone who cares about you to know that 
you are at the police station? 83% 
9. You do not need any money to pay for the police telling someone where 
you are. 84% 
10. Do you want to look at the Codes of Practice? 56% 
11. The Codes of practice is a book. 55% 
12. It tells you what the police are and are not allowed to do while you are at 
the police station. 72% 
13. If you do not want a solicitor right now, or you do not want someone told 
that your are at the police station right now, or you do not want to look at 
the Codes of Practice right now, you can change you mind later. 70% 
14. If you change your mind later, tell the police and they will help you. 69% 
15. I am now going to give you a card which tells you the main things I have 
said (Information For People Who Have Been Arrested By The Police). 55% 
16. There is some more information in the leaflet (Further Information For 
People Who Have Been Arrested By The Police) on the desk. 69% 
Information card 
1. Ask the police if you want a solicitor to help you while you are at the 
police station. 84% 
2. It will not cost you anything. 95% 
3. Ask the police if you want your family or someone else who cares about 
you to know that you are at the police station. 91% 
4. It will not cost you anything 89% 
5. Ask the police if you want to look at the Codes of Practice (the book 
which tells you what the police are and are not allowed to do while you 
are at the police station). 71% 
Further information leaflet 
1. You must be allowed to talk to a solicitor at anytime, day or night, when 
you are at a police station. 82% 
2. You do not have to pay any money to speak to a solicitor. 84% 
3. You can talk to a solicitor on the telephone without the police knowing 
what you are telling him or her. 76% 
4. A solicitor may come to see you at the police station. 85% 
5. Most of the time, the police are not allowed to ask you questions until you 
have had the chance to talk to a solicitor. 64% 
6. You can also ask for a solicitor to be in the room with you when the police 
ask you questions. 75% 
7. If you want a solicitor, tell the Custody Officer (the police officer who is 
in charge of you while you are at the police station). 74% 
8. The police will help you get in touch with a solicitor. 88% 
continued ... 
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Table 6.4.1 continued 
9. If you do not know a solicitor or you cannot get in touch with your own 
solicitor, there is a person called the duty solicitor. 72% 
10. The police will help you get in touch with him or her. 86% 
11. He or she is nothing to do with the police. 81% 
12. Or you can ask for a solicitor who lives nearby. 82% 
13. If a solicitor does not turn up, ask the police to get in touch with him or 
her again. 77% 
14. The police can ask you to give blood samples, urine samples, and samples 
of your breath before you have talked to a solicitor. 70% 
15. The Road Traffic Act, 1988, is the law which allows the police to ask you 
for these samples. 49% 
16. There are some very special times when the police can ask you questions 
before you have talked to a solicitor. 42% 
17. Information about these very special times is given in the Codes of 
Practice. 56% 
18. This is the book which tells you what the police are and are not allowed to 
do while you are at the police station. 70% 
19. If you want to look it up, it is in paragraph 6.6 of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice (page 48). 64% 
20. There are also some very special times when the police will not let you 
speak to a solicitor straight away. 49% 
21. Information about these very special times is given in the Codes of 
Practice. 64% 
22. If you want to look it up, it is in Annex B of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice (pages 71 - 73). 73% 
23. You can ask the police to tell your family or someone else who cares 
about you that you are at the police station. 89% 
24. You do not have to pay money for the police to get in touch with 
someone. 85% 
25. The police will get in touch with someone as soon as they can. 76% 
26. If the police cannot get in touch with the first person you want to know 
that you are at the police station they will ask you for the name of 
someone else. 85% 
27. If they cannot get in touch with this second person, they'll ask you for the 
name of someone else. 80% 
28. If the police cannot get in touch with any of the first three people you 
want told that you are at the police station, the Custody Officer (the police 
officer who is in charge of you while you are at the police station) may 
ask you for the names of other people. 43% 
29. But the Custody Officer does not have to do this. 47% 
30. There are some very special times when the police will not allow you to 
get in touch with anyone. 54% 
31. Information about these very special times is given in the Codes of 
Practice. 64% 
32. If you want to look it up, it is in Annex B of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice (pages 71 - 73). 72% 
33. The Codes of Practice is a book which tells you what the police are and 
are not allowed to do while you are at the police station. 72% 
34. If you ask the police, they will let you look at the Codes of Practice. 76% 
35. But you are not allowed to look at the Codes of Practice for such a long 
time that it holds up the police in finding out if you have done a crime. 51% 
continued ... 
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Table 6.4.1 continued 
36. Everything that happens to you when at the police station is written down. 68% 
37. The paper on which it is written is called the Custody Record. 68% 
38. When you leave the police station, you can ask for a copy of the Custody 
Record. 77% 
39. If you do not want to ask for it, your solicitor or someone you know well 
can ask for it instead. 80% 
40. The police have to give you a copy of the Custody Record as soon as they 
can. 64% 
41. You are allowed to ask the police for a copy of the Custody Record at any 
time in the 12 months (that is, the year) after you leave the police station. 64% 
42. If you ask more than 12 months (a year) after, the police will not give you 
a copy of the Custody Record. 71% 
Overall, each sentence of the experimental NDP was understood by a mean of 72% of 
the participants. The further information leaflet contained the most difficult sentences. 
In contrast, every sentence (excluding the caution) in the other two sections was 
demonstrably understood by at least 55 per cent of the participants. Further statistical 
analysis, using Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient (see Appendix 7 for 
details), showed that though there was a positive relationship between understanding 
and intellectual ability (r = 0.408; p<0.01,1-tailed), there was variation between the 
sections. Virtually full understanding of both the oral information and the information 
card was achieved by all the participants of Low Average ability (Full Scale IQ range: 
80-89). In contrast, the highest level of understanding of the further information leaflet 
was achieved by the participants of High Average ability (Full Scale IQ range: >_ 110). 
Questionnaire responses among the participants 
Table 6.4.2 shows the percentage of participants responding correctly to each of the 
questionnaire items (details of the items are given in Figure 6.3.2). 
Table 6.4.2 Responses to the questions about the caution and legal rights by the 
whole group after access to the experimental NDP 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
% of participants 
giving correct 84% 84% 60% 92% 97% 98% 30% 89% 
answer (N = 100) 
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With the exception of questions 3 and 7, all the questions were answered correctly by at 
least 80 percent of the participants. Using Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation 
Coefficient (see Appendix 7 for details), it was found that correct responding was 
associated with intellectual ability (r = 0.674; p<0.01,1-tailed) so that the questionnaire 
was most difficult for the most intellectually disadvantaged persons. 
6.4.4 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to examine understanding of the experimental NDP among 
the whole group of participants. Again, the findings were encouraging, particularly as 
the mean level of intellectual ability of the group was similar to that of suspects in 
police detention (Gudjonsson et al., 1993). 
Using paraphrased recall as a measure of understanding, each sentence was understood 
by a mean of almost three-quarters (72%) of participants. This was much better than the 
59% achieved by participants of similar intellectual ability in Gudjonsson's (1990a, 
1991 a) study of the original version though, contrary to expectations, the extent of this 
improvement was not statistically significant (Z-test; see Appendix 7 for details). 
Nevertheless, with only five exceptions, all thirty-eight sentences were explained or 
paraphrased correctly by more than half of those who took part. All the participants who 
were not intellectually disadvantaged (that is, had FSIQ scores of >_ 76) understood the 
right to legal advice - the most important practical information from the experimental 
version - with more than nine out of ten (92%) explaining, or paraphrasing, this right 
from the oral information alone. 
As expected from the analysis of its `Reading Ease' (see Table 6.2.2, Ch. 6.2), the 
further information leaflet appeared to be the most difficult section for the participants 
to understand. It contained all the sentences which were explained or paraphrased 
correctly by fewer than 50 per cent them. In addition, in contrast with both the oral 
information and the information card, which were understood virtually in their entirety 
by men and women of Low Average intellectual ability (FSIQ: 80-89), understanding 
continued to improve as ability increased. The highest level of understanding of the 
leaflet was attained by the most intellectually advantaged participants (in the High 
Average range, FSIQ: >_110). 
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On the questionnaire, six of the eight items were answered correctly by at least four out 
of five participants. In contrast, question 3 seemed puzzling to the most intellectually 
disadvantaged persons (see Table 6.4.2). Though direct comparison was not possible 
because of differences between the participants in the two studies, the same question 
was also very difficult for the `learning disabilities' group in the investigation of the 
understanding of the revised NDP (Study 2, Ch. 3.3). It is likely that this reflects its 
complex construction and content. As before, though, the lowest level of correct 
responding, was obtained on question 7 (see Table 6.4.2). In the earlier study (see Ch. 
3.3), it was argued that the poor performance by both people with learning disabilities 
and their `general population' counterparts reflected limited awareness of the 
significance of the information about the caution and legal rights in the NDP. Such an 
explanation would certainly be consistent with the findings from the `learning 
disabilities' group in Study 5 (Ch. 4.3). However, informal comments made during this 
study suggested that, in part, the difficulties arose simply from the wording of the 
question: several participants were uncertain about whether they were being asked about 
a legal or a personal issue (for example, one person replied: `yes, I would always tell the 
truth to the police, but I suppose you don't have to'). These responses indicated that the 
question itself required further development. 
Since the task was to investigate the possibility that the information to detained persons 
could be simplified without losing their legal acceptability, the findings of this, and the 
previous, study were interpreted liberally. In contrast, a more critical approach was 
taken to the final study in the series. 
6.5 STUDY 12: COMPARING THE EXPERIMENTAL AND 
ORIGINAL OR REVISED VERSIONS OF THE NOTICE TO 
DETAINED PERSONS 
6.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As already noted, there are no agreed criteria for the acceptability of legal material 
(Penny Letts, 1999, personal communication). However, the importance of the NDP 
suggests that any new version of the caution and legal rights ought at least to be more 
accessible than the original version, or the current version which, potentially, it would 
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replace. Whilst the findings of the studies reported in this chapter have been 
encouraging, they do not address this crucial issue. It is of particular salience since it 
appears, from the limited experimental evidence available, that simplifying the wording 
of the legal rights of suspects does not necessarily improve knowledge and 
understanding of the information (Ferguson and Douglas, 1970; Manoogian, 1978, cited 
by Grisso, 1981). 
The purpose of this study of the NDP, which used existing data, was two-fold: 
(i) to compare the impact on knowledge of the caution and legal rights of the 
experimental or original versions. It was expected that the `experimental' 
participants would benefit from access to the NDP more than their counterparts; 
(ii) to compare the impact on understanding of the material in the experimental and 
revised versions of the NDP. Again, it was expected that the performance of the 
`experimental' participants would be better than that of their peers . 
6.5.2. METHOD 
Participants 
Many of the participants involved in the earlier studies of the experimental NDP were 
intellectually disadvantaged (see Ch. 6.3.2 for details). However, in contrast with some 
of the men and women who took part in Study 1 (Ch. 3.2) or Study 2 (Ch. 3.3), no one 
fulfilled the criteria for a learning disability (see Methodological Considerations, Ch. 
2.4.1). So, instead, the comparisons involved the `general population' groups from the 
original or revised versions, and the 42 `experimental' participants (27 men and 15 
women) who were not intellectually disadvantaged (that is, had Full Scale IQ scores 
80). 
Table 6.5.1. shows the mean Full Scale IQ scores, standard deviations, and ranges of the 
groups involved in the comparisons of the experimental, original or revised versions of 
the NDP. The mean scores were compared statistically by calculating t-values. They did 
not differ significantly, suggesting that the Full Scale IQ scores of the groups were 
comparable. 
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Table 6.5.1 Characteristics of the groups involved in the comparisons of the 
experimental, original or revised versions of the NDP 
Experimental Original Revised 
mean s. d. Range mean s. d. range mean s. d. range 
FSIQ 94 13.4 80-128 99 7.2 83-111 98.6 11.2 88-128 
No. of participants 42 20 17 
t-tests for independent samples with equal variance were carried out to compare 
the means: 
" Experimental vs. Original: t=1.54, not significant (2-tailed, df = 60) 
" Experimental vs. Revised: t=1.23, not significant (2-tailed, df = 57) 
Measures and Procedure 
Since the methodology has already been described in Study 10 (Ch. 6.3), the Measures 
and Procedure are combined here. First, the data from the forty-two participants 
involved in assessing the impact on knowledge of the experimental version (see Ch. 6.3) 
were rescored. One point was allocated to each of the thirteen items in the original 
version (shown in Table 3.2.2) which were paraphrased or recalled from any of the three 
sections of the experimental version before (Initial Knowledge) and after (Knowledge 
After) access to the information. 
Then, data from the same participants' involvement in the investigation of 
understanding of the experimental version (Study 10, Ch. 6.3) were selected. Since this 
questionnaire had been used in the evaluation of the revised version (shown in Fig. 
6.3.2), no rescoring was needed. 
6.5.3 RESULTS 
Comparison of the impact on knowledge of the experimental or original versions 
Figure 6.5.1 shows the percentage of participants who correctly recalled, or paraphrased, 
each item of information before, and following, access to the experimental or the 
original NDP. 
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Statistical comparison using the Chi square test (see Appendix 7 for details) showed 
that, with the exception of two items (B and C), on which the `original' group 
performed better, there were no significant differences in the baseline knowledge of the 
two groups. For each item, Initial Knowledge and Knowledge After access were 
compared, using the Binomial or McNemar Test (see Appendix 7 for details). As 
expected, the experimental version was more effective: knowledge of eight items (C, E, 
F, G, I, J, L, M) improved significantly, compared with six (C, E, F, G, J, L) for the 
original. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, Knowledge After was not higher among 
the `experimental' participants. Statistical comparison using the Chi square test (see 
Appendix 7 for details) was carried out. On eight items, the groups did not differ 
significantly; on the remaining five (A, B, C, F, L), the performance of the participants 
involved in the evaluation of the original version was significantly better than that of 
their counterparts. 
209 
Figure 6.5.1: Knowledge of the caution and the rights before (Initial 
Knowledge) and after (Knowledge After) access to the 
Percentage experimental or original versions of the NDP 
of participants 
100 Experimental version 
Q Initial Knowledge 









100 Q Initial Knowledge 
Q Knowledge After 
Items: ABCDEFGHIJKLM 
KEY: 
Except for the parts in brackets, the wording is that of the information on the second page of 
the original NDP 
A: If you are asked questions about a suspected offence you do not have to say anything. 
B: What you say may be given in evidence. 
C: You have the right to have someone informed of your detention. 
D: You may on request have one person known to you, or who is likely to take an interest in 
your welfare, informed at public expense as soon as practicable of your whereabouts. 
E: If the person you nominate cannot be contacted you may choose up to two alternatives. 
F: If they (the two alternatives) too cannot be contacted the Custody Officer has discretion to 
allow further attempts until the information has been conveyed. 
G: (You have) the right to legal advice. 
H: You may at any time consult and communicate privately, either in person, in writing or on 
the telephone, with a solicitor. 
1: Under certain circumstances both of the above rights may be suspended for a limited period 
in accordance with the Codes of Practice. 
J: A copy of the Codes of Practice governing police procedures will be made available to you 
on request. 
K: You do not have to exercise any of the above three rights (i. e. C, G and J) immediately. 
L: A record of your detention will be kept by the Custody Officer. When you leave police 
detention or are taken before a Court, you or your legal representative shall be supplied on 
request with a copy of the Custody Record as soon as practicable. 




Comparison of the impact on understanding of the experimental or revised 
versions 
Figure 6.5.2 shows the percentage of participants who responded correctly to each item 
in the questionnaire after access to the experimental or revised NDP. 
The participants who received access to the experimental NDP performed as well as 
their counterparts with access to the revised version on two questions (Nos. 4 and 6), 
and better on two questions (5 and 8). Contrary to expectations, however, statistical 
comparison using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 for details) showed that none of 
the questions was answered by significantly more of the `experimental' participants. 
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Figure 6.5.2: Responses to the questions about the caution and legal rights after 
access to the experim ental or revised versions of the NDP 
Percentage Q Experimental NDP   Revised NDP 







Question: 123 45 67 8 
No. and % of Fisher 
KEY participants who 
The questions were as follows correctly answered 2 
exact 







1. Do you have to answer the police 39 16 0.67 ". s. 
questions even if you don't really 93% 94% 
want to? (No) 
2. If you say anything to the police and 41 17 0.71 n_s. 
your case goes to Court, can the 98% 100% 
police tell the Court what you've said 
to them? (Yes) 
3. Is it true that you only need a 37 17 0.17 n. s. 
solicitor if you've done the crime 88% 100% 
you're being questioned about (i. e. 
you're guilty)? (No) 
4. Do you need money in order to have 42 17 1 n. s. 
a solicitor to help you at the police 100% 100% 
station? (No) 
5. If you ask the police to tell your 42 16 0.29 n. s. 
family or someone who cares about 100% 94% 
you that you're at the police station, 
will they normally contact them? 
(Yes) 
6. Do you have to give the police 42 17 1 n. s. 
money before they'll contact 100% 100% 
someone who cares about you? (No) 
7. If you say anything to the police, do 24 12 0.92 "s 
you have to tell them the truth? (No) 47% 71% 
8. If you don't want a solicitor to 42 16 0.29 "S 
help you or someone told that 100% 94% 
you're at the police station 
straightaway, are you allowed to 
change your mind later? (Yes) 
Not significant 
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6.5.4 DISCUSSION t 
Using existing data from participants who were not intellectually disadvantaged, the 
impact on knowledge and understanding of the caution and legal rights of access to the 
experimental, original, or revised versions of the NDP were compared. 
Contrary to expectations based on the analysis of readability, knowledge of the material 
was no better among participants with access to the experimental version than their 
`original' counterparts. Indeed, on the three items (i. e. A, F, L, Fig. 6.5.1), on which, 
initially, the groups did not differ, the level of Knowledge After of the `experimental' 
participants was significantly worse. Less dramatically, but again contrary to 
expectations, access to the experimental, rather than the original, NDP made no 
significant impact on understanding. 
How can these findings be explained? First, despite their similar mean Full Scale IQ 
scores, and the well-established relationship between intellectual ability and knowledge 
and understanding of information about the caution and legal rights, or their equivalent 
(Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; Gudjonsson, 1980,1981,1990a, 
1991a; Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993; see Ch. 3.1.2), it is possible that there 
were important differences between the participants in the studies of the experimental 
version and the two previous versions. The men and women in this study appeared 
more socially and psychologically disadvantaged: for example, none had full-time paid 
employment, many had limited reading skills, and, as will be discussed in the Ch. 7, a 
significant proportion also had mental health problems and/or had attended schools for 
children with special needs. These disadvantages may have masked the effect of the 
experimental version. However, given that, with the exception of two items (B and C), 
baseline knowledge of the NDP did not differ significantly between the `experimental' 
participants and their `original' counterparts, it seems unlikely that this was the main 
explanation. 
More importantly, the readability formula analysis may have been an inadequate 
indicator of the complexity of the experimental version of the caution and legal rights. 
This was unexpected, given previous evidence supporting an association between 
readability and understanding of written information (Bormuth, 1966; Ley, 1977), 
including legal information (Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Jackson, 1995; Masson and 
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Waldron, 1994; Sherr, 1986), particularly for less able readers (Hartley, 1994). In 
addition, as already noted, in this study, the R. E. of each section of the experimental 
version was consistent with demonstrated understanding through paraphrased recall. 
However, in contrast with the way in which it was originally used (Flesch, 1948), 
readability in this study was assessed from very brief samples of text (i. e. for the 
information card). Moreover, there were major differences in the presentation of the 
three sections of the experimental version. The information card was intended to be 
maximally accessible to suspects alone in their cells; in contrast, the further information 
leaflet was always intended as reference material, probably to be studied with assistance 
from a legal adviser. It is most likely, though, that the discrepancies reflect the very 
limited linguistic variables employed by readability formulae (Bormuth, 1966). This 
suggests that, as Hartley (1994) has argued, an analysis of the complexity of 
information, using a readability formula, can be no more than a legitimate starting point 
in devising or amending informational materials. Some forensic linguists (Jackson, 
1995; Owen, 1995; Rock, 1999a, b; Scott, 1996), however, would go further, regarding 
readability formulae as irrelevant. Support for this perspective was obtained from the 
pattern of findings for the three groups involved in this study. With two exceptions 
(items I and M), knowledge of the same items improved significantly after access to the 
experimental and original versions (C, E, F, G, J, L); and correct responding was lowest 
for the same two items (questions 3 and 7) of the questionnaire measure of 
understanding after access to the experimental and revised versions. These similarities 
suggest that some legal concepts, however much they appear to be simplified by 
changes in word and sentence length, remain very difficult for actual participants. 
6.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Psychological methodologies were used to develop and evaluate an experimental 
version of the Notice to Detained Persons which was intended to enhance the 
accessibility of the information about the caution and legal rights. The exploratory 
studies described here involved, first, producing a less complex version, and, secondly, 
piloting with participants in an experimental situation. 
Whilst both knowledge and understanding of the experimental NDP remained, as for the 
original and revised versions, most difficult for the most intellectually disadvantaged 
214 
participants, the findings of the initial studies were encouraging. Consistent with 
previous work (Bormuth, 1966; Jackson, 1995; Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Ley, 1977; 
Masson and Waldron, 1994; Sherr, 1986), the results suggested that readability was 
associated with comprehension and supported Hartley's (1994) view that readability 
formulae provide a legitimate starting point in revising existing text. On this basis, a 
number of suggestions were made for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
(RCCJ) to consider: 
" though the oral information section of the experimental NDP was much longer 
than its counterpart in the revised version, taking almost four minutes to present, 
its effectiveness should be tested in the real-life setting of a police station. This 
would provide further information about whether, and to what extent, it might be 
reduced; 
" since even adequate oral information about the caution and legal rights may be 
presented cursorily by Custody Officers (Brown et al., 1992) and/or poorly 
absorbed and retained by suspects (Gudjonsson et al., 1993; Irving, 1980; Irving 
and McKenzie, 1989), some written material should remain available to suspects; 
" notwithstanding the finding that the further information leaflet appeared to 
improve participants' knowledge of the material, it was suggested that the 
information card, which was less complex and seemed more likely to be 
understood by men and women who were intellectually disadvantaged, should be 
retained. If it were given to each suspect before s/he were placed in a cell, it could 
provide a useful reminder of the most important rights. However, before piloting 
in situ, it needed further development to maximise its effectiveness; 
" the further information leaflet should not be given to suspects but the material it 
contained, particularly about the right to a copy of the Custody Record, should be 
readily available elsewhere. 
Subsequently, the report of the RCCJ (para. 40, Runciman, 1993) recommended that, 
after the suggested developments had been made, the experimental NDP should be 
piloted in police stations. It was also recommended that the effectiveness of the 
experimental version for suspects be compared with that of revised version presented on 
a video-tape. In fact, neither of these recommendations was implemented, in part, 
perhaps, because the focus of concern shifted to the modification of the right to silence 
which was later introduced under the Criminal Justice & Public Disorder Act 1994. 
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With hindsight, this was fortunate. In the original study, the criterion for adequacy was 
liberal. Arguably, this was justifiable on the grounds that so few attempts had been 
made to rewrite and pilot the information given to suspects in police detention; the 
enterprise itself was rather novel and, as an independent reviewer commented, 
`the study provides a useful step towards better methods of communication' 
(Brown, 1997, p. 81). 
Now, however, despite the continuing absence of accepted criteria (Penny Letts, 1999, 
personal communication), it is more widely acknowledged that legally-significant 
information provided to `customers' (hospital patients, tax payers, welfare benefits 
claimants, witnesses to alleged crimes) about their rights must be accessible (see, for 
example, the history of success of the Plain English Campaign). It seemed appropriate, 
therefore, for this thesis, to adopt a more stringent criterion. This involved detailed 
comparison, under experimental conditions, between the performances of the 
participants who were not intellectually disadvantaged and their counterparts with 
access to the original or revised versions. Unfortunately, the experimental NDP was 
found to be no more accessible to these participants, in the sense that it improved 
knowledge or understanding, than the (inadequate) versions it was intended to replace. 
Though it is a limitation that performance among men and women with learning 
disabilities was not assessed directly, the positive relationship between intellectual 
ability and knowledge and understanding of the legal rights to detained persons (Cooke 
and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1995; Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993; 
see Ch. 3.1.2) indicates that the experimental version, which contains a caution which 
has been superceded, would also have been too complex for this group. Since the 
experimental NDP was evaluated, the current caution, which presents difficulties even 
for police officers (Study 3, Ch. 3.4), has been introduced. If this had been included, 
there seems little doubt that the material would have been too complex for people with 
learning disabilities. 
The dearth of further published attempts in England and Wales, as in other jurisdictions, 
to develop more accessible versions of the NDP suggests pessimism about the task. This 
is not necessarily justified. First, though considerable care was taken in the development 
of the experimental version, the process was restricted by the time constraints imposed 
by the RCCJ. As the attempts of the Home Office to prepare new versions of the caution 
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attest (see Ch. 3), enhancing the accessibility of the information to detained persons is 
not straightforward. Secondly, based on the evidence which was then available 
(Bormuth, 1966; Gudjonsson, 1990a, 1991a; Ley, 1977; Sherr, 1986), too much weight 
was given to the apparently satisfactory results of the readability formula analysis 
without sufficient attention to its limitations. If another attempt to rewrite the NDP were 
to be made, its development should reflect some of the insights from modem forensic 
linguistics. For example, further analyses should be carried out of the meaning in 
everyday use of key terminology (such as `caution') and the associations with other 
words and concepts which may interfere with understanding in a forensic context. In 
such analyses, data bases, such as the COBUILD Bank of British English (Rock, 1999a), 
audio-tapes and transcripts of police interviews with suspects (Shuy, 1998), or direct 
interviews with suspects in police detention (Cotterill, 2000; Hartley, 2000), might all 
be used. Similarly, the impact of possible changes to the order of items within specific 
sections (such as the caution) or across sections, needs to be studied empirically. The 
experimental version retained the order of the original and revised versions of the NDP 
but this may not be the most effective. As Shuy (1997) has pointed out, in relation to 
the Miranda rights: 
`the discourse sequence in a series of statements can influence the respondent in 
what might be considered coercive ways' (ibid., p. 177-178). 
Finally, a more sophisticated approach is needed to the evaluation of the impact of any 
rewritten version. Both recall and paraphrasing rely too heavily on verbal ability. 
Moreover, they do not allow any distinction to be drawn between knowledge or 
understanding of the `facts' about the caution and legal rights and recognition of their 
legal significance. In any case, experience with the experimental NDP suggests that 
paraphrased recall becomes increasing difficult to score as the material is simplified. 
Other psychological methodologies which may be helpful include the `think aloud' 
method (van Someren et al., 1994; see Ch. 4.2.1) or some other form of structured or 
semi-structured interview (Hartley, 2000), and tasks requiring the identification of 
phrases and sentences as the `same as', or `different from' the meaning of the text (see 
Grisso, 1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993; Cooke and Philip, 1998, for examples of 
methodologies of the information about the caution and legal rights, or their equivalent, 
from other jurisdictions; see also Ch. 3.1.1 for examples from other areas of legally- 
significant decision-making). Since, as this chapter has so clearly shown, all 
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methodologies have strengths and weaknesses, the use of multiple indicators is 
recommended. 
Nevertheless, the arguments made by Jackson (1995), in particular, regarding the 
inherent differences between the `discourses' of the law and of lay-people, suggest that, 
despite further efforts, it may simply not be possible to translate information devised 
primarily to perform a legal function - that of satisfying the requirements of the Codes 
of Practice - into a form which fulfils adequately its intended purpose of safeguarding 
suspects, particularly `vulnerable' persons such as men and women with learning 
disabilities. What other practical strategies might be possible? 
First, as noted earlier (see Ch. 3.5), the presentation of the current Notice to Detained 
Persons could be improved for all suspects by police officers presenting the oral part of 
the information one sentence at a time. In addition, particularly given the difficulties 
experienced by many detained persons (Gudjonsson et al., 1993; Gudjonsson, Rutter 
and Clare, 1995; Irving, 1980; Irving and McKenzie, 1989), the clarity of the 
presentation by police officers needs to be more adequate (Brown et al., 1992; 
McConville et al., 1991). Specific training for Custody Officers may be helpful. Further, 
as suggested in Ch. 3.5, rather than using self-report to identify difficulties in 
understanding the caution, police officers and solicitors could at least ask suspects to 
explain its meaning in their own words, with standardised questions. 
Secondly, and more radically, much greater emphasis could be placed on assisting 
school pupils, including pupils with learning disabilities, to develop a better 
understanding of, and increased confidence in exercising, the caution and their legal 
rights during police detention. Even among the general population, increased experience 
of arrest and detention does not seem to improve understanding of the caution and legal 
rights, or their equivalent (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Grisso, 1981; Gudjonsson, 1992a; 
Olley and Ogloff, 1993; Stricker, 1985), probably because high levels of situational 
anxiety (Gudjonsson et al., 1993, Gudjonsson et al., 1995) restrict suspects' ability to 
learn complex new material. Whilst it is undoubtedly important to remind suspects in 
police detention of the caution and legal rights, it may be most effective for people to 
become familiar with the information in another setting. Several of the `general 
population' participants in the study of the original NDP (Study 1, Ch. 3.2) who were 
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able to recall the pre-1995 caution reported that they watched a television programme 
which attempts to portray the police in a realistic way ('The Bill'). This suggests that 
television, or video-tapes, might be used to educate children, as they grow up, to 
become familiar with suspects' right to silence and the importance of legal advice 
(Baldwin, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Leng, 1993; McConville and 
Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1993; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998). 
The current Government's initiatives to include `citizenship' as a formal part of the 
curriculum may provide an opportunity to develop, and evaluate, ways of addressing 
this task which are effective for children in both mainstream and `special' education. 
Finally, it may be possible to alleviate the `psychological vulnerability' which limited 
knowledge and understanding of the caution and legal rights presents to suspects with 
learning disabilities by improving. their (limited) identification as `vulnerable' by police 
officers and other criminal justice personnel. Improved identification should lead to 
much greater use of the `special provision' for the presence of an Appropriate Adult 
during detention and questioning introduced under PACE. Though training, particularly 
for Custody Officers, may be helpful, the heterogeneity of the population of men and 
women with learning disabilities and the overlap with the general population is likely to 
limit its effectiveness. In the next chapter, the possibility of an alternative practical 
strategy, that of encouraging self-identification by `vulnerable' persons, including men 
and women with learning disabilities, who have been detained by the police, is explored. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ENHANCING THE `SPECIAL PROVISION' AS A 
SAFEGUARD FOR `VULNERABLE' ADULT SUSPECTS 
Whilst understanding of the `psychological vulnerabilities' of people with learning 
disabilities has developed recently, the possibility that, as suspects, they might face 
more difficulties than their peers received statutory recognition with the introduction 
under PACE and its accompanying Codes of Practice of the `special provision' (see Ch. 
1.4.2). According to this provision, an independent person (the Appropriate Adult, AA), 
must be present when a `vulnerable' adult suspect is interviewed by the police or 
involved in any formal procedure (such as receiving the caution and legal rights). 
Unfortunately, despite the legal and practical importance of the `special provision' (see 
Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 10 ff., for a review of some of the miscarriages of justice 
involving innocent people with learning disabilities; and Ch. 1), there are major 
problems in both the way it is drafted (see Ch. 1.4.2) and, as will be discussed in more 
detail in this chapter, in its implementation. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
describe the development and piloting of a questionnaire intended to alleviate some of 
these problems by encouraging `vulnerable' adult suspects to identify themselves in 
police detention. 
Since the introduction of PACE, there have been three editions of Code C of the Codes 
of Practice. For clarity, in this chapter these are invariably referred to as the: 
1. Original: the first edition (Home Office, 1985b) which was introduced in England 
and Wales on 1st January, 1986, and remained in use until 3 1St March, 1991; 
2. Revised: the second edition (Home Office, 1991), which was introduced on Ist 
April, 1991, and remained in use until 31St March, 1995. It contained one 
substantive change to the `special provision': the independent person could no 
longer be the legal adviser acting for the suspect (see Ch. 1.4.2). 
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3. Current: the third edition (Home Office, 1995a), was introduced on 1St April, 
1995. It contains some minor amendments (see Ch. 1.4), including improvements 
to the conditions of detention for `vulnerable' suspects and a requirement that both 
the suspect and the independent person will be asked to provide reasons (which 
should be recorded) if the suspect declines legal advice. More subtly, there is a 
reminder that the `special provision' should be implemented if there is any doubt 
about whether the suspect has a learning disability or mental health problems. 
Unless otherwise specified, it is this third edition which is referred to throughout 
this chapter. 
7.1 BACKGROUND 
7.1.1 THE USE OF THE `SPECIAL PROVISION' FOR VULNERABLE 
SUSPECTS 
Arguably, the best estimate of the prevalence at police stations of adult suspects with 
learning disabilities and/or other `psychological vulnerabilities' is provided by 
Gudjonsson and his colleagues (Gudjonsson et al., 1993). They suggested that, 
consistent with more recent findings relating to mental health problems among adults 
living in private households in the UK (Singleton et al., 2001), 15 - 20 per cent of men 
and women in police detention following alleged criminal offending are 
`psychologically vulnerable' and should receive the protection of the `special 
provision'. 
In practice, however, despite clear guidance that the `special provision' should be used 
if the Custody Officer `has any suspicion, or is told in good faith' (Home Office, Code 
C, para. 1.4) that an adult suspect may be `vulnerable', it is rarely implemented. Based 
on large-scale examinations of the Custody Records (CRs) of different police forces, the 
rate of attendance at police stations by Appropriate Adults appears to range between: 
" two in every thousand CRs (< 0.2%, N=20,085, Bean and Nemitz, 1994); 
" approximately one in every hundred CRs (the precise figures are uncertain, 
N=10,167, Brown et al., 1992); and 
" two in every hundred CRs (1.7%, N=23,321, Medford et al., 2000). 
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Whilst the quantity and quality of information available in Custody Records (CRs) is 
often very poor (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Medford et al., 2000), these data are supported 
by a study using a different methodology. Based on observations in seven police stations 
in the Metropolitan Police District (MPD), Robertson et al. (1996) found that fewer than 
one per cent (0.4%, N=2571) of suspects aged 19 years or more received support from 
an AA; even among those who were interviewed, the figure remained below two per 
cent (1.7%, N=732). 
In contrast, though, Gudj onsson et al. (1993) found that four per cent (N=160, for this 
part of the study) of suspects were supported by AAs when they were later interviewed 
(Pearse et al., 1998). Given subsequent data from the same force (Medford et al., 2000; 
Robertson et al., 1996), the suggestion (Bean and Nemitz, 1994) that the findings reflect 
the location of the study is unconvincing. A more plausible explanation is that the 
Custody Officers' behaviour may have been affected by the knowledge that the 
investigation was being carried out to inform the review of the RCCJ. 
Nevertheless, even the most generous figures indicate a striking discrepancy between 
the estimated prevalence of `psychological vulnerabilities' among adult suspects and 
Appropriate Adults' attendance at police stations; several studies have explored this 
discrepancy. 
7.1.2 IDENTIFYING `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' 
Surprisingly, perhaps, given its legal importance and the attention given to miscarriages 
of justice involving innocent suspects, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
possibility of `psychological vulnerability' among suspects is rarely documented. 
Focussing exclusively on `mental handicap' and `mental disorder', Brown et al. (1992) 
found that only one per cent of Custody Records (N=10,167) contained any reference to 
the presence of these difficulties. In fact, the data may provide an overestimate of the 
level of identification of criminal suspects because more than half the CRs related to 
men and women who were not detained because of any alleged offending. Rather, they 
had been identified as people with a `mental disorder' `in immediate need of care or 
control' under s. 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Similarly low levels of 
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identification were reported by Bean and Nemitz (1994). Only two per cent (N=20,805) 
of the Custody Records they examined referred either to a specific form of 
`psychological vulnerability' (for example, stating that the person was `mentally 
disordered' or `mentally ill') or to symptoms indicating an abnormal mental state (such 
as `depressed' or having `self-inflicted injuries'). 
In contrast, in a large study of Custody Records (N=23,321) in the Metropolitan Police 
District, Medford and her colleagues (Medford et al., 2000) found that just over four per 
cent (4.3%) contained a reference to some type of `vulnerability'. However, the results 
do not necessarily indicate greater awareness among police officers in London; they may 
simply reflect the higher prevalence of `vulnerable' suspects in that area. In any case, 
even the most generous figures suggest limited awareness of 'vulnerability'. 
How is it that, then, on at least some occasions, Custody Officers become alerted to the 
possibility that a suspect has learning disabilities and/or other `psychological 
vulnerabilities'? Information may be available to them through a variety of sources 
(Medford et al., 2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996), including: 
" people who know, or are acquainted with, the suspect (including paid and unpaid 
carers; friends; other police officers; legal advisers; practitioners in primary or 
mental health care or social services); 
" details of the circumstances of the arrest; and 
" notification through the Police National Computer and other criminal justice 
records. 
None of these sources is reliable, however, and identification often depends on Custody 
Officers' direct observations. From the findings of their substantial qualitative study, 
Palmer and Hart (1996) propose that the possibility that an adult suspect is `vulnerable' 
is raised in response to: 
" florid behaviour, such as `shouting or screaming' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 30); 
" tangible clues, such as the possession of prescribed medication for epilepsy or a 
mental health problem, or obvious difficulties in signing forms; 
" less obvious indications, such as a neglected or dishevelled appearance, nervous 
movements, or as one Custody Officer reported, the `person's demeanour and 
behaviour' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 31). 
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This framework, which relies on immediate visual and behavioural clues, does not seem 
adequate. First, there are practical difficulties in its implementation: the `booking in' of 
suspects is often chaotic and there may be little opportunity for Custody Officers to 
carry out the detailed observations needed to assess `psychological vulnerabilities' 
among suspects who are socially withdrawn or, superficially, appear `ordinary' (Palmer 
and Hart, 1996). Secondly, since it is subjective, the application of the framework will 
rely, to an extent which is inappropriate given the legal and ethical importance of the 
`special provision' for `vulnerable' suspects, on the experiences and perceptions of 
particular officers: 
`I'm not trained so I can only go on intuition, personal feeling, how I feel about 
that particular thing' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 33); 
`It's like a sixth sense isn't it? You just sort of get something and you think, well, 
he's not quite right this chap' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 33). 
Local working practices may also be important: where the police serve as Custody 
Officers on a rotational, rather than permanent, basis and therefore do not gain detailed 
knowledge of suspects in police detention, the possibility of `psychological 
vulnerability' is less likely to be acknowledged (Gudjonsson et al., 1993; Palmer and 
Hart, ibid. ). 
The difficulties which the police have, however, may be exacerbated by the reluctance 
of at least some people who would be `vulnerable' as suspects to identify themselves 
spontaneously. As part of another study (Study 1, Ch. 3.2), Clare and Gudjonsson 
(1991) asked men and women with learning disabilities (N=20; mean pro-rated Full 
Scale IQ: 65; s. d.: 5.3) a simple question: `if you were arrested by the police, would you 
tell them you are a person with a learning disability? ' Each person was then asked to 
explain the reason for his or her answer. 
The responses suggested that spontaneous self-identification would be limited. Only 
thirteen (65%) of the participants indicated that they would inform the police of their 
difficulties. The ten men and women who explained their responses all realised that self- 
identification might be helpful to them (saying, for example `the police would be kinder 
to you'; `(the police) could get in contact with (name of centre) to get someone to help'). 
None, however, made any specific mention of the `special provision' under Code C of 
the Codes of Practice. 
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Worryingly, though, the remaining seven (35%) participants reported emphatically that 
they would not tell the police about their learning disabilities, primarily because the 
information was `personal' or 'private'. Regardless of their level of intellectual 
functioning, most of these men and women appeared to have good social functioning; 
they seemed to be trying hard to appear `ordinary'. In general, they were also the 
participants who were most reluctant to admit to reading difficulties. For example, 
several of them appeared willing to try to read the Notice to Detained Persons despite 
obtaining scores on the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (Neale, 1978) which 
indicated that they were not functionally literate (Dalglish, 1982; see Study 1, Ch. 
3.2.3). Indeed, one person who attempted to read the NDP obtained a reading accuracy 
score of zero (from a maximum score of 100). Arguably, these participants might be at 
particular risk of being detained and interviewed without their `vulnerability' being 
identified and access to the `special provision' ensured. 
Though these findings are based on a very small sample, and no attempt has ever been 
made to replicate them, they are consistent with other results suggesting that people with 
learning disabilities, in particular (but see also a report of similar reticence among 
people with reading difficulties, Chamley and Jones, 1979), attempt to `pass' (Edgerton, 
1967) as members of the general population. Some Custody Officers attempt to 
circumvent these problems by applying their own `screening' questionnaires which ask 
the detained person about his or her educational history and current problems (Palmer 
and Hart, 1996). Unfortunately, though, perhaps because the formal demands on 
Custody Officers are so great, it appears that such questionnaires are implemented to 
confirm existing concerns; they do not seem to be used systematically to assist in the 
identification of vulnerability among suspects who, at least superficially, appear 
`ordinary'. 
Even when the Custody Record of an adult suspect indicates that his or her 
`vulnerability' has been identified, however, it is far from inevitable that he or she will 
receive the `special provision'. 
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7.1.3 REQUESTING THE `SPECIAL PROVISION' 
There is consistent evidence that the number of adult suspects who are identified as 
vulnerable considerably exceeds the number of requests for an Appropriate Adult. 
The CRs examined by Brown et al. (1992) suggest that AAs were sought for about two- 
thirds (65%, but the sample size is uncertain) of the putatively `mentally disordered' or 
`mentally handicapped' suspects. In striking contrast, in Bean and Nemitz' (1994) study, 
requests were made for fewer than one in ten (8%, N=486) of those who appeared 
'vulnerable'. More recently, in their investigation in the Metropolitan Police District, 
Medford et al. (2000) noted that AAs were sought for just over half (54%, N=1008) of 
the suspects with documented 'vulnerability'. More encouragingly, based on direct 
observations in police forces in different parts of the country, Phillips and Brown (1998) 
found that AAs were requested for three-quarters (75%, N=44) of such suspects. 
Whilst the factors contributing to the discrepancies between the findings remain 
uncertain, the evidence consistently suggests two main reasons why the `special 
provision' is not always requested for `vulnerable' suspects. First, there appears to be 
widespread confusion about the meaning and interpretation of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice. Some police officers simply do not seem to know that the `special provision' 
may, in some circumstances, be relevant to adult suspects. Based on their interviews 
with Custody Officers, Bean and Nemitz (1994), for example, concluded that: 
`the impression that AAs are for juveniles is deeply ingrained... there was little or 
no understanding that AAs were for adults' (Bean and Nemitz, 1994, p. 44). 
Such a conclusion is consistent with Medford et al. 's (2000) finding that, in contrast 
with vulnerable adults, requests for the attendance of an AA were made for almost all 
(94.7%, N=3514) juvenile suspects. Given that it is now more than fifteen years since 
the introduction of PACE and its accompanying guidelines, these data indicate a 
worrying lack of knowledge of their responsibilities among those charged with the 
protection of detained persons (see PACE, Parts IV and V). 
There seem also to be more complex misunderstandings. Some Custody Officers appear 
to believe that the guidance in Code C is discretionary: though identifying a suspect's 
`vulnerability' they may subsequently decide that it is not `serious enough' (Brown et 
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al., 1992, p. 78) to warrant implementation of the `special provision'. In making such 
decisions, they appear to be influenced by the seriousness of the alleged offence 
(Robertson et al., 1996), and, in particular, by whether it is likely that the suspect will be 
interviewed (Medford et al., 2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996). 
Where the investigation has already indicated that the offence(s) are very serious, a 
generous approach to the `special provision' seems to be adopted (for example, in the 
case of Fred West, the alleged serial murderer, Campbell, 1995). Presumably, the 
intention is to minimise the possibility that any information might subsequently be ruled 
inadmissible in court. In contrast, where the alleged offence is apparently trivial, and 
perhaps seems unlikely even to lead to a charge, Custody Officers appear reluctant to 
detain `vulnerable' persons whilst they seek to implement the provision. Recent findings 
(Medford et al., 2000) indicate that, on average, `vulnerable' suspects wait more than 
four and a half hours between their arrival in custody and the attendance of an AA; 
`many' (Medford et al., p. 10), however, wait for more than twenty hours. In this 
context, the use of discretion by Custody Officers appears pragmatic and compassionate. 
Nevertheless, it is a breach of the Codes, and has potentially serious implications under 
PACE (see Ch. 1.5). 
Secondly, there seems to be widespread confusion about the procedure for 
implementing the `special provision' (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Medford et al., 2000; 
Palmer and Hart, 1996). Under Code C (see Ch. 1.4.2), if a Custody Officer has any 
suspicion that a suspect is `mentally handicapped', the attendance of an AA must be 
sought. If, however, the suspicion is of `mental disorder', the Custody Officer must 
request an AA and, at the same time, seek a medical assessment from a police surgeon 
(in London, Forensic Medical Examiner) to establish the suspect's `fitness to detain' 
and `fitness for interview'. In practice, though, Custody Officers often delay calling the 
Appropriate Adult until the police surgeon has visited and given his or her opinion 
(Medford et al., 2000; Phillips and Brown, 1998; Palmer and Hart, 1996; though c. f. 
Robertson et al., 1996). Medford et al. (2000), for example, found that, where the FME 
declared the suspect fit to be detained and interviewed, and did not make a specific 
recommendation for the involvement of an AA, invariably no one was called. Such an 
abrogation of responsibility is particularly unfortunate since police surgeons are 
generally general practitioners; they are used to focussing on physical disorders and, 
from a recent study (Gudjonsson et al., 2000), seem to have limited understanding of the 
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safeguards for `vulnerable' suspects. -. Technically, Custody Officers have also committed 
a breach of the Codes of Practice. 
Even when the police do attempt to contact an Appropriate Adult, however, they are not 
always successful (Medford et al., 2000; Phillips and Brown, 1998). Moreover, the 
problems do not end with the AA's attendance. 
7.1.4 THE `SPECIAL PROVISION' AT THE POLICE STATION 
Perhaps reflecting the limitations of the official guidance about the `special provision' 
(Code C, para. 11.16; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996; see Ch. 1.4.2), different views 
have developed about the role of the Appropriate Adult at the police station. 
Consistent with the findings that the `special provision' is more likely to be 
implemented when it is known that the suspect will be interviewed ((Medford et al., 
2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996), it seems that the police perceive 
the Appropriate Adult's role as quasi-parental, safeguarding the physical welfare of the 
suspect to maximise the possibility that confession evidence is admissible in court 
(Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996). Contrary to 
Code C (para. 11.16), it appears that advice about their role is rarely given to 
Appropriate Adults (Palmer and Hart, 1996; Pearse, 1997). When advice is given, it may 
reflect the police officer's individual perspective rather than the official guidance. As 
one of the Custody Officers interviewed by Palmer and Hart (1996) reported: 
`I would ask them to make sure they know what their role was... There's nothing 
worse if you have an interview with somebody and this novice keeps piping up 
and butting in all the time' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 65); 
or, more baldly, as was apparently explained to a Social Worker acting as an AA: 
`You are wallpaper, pal' (Pinnock, 1989, quoted in Dixon et al., 1990, p. 120). 
In striking contrast, a lawyer has suggested that the AA's task involves: 
`advising the suspect about a number of crucial decisions... such as when to 
remain silent and refuse to answer police questions' (Rhead, 1997, p. 26). 
The view that an unqualified, and unaccountable, Appropriate Adult should attempt to 
provide legal advice is controversial, even among lawyers (Palmer and Hart, 1996), not 
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least because legal privilege does not extend to the AA. It certainly conflicts with other 
guidance (Littlechild, 1996; Mencap, 1997) which emphasises that the AA's task is to 
seek legal advice for the suspect, if necessary over-riding his or her wishes, as is 
permitted. under the Code C (Home Office, 1995a, para. 3.13). Before dismissing 
Rhead's view, however, it should be noted that it is consistent with a judgment made by 
the Court of Appeal (Lewis (Martin), 1996). Mr. Lewis sought to introduce evidence of 
a learning disability to argue that he should have had the support of an Appropriate 
Adult when he was interviewed. The court attached great weight to the fact that a legal 
adviser was present, stating that the functions of a solicitor and an AA are similar 
(Hodgson, 1997). 
This continuing debate about the role of the Appropriate Adult suggests that, more than 
twenty-five years after the publication of the report of the Confait inquiry, Fisher's 
(1977) criticism of a lack of knowledge among police officers and lawyers of the 
safeguards for `vulnerable' suspects (Fisher, 1977; see Ch. 1.2.2), is still depressingly 
relevant. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, given the uncertainty about the purpose of their attendance at 
police stations, there is a range of views about the effectiveness of Appropriate Adults 
in safeguarding `vulnerable' suspects. Considerable concern has been expressed about 
their passivity (Hodgson, 1997; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Pearse, 1997). Of equal concern, 
however, are the contributions of `active' AAs. Examining the audio-taped interviews 
of twenty suspects allegedly involved in serious offences which they initially denied but 
then admitted, Pearse (1997) found that four suspects were `supported' by AAs (a total 
of six AAs). In two cases, the suspects' confessions were preceded by a prompt or 
intervention from the AA; in only one case did the AA intervene appropriately. 
According to one of the Notes for Guidance in Code C (Home Office, 1995a, Note 1E), 
the person who acts as the Appropriate Adult for `vulnerable' adult suspects should, 
ideally, be someone with relevant experience or training. In fact, family members are 
often requested by the police, in part because, in areas without any formal volunteer 
scheme, they may be more readily available than, for example, social workers (Bean and 
Nemitz, 1994; Medford et al., 2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996). However, there are 
concerns that they are too easily intimidated by the police because of their emotional 
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involvement (Hodgson, 1997). As one of the solicitors interviewed by Palmer and Hart 
(1996) commented: 
`(t)heir view could be coloured by personal knowledge of recent 
events... Insufficiently detached, strong likelihood of bias being present' (ibid., p. 
69). 
There may be additional difficulties. Sometimes, family members may also have mental 
health problems and/or be intellectually and socially disadvantaged. These problems 
may impair both their understanding of the procedures and their significance and their 
ability to assert themselves to safeguard their relative (Gudjonsson, 1993; Gudjonsson 
and MacKeith, 1994). 
Unfortunately, however, there is empirical evidence (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Pearse, 
1997) that even people with professional experience of working with men and women 
with learning disabilities and/or other `psychological vulnerabilities' may still not 
provide adequate safeguards for suspects. They may feel intimidated in a police station. 
These feelings can be complicated by role conflicts, for example, when the carer of a 
suspect with learning disabilities also knows the alleged victim, or when an Approved 
Social Worker is also involved in making an assessment under the Mental Health Act 
1983 (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Hodgson, 1997). In addition, most health care and social 
services practitioners have a professional duty to disclose information `in the public 
interest', so the extent to which they can maintain confidentiality is very limited. As the 
RCCJ (Runciman, 1993) commented, this: 
`arguably undermines the whole purpose of the role' (Runciman, 1993, p. 44). 
So far, the courts have made little positive contribution to resolving these problems. 
They have been concerned only with whether Appropriate Adult could have fulfilled the 
role (Palmer and Hart, 1996). They have often excluded confession evidence when it has 
been shown that the AA is themselves `psychologically vulnerable' or is so estranged 
from the suspect that he or she could not act properly (Gudjonsson, 1993). However, 
they have shown little interest in whether the person did fulfil the role effectively 
(Palmer and Hart, 1996). Instead, the presence of an Appropriate Adult is usually no 
more than a formality (Harkin, 1997; Hodgson, 1997; Palmer, 1996) so that: 
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`the vulnerable suspect is apparently protected, but in reality no more so, and 
possibly less, than if the safeguards had not been implemented' (Palmer and Hart, 
1996, p. 23). 
This catalogue of problems indicates that, despite its importance, the `special provision' 
does not fulfil adequately its intended purpose of safeguarding `vulnerable' adult 
suspects. Indeed, Irving and McKenzie (1989), reviewing the Confait case in the light of 
the current legislation and guidelines, argue that the possibility cannot be excluded that 
Colin Lattimore would again be the victim of a miscarriage of justice. The 
comprehensive review recommended by the RCCJ (Runciman, 1993, para. 86) is, at 
last, being carried out (Ian Blackie, 2002, personal communication); as yet, though, no 
changes have been introduced. 
Nevertheless, despite its problems, the `special provision' is the only specific safeguard 
for adult suspects with learning disabilities and/or other `psychological vulnerabilities' 
in police detention, and its `importance... cannot be over emphasised' (Bean and 
Nemitz, 1994, p. 7). It seems appropriate, then, to make some efforts, however limited, 
to alleviate the current problems. In this chapter, two related exploratory studies are 
described. In the first study, an experimental questionnaire is developed which is 
intended to support Custody Officers by encouraging people with learning disabilities 
and/or other `vulnerabilities' to identify themselves. In the second study, the 
questionnaire is piloted at a police station to examine its effectiveness in everyday 
practice. As far as is known, more recent attempts to encourage self-identification by 
`vulnerable' adult suspects have been based on the work carried out as part of these 
studies; they are therefore described in detail. 
7.2 STUDY 13: DEVELOPING AN EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE TO 
ENCOURAGE SELF-IDENTIFICATION BY `VULNERABLE' ADULTS 
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of an experimental questionnaire to encourage self-identification by 
people who would be `vulnerable' as suspects (initially reported as Clare and 
Gudjonsson, 1992) formed part of the research commissioned by the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice (RCCJ, Runciman, 1993) to inform their review of the protections 
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offered to men and women in police detention (see Ch. 7). In this study, however, the 
RCCJ was specifically interested in `vulnerable' suspects, including men and women 
with learning disabilities. 
Though this was the first formal attempt to encourage self-identification by men and 
women with learning disabilities and/or other `psychological vulnerabilities', some 
guidance was available to inform its development. First, the wording of Code C 
(para. 1.4), which is supported by case law (for example, Rv Everett (1988); Rv Moss 
(1990); Rv Cox (1991); Rv Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip (1991)) suggests that the 
criteria for using the `special provision' should be interpreted generously. The 
implication was that the measure should be inclusive rather than exclusive: its 
sensitivity was more critical than its specificity (Streiner and Norman, 1995). Secondly, 
though they were not aware of the `special provision', the majority of people with 
learning disabilities in Clare and Gudj onsson's (1991) study understood that it might be 
helpful to inform the police of their difficulties. The wording of any measure needed to 
emphasise the potential benefits during detention of self-identification. At the same 
time, it is known that people with learning disabilities (Clare and Gudj onsson, 1991) or 
reading difficulties (Charnley and Jones, 1979) are sensitive about information relating 
to their vulnerabilities. Similar feelings may be widespread among men and women with 
mental health problems, given the stigma and social exclusion which they often 
experience (see Byrne, 1999, for a review). This suggested that it was important to try to 
minimise the likelihood that the measure would be perceived as demeaning by the 
people it was trying to benefit. Finally, given the constraints under which Custody 
Officers work (Runciman, 1993), it had to be easily administered. 
The aim of this study was to develop an experimental measure which might encourage 
self-identification by men and women who would be `vulnerable' in police detention. 
As part of the process of its development, a preliminary evaluation of its effectiveness 
was carried out. Since, as noted earlier in relation to the NDP (see Ch. 6.5), there are no 
agreed criteria for the acceptability of legal material (Penny Letts, 1999, personal 
communication), the study was descriptive. 
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7.2.2 METHOD 11 
Developing the self-identification questionnaire 
The development of the measure, like that of the experimental version of the Notice to 
Detained Persons (Study 9, Ch. 6.2), involved an `iterative process' (Waller, 1984). 
First, after informal discussions with police officers with experience of working in the 
Custody Suite, an initial draft was prepared. This comprised a series of standardised 
statements, worded to emphasise Custody Officers' responsibility to provide particular 
assistance, or `special help', to suspects who, in the terminology of Code C of the Codes 
of Practice, are `mentally handicapped' or `mentally disordered'. Since reading 
difficulties are also of practical importance, and are frequent amongst suspects 
(Gudjonsson et al., 1993), there was an additional statement about this problem. Each 
set of statements was followed by a closed question, only answerable with a `yes' or 
'no'. The decision to present the measure as a questionnaire was made for two reasons: 
first, it has been established that direct questioning is effective in encouraging people to 
provide information which is potentially sensitive (Hawton, 1985). Secondly, because of 
the susceptibility to acquiescence, particularly among people who, like the majority of 
suspects, are intellectually disadvantaged (see Ch. 5.3), it was thought that `yes'/'no' 
questions would increase the likelihood of self-identification. The draft was submitted 
to the Home Office for advice about its legal acceptability. The use of the term `special 
help' was agreed upon because it indicated that the presence of an AA was additional to, 
rather than a replacement for, the suspect's other legal rights. 
Next, users of services for people with learning disabilities or mental health problems 
were asked for their response to the language used in Code C. Not surprisingly, the 
terms `mentally disordered' and `mentally handicapped' were not acceptable. Moreover, 
`mental disorder' was not readily understood and was believed to refer only to the most 
severe forms of mental health problems. A number of other terms were suggested. 
Comments from police officers indicated that, whilst some of these were meaningful to 
them, others, such as `mental distress', were not. As a compromise, the questionnaire 
was redrafted so that it referred to people with `reading problems'; `learning difficulties 
(mental handicap)'; and `mental illness'; and asked whether the individual had attended 
a `special school' in childhood or had a recent admission to a `psychiatric hospital'. 
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With the agreement of the Home Office, the questionnaire was inserted at the end of the 
oral information section of the experimental version of the NDP so that, in real life, it 
would be read out by Custody Officers to all adult suspects, regardless of their 
appearance and behaviour. 
A copy of the final version of the experimental self-identification questionnaire is 
shown as part of Study 14, in Figure 7.3.1. 
Participants 
Though the study involved experimental participants, not men and women in police 
detention, efforts were made to improve its ecological validity. A group (described fully 
in Ch. 6.3.2) of one hundred volunteers (64 men and 36 women) who, like the majority 
of suspects (Gudjonsson et al., 1993), were of below average intellectual ability, had 
already been recruited through `job-finder' and work experience centres or basic skills 
clubs to take part in the evaluation of the experimental version of the Notice to Detained 
Persons. The participants in this study comprised the same group. All of them were 
`adults' (i. e. aged >_ 17 years) in terms of the criminal justice system and were fluent in 
English. 
Measures 
1. Reading ability: as described in Ch. 6.3.2, reading ability was assessed using the 
Schonell Graded Word Reading Test (GWRT, Schonell and Goodacre, 1974). 
2. Intellectual functioning: as described in Ch. 6.3.2, intellectual functioning was 
assessed using all eleven sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- 
Revised (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981). 
3. Evaluation of the questionnaire: to assess whether the questionnaire's 
acceptability, qualitative information was collected about the participants' 
responses. To assess its effect on self-identification as a `vulnerable' person, the 
responses of the participants were compared with independent information. 
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Procedure 
The participants were recruited and assessed by Ms. Philippa Cross, the Research 
Assistant who had already been involved in Study 2 (Ch. 3.3) and subsequent studies 
(Studies 6,7 and 8, see Ch. 5; and Studies 10 and 11, see Ch. 6). They were seen 
individually at the centres/clubs they attended. 
Reading ability and intellectual functioning were assessed during the first session with 
the participants (described in full in Ch. 6.3). Three or four days later, after the 
evaluation of the caution and legal rights in the NDP (described in Ch. 6.4), the 
assessment of the self-identification questionnaire was carried out. Each participant was 
given a copy of the text, which was read aloud in its entirety. Then, every sentence was 
read out in turn. After each question, the participant was asked whether he or she would 
need this `special help', and the responses were recorded. 
7.2.3 RESULTS 
Participant characteristics 
Table 7.2.1 shows details of the chronological ages, Full Scale IQ scores and raw 
reading accuracy scores of the sample. 
Table 7.2.1 Characteristics of the participants 
mean s. d. range 
Chronological age 33.2 10.5 17 - 69 
Full Scale IQ 79.5 15.8 53 - 128 
Reading accuracy raw score 60.4 28.9 0- 100 
Number of participants 100 
Evaluation of the questionnaire 
No one appeared distressed or irritated by the questions and they were answered fully by 
all 100 participants. 
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To examine the effect of the questionnaire on self-identification, each participant's 
responses were compared with his or her scores on the tests of. 
" reading ability, using a reading accuracy score of < 43 (a reading age equivalent to 
9 years) on the GWRT as the criterion for `reading problems' (Dalglish, 1982); 
and 
" intellectual functioning, using a Full Scale IQ score of _< 
75 on the WAIS-R as the 
criterion for `learning difficulties'. 
As no other independent information was available, it was not possible to carry out 
similar comparisons for attendance at a `special school' and/or having `recently been in 
a psychiatric hospital' and/or having a `mental illness'. 
Table 7.2.2 shows the responses of the fifty-four (54%) participants who reported that 
they would need `special help'. 
Table 7.2.2 Participants' responses to the self-identification questionnaire 
Reasons given by 
participants self-reporting 










No. of participants 
fulfilling criteria for 
`special help' : 
" RP* 2 2 0 4 
" LD** 15 2 0 17 
" RP* and LD** 18 4 0 22 
Total 35 8 0 43 
KEY: 
RP: `reading problems' 
LD: `learning difficulties' 
SS: attendance at `special school' 
MI: `mental illness' 
PH: `recently in a psychiatric hospital' 
* Reading accuracy score < 43 on the GWRT 
** FSIQ <_ 75 on the WAIS-R 
Thirty-five (95%) of the participants who reported that they had `reading problems' 
and/or `learning difficulties' and/or had attended a `special school' fulfilled the criteria 
for impairments of reading ability and/or intellectual functioning. These criteria were 
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also fulfilled by eight (53%) of the men and women who claimed that they needed 
`special help' only on the grounds that they had `recently been in a psychiatric hospital' 
and/or had a `mental illness'. The validity of the remaining reports could not be 
established but, even assuming, very stringently, that none of them was true, no more 
than eleven (20%) participants could have been `false positives'. 
Of greater concern, though, in evaluating the questionnaire, was the proportion of 
`vulnerable' men and women who identified themselves in response to the questions. 
Table 7.2.3 shows the responses of the 54 (54%) of participants who fulfilled the criteria 
for `reading problems' and/or `learning difficulties'. 
Table 7.2.3 Self-identification among participants needing `special help' 
No. of participants 










Reasons given by 
participants self-reporting 
need for `special help' 
" RP/LD/SS 2 15 18 35 
" MUPH 2 2 4 8 
Total 4 17 22 43 
Percentage of participants 
fulfilling criteria for RP 
and/or LD who reported 
need for `special help' 67% 89% 76% 80% 
KEY: 
RP: `reading problems' 
LD: `learning difficulties' 
SS: attendance at `special school' 
MI: `mental illness' 
PH: `recently in a psychiatric hospital' 
* Reading accuracy score < 43 on the GWRT 
** FSIQ <_ 75 on the WAIS-R 
Of these fifty-four participants, forty-three (80%) reported that they would need `special 
help' in police detention: thirty-five (65%) stated that their reading ability and/or 
intellectual functioning was impaired and/or that they had attended a `special school'; 
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the remainder reported mental health problems (either having `recently been in a 
psychiatric hospital' or a `mental illness'). 
Though it seemed that, compared with their counterparts who fulfilled the criteria for 
`learning difficulties', participants with `reading problems' were more likely to report 
the need for `special help', statistical analysis, using the Fisher exact test (see Appendix 
7 for details) indicated that the difference was not significant. 
7.2.4 DISCUSSION 
Using an `iterative process' (Waller, 1984), an experimental questionnaire to encourage 
self-identification by people who would be `vulnerable' suspects in police detention was 
developed and a limited evaluation of its effectiveness was carried out. 
The initial findings were encouraging: first, it appeared that the questionnaire was 
practical, and was not perceived as demeaning. Secondly, the need for `special help' was 
reported by four-fifths (80%) of those who, from independent information about their 
reading ability and intellectual functioning, would be `vulnerable' during police 
detention and interviewing. Thirdly, and of practical importance given the difficulties 
which are often experienced by Custody Officers in making contact with an Appropriate 
Adult (Medford et al., 2000), it did not appear that use of the questionnaire would result 
in an overwhelming number of requests for `special help' by men and women for whom 
it was not needed. 
Nevertheless, one in five (20%) participants who, based on their results on tests of 
reading ability and/or intellectual functioning, would require the `special provision' 
during police detention and interviewing did not identify themselves as `vulnerable'. 
This is not statistically significantly fewer than the 35% of participants who reported to 
Clare and Gudjonsson (1991) that they would not reveal their learning disabilities to the 
police spontaneously. Though the two studies used different participants so the findings 
could not be compared directly, the implication is that the effectiveness of direct 
questioning is limited. Still, a decision was made that, at this stage, it would be 
premature to discard the questionnaire. First, the generalisability of the findings from 
the preliminary evaluation was uncertain. In the real-life setting of a police station, a 
238 
greater proportion of `vulnerable' suspects might identify themselves in order to access 
the `special help', though, at the same time, there might be such a substantial increase 
in the number of attempts to gain the `special provision' that the police would be 
overwhelmed. Secondly, the legal and practical importance of the `special provision' 
suggested that determined efforts should be made to enhance its adequacy as a 
safeguard. Thirdly, consistent with the findings of more formal interviews (Harkin, 
1997; Palmer and Hart, 1996, though c. f. Bean and Nemitz; Medford et al., 2000), 
informal discussions with Custody Officers suggested that they did not feel confident in 
identifying `psychological vulnerabilities', particularly among suspects who, in the 
context of a police station appeared `ordinary', and were eager for support. 
These considerations suggested that the experimental questionnaire might be of 
potential value though it needed further development and, above all, piloting in an 
actual police station. 
7.3 STUDY 14: PILOTING THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO 
ENCOURAGE SELF-IDENTIFICATION BY `VULNERABLE' 
CRIMINAL SUSPECTS 
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is now substantial evidence that the identification of `vulnerable' adult suspects 
can be difficult (Bean and Neoritz, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Gudjonsson et al., 1993; 
Medford et at, 2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996). However, there were no published 
accounts, either in England and Wales or in other jurisdictions, of formal attempts to 
support the police in this task in their everyday practice. The findings of the previous 
study (Study 13, Ch. 7.2) suggested that the use of a questionnaire measure, presented to 
all suspects, might be helpful. 
Some time later, it became possible to explore this suggestion by carrying out a pilot 
study in the real-life setting of a police station. The main aim was to investigate the 
feasibility and effectiveness of the questionnaire. It was expected that its introduction 
would increase the proportion of adult criminal suspects identified by Custody Officers 
as requiring the safeguard of the `special provision' during police detention and 
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interviewing. It was also expected that, if more requests were made for AAs, they 
would attend the police station more frequently. 
7.3.2 METHOD 
Developing the questionnaire 
Following the previous study (Study 13, Ch. 7.2), informal discussions were held with 
users of services for men and women with learning disabilities or mental health 
problems and Custody Officers in the Metropolitan Police Service and some changes 
were made to the experimental questionnaire: 
" to reduce the demands on suspects' working memories, each set of statements was 
abbreviated, and the questions about the need for `special help' were asked three 
times, rather than twice; 
" in order that Custody Officers could implement the different procedures under 
Code C of the Codes of Practice for suspects who are `mentally disordered' and 
those who are `mentally handicapped', the statements about mental health 
problems and learning disabilities were clearly separated; 
" to encourage `vulnerable' persons to identify themselves, an additional statement 
was added, asking suspects if they would need `special help' for `any other 
reason'; if the answer was `yes', they were to be asked why; 
9 the meaning of `special help' was explained. 
A copy of the amended version of the questionnaire is shown below, as Figure 7.3.1. It 
was made into a stamp, to be inserted onto the first inside page of every Custody Record 
(CR) opened for an adult suspect. 
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Figure 7.3.1 Final version of the questionnaire to encourage self-identification 
by `vulnerable' adult suspects 
THERE IS SOME SPECIAL HELP THE POLICE MUST GIVE TO PEOPLE WHO 
HAVE READING PROBLEMS OR WHO WENT TO SPECIAL SCHOOL. DO YOU 
NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP? YES Q NO Q 
THE POLICE MUST ALSO GIVE SPECIAL HELP TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE 
LEARNING DIFFICULTIES OR LEARNING DISABILITIES (MENTAL 
HANDICAP). DO YOU NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP? YES Q NO Q 
THE POLICE MUST ALSO GIVE SPECIAL HELP TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE A 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEM OR MENTAL ILLNESS. DO YOU NEED THIS 
SPECIAL HELP? YES Q NO Q 
DO YOU NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP FOR ANY OTHER REASON? 
YES Q NO Q 
IF YES, FOR WHAT REASON?: 
........................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................ 
THE TERM "SPECIAL HELP" IN THE QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE REFERS TO 
THE PROVISION FOR AN "APPROPRIATE ADULT". PLEASE EXPLAIN THE 
ROLE OF THE "APPROPRIATE ADULT". 
Materials 
The study used the Custody Records of men and women aged 17 years or more who had 
been arrested and detained by the police for alleged criminal offences. Information about 
individuals who were detained for alleged immigration offences or had been taken to the 
station as a `place of safety' under s. 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was not 
included. 
Measures 
The information was collected by examining all the Custody Records of adults detained 
at the police station during a three-month period before, and then again after, the 
introduction of the questionnaire. 
1. Identification of `vulnerability': since the purpose of the study was to evaluate 
the practical impact of the questionnaire, the identification of `vulnerability' was 
operationalised as evidence in the CR that the Custody Officer had made at least 
one attempt to seek the `special provision' of an Appropriate Adult for a particular 
adult suspect. 
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2. Attendance of an Appropriate Adult: the attendance of an AA was defined as 
evidence that an adult (aged 18 years or more) in one of the categories listed under 
para. 1.7 (b) of Code C, and who was not excluded under Notes IC and IF of the 
Notes for Guidance in the same Code, had come to the police station to assist a 
`vulnerable' suspect. 
3. Suspects' responses to the questions: the responses were noted of suspects who 
responded affirmatively to one or more items of the questionnaire. 
Procedure 
The pilot study was carried out at a busy police station in the Southwark Division of the 
Metropolitan Police District. I planned the study but I received considerable support in 
making the necessary practical arrangements and in collecting the data from Inspector 
Roderick Jarman, a serving uniformed officer with many years' experience. 
After permission had been obtained from the station's senior officer, `baseline' 
information was obtained by examining all the CRs of adults detained for alleged 
criminal offences during the first three months of 1994. The introduction of the self- 
identification questionnaire was then discussed with, and agreed by, the permanent 
Custody Officers. After this, arrangements were made with the senior officer at the 
station for the administrative staff to stamp the questionnaire onto 1500 Custody 
Records (the average number used for adults in a three month period) and ensure these 
amended CRs were readily available in the Custody Suite; in case any were forgotten, a 
second stamp was readily available at the Custody Officers' desk so the questionnaire 
could be added immediately. In addition, the senior officer issued a directive so that the 
acting COs, who `filled in' when their permanent colleagues were not available, 
understood that their participation was mandatory. The directive also reminded all 
Custody Officers that, in order to adhere to the guidance in Code C of the Codes of 
Practice, they should implement the `special provision' if an adult suspect responded 
affirmatively to one or more of the questions or, if despite negative responses, they had 
a `suspicion' or were `told in good faith' that he or she was 'vulnerable'. Since it was 
expected that the piloting of the questionnaire would increase the demand for the 
`special provision', they were also given explicit information about obtaining AAs 
through the local Social Services Department. 
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Initially, despite the directive, few of the CRs were stamped with the questionnaire; 
even where they had been stamped, it seemed that the questions were only asked by the 
permanent Custody Officers. Inspector Jarman liaised closely with the administrative 
staff and both of us visited the Custody Suite regularly so we were available to discuss 
the study with the officers working there. Though no more than 61% of the CRs were 
ever stamped in a month, the number of records containing the questionnaire increased 
considerably. There was also a very marked improvement in the completion of the 
questionnaire, and it appeared that the questions had sometimes been asked even when 
the CR had not been stamped. For the next three months, then, the CRs of all adult 
suspects detained for alleged criminal offences were examined; again, the relevant 
information was recorded. 
Since the room where the CRs were kept was very close to the Custody Officers' desk, 
it was often possible to hear the questionnaire being read out as suspects were `booked 
in'. Unintentionally, this provided informal information about its presentation. 
7.3.3 RESULTS 
Examining the Custody Records 
The CRs were often inadequately, or inconsistently, completed and it was sometimes 
difficult to find the relevant information. Difficulties were resolved through discussion 
with Inspector Jarman. 
Effect of introducing the self-identification questionnaire 
Table 7.3.1 shows the percentage of alleged criminal suspects who were identified as 
`vulnerable' by Custody Officers and for whom an AA was sought before and after the 
introduction of the self-identification questionnaire. The impact was examined 
statistically using the Chi-square test (see Appendix 7 
for details). 
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Table 7.3.1 Effect on `vulnerable' adult suspects of the introduction of the self- 
identification questionnaire 
Total Number Number 
number of identified as % supported by % 
relevant `vulnerable' AA 
adult CRs by Cos 
Before 1611 41 2.5 32 2.0 introduction 
After 1433 63 4.4 58 4.0 
introduction 
x2=7.88* x2= 11.23** 
* p<0.005; ** p<0.001 (1-tailed, df = 1) 
As expected, following the introduction of the questionnaire, significantly more suspects 
were identified as 'vulnerable'. 
Table 7.3.1 also shows the percentage of adult criminal suspects who were supported by 
an AA at the police station before and after the introduction of the self-identification 
questionnaire. Again, the impact was examined statistically using the Chi-square test. 
As expected, after the questionnaire was introduced, there was a significant increase in 
attendance by AAs. 
However, Table 7.3.1 indicates that not all the suspects who were identified as 
`vulnerable' in fact received the `special provision'. Though information was only 
collected after the introduction of the questionnaire, it appeared that there were two 
reasons: in four (67%) of the six cases, the suspect's circumstances changed (for 
example, release from detention without further action; transfer to another police station 
or to Court) before the AA could arrive. In the remaining two cases, 
despite repeated 
attempts, an AA could not be contacted; in both cases, the police continued with their 
procedures. One suspect subsequently received a 
formal warning; the other, a formal 
caution. 
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Presentation of, and responses to, the questionnaire 
It was not always possible for Custody Officers to present the questionnaire, usually 
because a suspect was too drunk. However, when the questions were asked, the style of 
presentation varied widely, from apparent concern to apparent contempt. 
Table 7.3.2 shows the responses of the suspects who answered one of more questions in 
the affirmative. 
Table 7.3.2 The responses of the suspects (N=63) who responded positively to the 
items of the self-identification questionnaire 
Number 
Question responding % 
affirmatively 
THERE IS SOME SPECIAL HELP THE POLICE MUST 
GIVE TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE READING 37 5 8.7 
PROBLEMS OR WHO WENT TO SPECIAL SCHOOL. 
DO YOU NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP? 
THE POLICE MUST ALSO GIVE SPECIAL HELP TO 
PEOPLE WHO HAVE LEARNING DIFFICULTIES OR 21 33.3 
LEARNING DISABILITIES (MENTAL HANDICAP). 
DO YOU NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP? 
THE POLICE MUST ALSO GIVE SPECIAL HELP TO 
PEOPLE WHO HAVE A MENTAL HEALTH 15 23.8 
PROBLEM OR MENTAL ILLNESS. DO YOU NEED 
THIS SPECIAL HELP? 
DO YOU NEED THIS SPECIAL HELP FOR ANY 
4 6.3 
OTHER REASON? 
NB. Percentages add up to more than 100% because some suspects answered `yes' 
to more than one question 
The largest proportion of `yes' responses followed the first question relating to reading 
problems or attendance at `special school'. The question about `other problems' was 
only answered affirmatively by four suspects: 
" two who also responded `yes' to the previous three questions but did not elaborate 
on any of their responses; 
" one who reported a `hormonal problem' after the birth of her child, but said that 
she had now recovered fully and did not need `special help'; 
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" one whose earlier response had indicated that he did not have mental health 
problems reported that he was receiving psychiatric treatment for schizophrenia. 
7.3.4 DISCUSSION 
The results of this small pilot study were encouraging. As expected, after the 
introduction of the self-identification questionnaire, significantly more adult criminal 
suspects were both identified as `vulnerable' by Custody Officers and received the 
support of the attendance of an AA at the police station. 
How can these findings be explained? First, it is possible that, as intended, the 
questionnaire supported Custody Officers in the identification of `vulnerable' detained 
persons by encouraging explicit admissions about their problems from men and women 
whose difficulties would not otherwise have been recorded. The majority of positive 
responses to the questions were from men and women with academic difficulties 
(reading problems or a history of `special' schooling). In the context of a police station, 
where the majority of suspects are intellectually disadvantaged (Gudjonsson et al., 
1993), these are persons who, in the absence of any direct questions, it may be 
particularly hard to identify. As a police officer reported in an earlier study: 
`(a)s you come down (sic) the scale, people start becoming normal. And that's 
going to be a difficulty in assessment' (Palmer and Hart, 1996, p. 34). 
A second possibility is that amending the Custody Records so that the questionnaire 
formed part of the `booking in' procedure simply prompted Custody Officers to make 
use of information they would have documented but might otherwise have ignored. The 
design of the pilot study did not enable this possibility to be investigated but, in its 
support, an independent investigation in the same police force (Medford et al., 2000) 
found that reference to `vulnerability' was recorded in just over four per cent (4.3%) of 
the CRs of adult suspects; this is similar to the proportion of suspects for whom the 
`special provision' was sought after the introduction of the questionnaire. It has been 
suggested that the police do not always attempt to seek the `special provision' for adult 
suspects identified as `vulnerable' because of uncertainty about the appropriate 
procedures (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Medford et al., 2000; Palmer 
and Hart, 1996; Phillips and Brown, 1998). Certainly, the evidence 
in this study of two 
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clear breaches of the Codes (when ý suspects for whom attempts to obtain AAs were 
unsuccessful were nevertheless involved in formal procedures) suggested that some 
Custody Officers are not fully aware of their responsibilities under PACE. 
Though the implementation of the `special provision' increased significantly after the 
introduction of the questionnaire, it was still very limited: AAs were sought, and 
obtained, for fewer than 5 per cent of adult suspects. This is a much higher rate than in 
other studies (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et al.; Medford et al., 2000; Robertson et 
al., 1996), but it is very far below the estimated proportion (15-20%) of suspects who 
may be `vulnerable' during police detention and inteviewing (Gudjonsson et al., 1993). 
Many suspects seem to have been reluctant to admit their difficulties. Possibly, they 
objected to the wording of the questionnaire which was a compromise between the 
views of users of services for people with learning disabilities and mental health 
problems and the terminology used within the criminal justice system. However, neither 
the CRs nor informal evidence suggested that the items caused irritation or distress. 
It seems more likely that some suspects did not respond because of the unsympathetic 
manner in which, Inspector Jarman and I could overhear, the questionnaire was 
sometimes presented. Since the study was carried out in a police force subsequently 
criticised for its `institutional racism' (Macpherson, 1999, Ch. 6), it is possible that the 
way in which the questions were asked was related to the perceived ethnicity of the 
suspect; this was not investigated. Informally, though, it seemed that the presentation 
reflected the range of views towards suspects, regardless of their backgrounds, held by 
different Custody Officers. Though the study was strongly supported by the senior 
officer and the permanent Custody Officers, it did not appear acceptable to everyone. In 
the words of one officer: 
`we give them (suspects) a solicitor and all these rights. And now you want us to 
give them this `special help'! It's taking the piss'. 
The extent to which these views were shared, or were modified during our discussions 
with officers in the Custody Suite, is unknown. However, the absence of complete 
compliance with the senior officer's directive suggests that unfavourable perceptions 
persisted. Unfortunately, detailed interviews, which would have allowed exploration of 
this suggestion, were not included in the pilot study. 
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7.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In an attempt to enhance the safeguard of the `special provision', an experimental 
measure was developed to support Custody Officers in the identification of `vulnerable' 
suspects, including suspects with learning disabilities, in police detention. The effect of 
this measure, which was presented as a questionnaire which would encourage self- 
identification by `vulnerable' men and women was then evaluated, first with 
experimental participants, and then, in the real-life setting of a police station. 
The findings were encouraging and have been received with considerable interest: 
requests for copies of the questionnaire have been received from police forces in 
different parts of England and Wales. In 1998, with only minor modifications, it was 
introduced formally into the Custody Records of the Metropolitan Police Service (as 
Form 57M: `Appropriate Adult and Medical Care' (see Appendix 6)). Helpfully, the 
form also contains written guidance that, regardless of the suspect's answers to the 
questions, the assessment of vulnerability remains the responsibility of the Custody 
Officer. Whilst a large-scale evaluation is still awaited, it has been predicted that, since 
1998, there has been: 
`a significant increase in the number of vulnerable persons identified and requiring 
AAs since the form's introduction. Indeed, conversations with custody 
officers... would appear to lend weight to this hypothesis' (Medford et al., 2000, p. 
21). 
The adoption by the largest police force in England and Wales of this simple, and 
practical, strategy to enhance the safeguard provided to `vulnerable' suspects in police 
detention is, of course, satisfying. However, it by no means resolves the catalogue of 
problems associated with the `special provision'. 
Difficulties in identifying suspects who are `vulnerable' during police detention and 
interviewing remains. The initial, experimental, evaluation indicated that there is a 
substantial minority of persons with vulnerabilities who do not answer `yes' to the 
questions. Independent information was only available about men and women with 
reading problems and/or impaired intellectual functioning so 
it is not known whether 
this reticence is shared by people with other difficulties; it may be, because of the stigma 
and social exclusion often experienced by those with mental 
health difficulties (Byrne, 
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1999). It seems very unlikely that, the reluctance to admit their difficulties of the 
experimental participants in the first study (see Ch. 7.2) reflected the manner in which 
the questionnaire was presented; more plausibly, the wording or format of the measure 
may need to be developed further through discussions with users of services for people 
with learning disabilities, mental health problems, and other `vulnerabilities', and the 
police. It would be disappointing if the version of the questionnaire introduced by the 
Metropolitan Police Service were simply copied by other police forces. 
However, the findings of the pilot study also suggested that some `vulnerable' suspects 
may be reluctant to admit their difficulties because of the way in which the 
questionnaire is presented by Custody Officers. As others have noted in relation to the 
presentation of the caution and legal rights (Brown et al., 1992; McConville et al., 
1991), the implementation of police procedures is sometimes very poor. Some of the 
officers involved in the pilot study did not appear to understand the relevance to their 
work of the `special provision' :a confession to a criminal offence from an adult who is 
`vulnerable' but does not receive this safeguard may be excluded as evidence in Court 
on the grounds that there has been a breach of the Codes of Practice (see Rv Everett 
1988; Rv Cox 1991; Rv Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip 1991; and Ch. 1). In 
Southwark, where the pilot study was carried out, Form 57M has been introduced as 
part of a `vulnerable adults' policy, jointly developed by the Metropolitan Police Service 
and the local Social Services Department to improve access to justice for alleged 
victims of crime as well as suspects (Southwark Council and the Metropolitan Police 
Service, 1996), and involving substantial training for police officers. Empirical research 
is needed to examine whether the presentation of the questionnaire is generally more 
adequate when it is placed within the context of a policy, rather than as a `stand-alone' 
initiative. 
Still, even if the questionnaire and its presentation were improved, the identification of 
all `vulnerable' adult suspects is likely to remain unachievable: people with 
vulnerabilities, including people with learning disabilities, are a heterogeneous 
population who overlap with the general population. The best, perhaps, that can be 
achieved is to continue to review and refine practice and policy. There is still a long way 
to go. Even when men and women are identified as `vulnerable', there is substantial 
evidence that Custody Officers do not always persist 
in attempting, or even make any 
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attempt at all, to implement the `special provision' (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et 
al., 1992; Medford et al., 2000; Phillips and Brown, 1999; Robertson et al., 1996). 
Moreover, when AAs attend at the police station, they often provide little, or no, 
guidance (Dixon et al., 1990; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Pearse, 1997). Given their crucial 
role under s. 39 of PACE in protecting the suspect during his or her detention, Custody 
Officers' lack of awareness of their responsibilities is of great concern; it demands 
attention. 
Nevertheless, the task of Custody Officers is not made easier by the complexity of the 
relevant procedures under Code C (see Ch. 1.4.2). At present, suspects who are 
identified as `mentally disordered' should have access to a police surgeon (FME) as well 
as an AA; those who are `mentally handicapped' only need access to an AA. On 
theoretical grounds, it is not clear why the two groups should be treated differently since 
the police surgeon's role is to address whether the suspect is `fit to detain' or `fit to be 
interviewed'; this is a different task from the assessment of `vulnerability'. Moreover, 
from the very limited data available from the experimental study (Table 7.2.2) the 
distinction between the two groups does not seem to be empirically justified: more than 
half (53%, N= 15) of the participants who reported only that they had experienced 
difficulties with their mental health also fulfilled the criteria for `reading problems' 
and/or `learning difficulties'. Are these, then, primarily people with mental health 
problems or learning disabilities? The Codes of Practice should be amended so that the 
same procedures are used to safeguard all suspects identified as `vulnerable', with the 
functions in this process of the Custody Officer, police surgeon (FME), and Appropriate 
Adult clearly set out. 
Based on the findings of this chapter, and the anecdotal information reported by 
Medford et al. (2000), the introduction of questionnaires or other measures to encourage 
self-identification among `vulnerable' men and women in police detention is likely to 
increase the demand for Appropriate Adults. Given the widespread and long-standing 
concerns about the role and its limits and the competence of Appropriate Adults 
(Harkin, 1997; Hodgson, 1997; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Pearse, 1997), the 
recommendation in the RCCJ's Report (Runciman, 1993) 
for a comprehensive review 
of the `role, functions, qualifications, training and availability of appropriate adults' 
(ibid., para. 86) has assumed new importance. It is reassuring that, at last, a Home 
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Office Working Party has been convened to carry out this task (Ian Blackie, 2002, 
personal communication). In the meantime, there is a burgeoning network of schemes, 
mostly involving volunteers, which has developed to meet the demand for the `special 
provision'. Though apparently regarded positively by Custody Officers (Medford et al., 
2000), no published information is available about the location and organisation of 
different schemes, let alone formal evaluations of particular models or comparisons 
between them. Such work is urgently needed in order to promote `best practice' and 
alleviate the position of the `special provision' as `something of the poor relation of 
criminal justice' (Hodgson, 1997, p. 785). 
Finally, as suggested in the previous chapter (see Ch. 6.6) in relation to the caution and 
legal rights, much greater emphasis could be placed on assisting school pupils, including 
pupils with learning disabilities, to develop a better understanding of, and increased 
confidence in reminding Custody Officers of, the `special provision'. Similar assistance 
should also be provided, as a priority, to men and women living in, or attending, 
designated services or training courses for people with learning disabilities, mental 
health problems, or other `vulnerabilities'. Some materials which appear to be 
acceptable to people with learning disabilities are already available (for example, the 
picture book You're Under Arrest (Hollins, Clare, Murphy and Webb, 1996); an episode 
of the TV detective series, Frost, in which a man with Down Syndrome is detained for 
interviewing) but formal evaluation of their effectiveness is badly needed. 
In the final chapter, the implications for the concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' of 
the empirical work described in this thesis are considered, and the theoretical 
framework is reconsidered 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS: FROM `PSYCHOLOGICAL 
VULNERABILITIES' TO `CAPACITY' 
Prompted by changes in social policy which are likely to lead to the increasing 
involvement in the criminal justice system of alleged offenders with learning 
disabilities, the work described in this thesis has explored the assumption in PACE and 
its accompanying Codes of Practice that, compared with their counterparts in the general 
population, people with mild learning disabilities are `vulnerable' during police 
detention and interviewing because they are `at risk' of providing information which is 
unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating, including false confessions. Since 
confessions play an important part in the English criminal justice system (Baldwin, 
1993; Baldwin and McConville, 1980; Gudjonsson, 2003; McConville, 1993; 
McConville et al., 1991; Moston, 1990, cited in Pearse, 1997; Pearse, 1997; Pearse et 
al., 1998), the implication is that innocent people with learning disabilities have an 
increased likelihood of becoming involved in miscarriages of justice (see Ch. 1). 
The findings of the experimental studies suggest that the assumption in PACE and the 
Codes about the `vulnerability' of people with learning disabilities is well-founded. 
Compared with their peers in the general population, they are: 
(i) less likely to understand information about the caution and legal rights; 
(ii) more likely to make decisions which would not protect their rights as suspects 
and defendants; and 
(iii) more likely to be acquiescent. They were also more likely to be suggestible 
because of their susceptibility to leading questions; and, though not more likely 
to confabulate, recalled proportionately more information which was incorrect. 
In addition, a review of the literature suggested that people with learning 
disabilities may also be at increased risk of compliance. 
These findings are of serious concern. In order to alleviate their potential impact, 
attempts were made to improve the accessibility of the 
information about the caution 
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and legal rights provided to all suspects and to enhance the use of the specific safeguard 
for `vulnerable' suspects. 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, to review the implications for practice and 
policy of the findings of the empirical studies, and secondly, to revisit Gudjonsson's 
(1992a, 1993,1994,1999) concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' which provided the 
theoretical framework for the studies. 
8.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND POLICY 
According to Zander (1995), the legislative framework provided by PACE and the 
Codes is unlikely to change. Accepting, then, that the present `two-tier' system of 
safeguards for all suspects and additional protection for those who are identified as 
`vulnerable' will remain, how might the difficulties which have been highlighted in the 
studies be addressed? 
The pilot study (Study 14, Ch. 7.3) suggests that the problems which the police 
experience in identifying suspects with learning disabilities or other `psychological 
vulnerabilities' (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Gudjonsson et al., 1993; 
Medford et al., 2000; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996) might be alleviated 
by encouraging self-identification. Whilst there is anecdotal support (Medford et al., 
2000) for this suggestion, a large-scale evaluation of the effect of its introduction in the 
Metropolitan Police Service is needed to assess whether, after further development of its 
wording and format, the questionnaire should be introduced as part of the `booking in' 
procedure for suspects throughout police forces in England and Wales. 
However, difficulties in identifying `vulnerable' suspects form only part of the catalogue 
of problems relating to the `special provision'. Custody Officers need to be more aware 
of their statutory responsibilities under s. 39 of PACE. Implementation of the provision 
may, at times, be very frustrating, but, contrary to what some police officers seem to 
believe (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Brown et al., 1992; Medford et al., 2000; Palmer and 
Hart, 1996; Phillips and Brown, 2000; Robertson et al., 1996a) and also emerged from 
Study 14 (Ch. 7.3), it is not discretionary. Training may be helpful but the adoption of 
the robust approach, mainly under s. 78 of PACE, which the courts have taken to 
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excluding self-incriminating evidence involving other breaches of the Codes of Practice, 
including failures to provide Appropriate Adults for juvenile suspects (R. v. Glaves 1993; 
Rv Weekes (Trevor Dave) 1993; see Ch. 1.5)), may encourage better adherence by 
police officers. 
The problems which the police experience in implementing the `special provision' 
might be alleviated if the guidance provided for them in Code C were less confusing 
(see Ch. 1.4.2). Though the recommendations of the working party convened by the 
Home Office (Home Office, 1995b) in response to the report of the RCCJ (Runciman, 
1993) were not accepted, a comprehensive review of the whole of Code C is now being 
undertaken (Ian Blackie, 2002, personal communication). The material presented in this 
thesis indicates that this review should consider at least three major changes: 
" since `vulnerable' adult suspects are a heterogeneous group, and sometimes have 
multiple difficulties (Table 7.2.2), attempts to identify them by listing diagnostic 
categories (such as `mentally handicapped', `unable to read', Home Office, 1995a, 
paras. 1.4 and 1.6; and see Ch. 1.4.2) are unlikely to be successfiul. The diagnostic 
categories should be replaced with a broad, generic, definition and the same 
procedures for all suspects identified as `vulnerable'. As the Home Office working 
party recommended some years ago (Home Office, 1995b), these procedures 
should include involving an Appropriate Adult whenever a police surgeon (FME) 
is called to assess `fitness to detain' and/or `fitness to interview'; 
" further, despite the criticisms of the competence and effectiveness of legal 
advisers (Brown, 1997; Hodgson, 1994; Lord Chief Justice in R. v. Paris, Abdullahi 
and Miller 1993; McConville et al., 1991; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; 
Runciman, 1993), since there is overwhelming evidence that suspects who receive 
such help are less likely to make self-incriminating admissions, including 
confessions (Baldwin, 1992; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Leng, 1993; 
McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1993; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 
1997) and, it seems (Bucke et al., 2000), the importance of this right has assumed 
even more importance since the modification of the right to silence, it is very 
strongly suggested that suspects who are identified as `vulnerable' should always 
be provided with legal advice as well as an Appropriate Adult; 
" the roles of the Custody Officer, police surgeon (FME) and Appropriate Adult 
should be defined clearly in Code C. Standardised information, both oral and in 
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writing, which is available at police stations to advise AAs of their function and 
responsibilities, needs urgently to be prepared; and 
" the material in Code C needs to be consistent with the primary legislation (PACE). 
Even more importantly, it needs to be both drafted, and presented (Bhatia, 1993; 
Hartley, 1978 et seq., 1994; and see Jackson, 1995), in a way which is accessible 
to both Custody Officers and to suspects. The experience of attempting to devise 
and pilot an experimental version of the revised caution and the Notice to 
Detained Persons (Studies 9,10,11, and 12, Ch. 6) suggests that this is unlikely 
to be straightforward. Certainly, it is unlikely to be satisfactory to rely on any 
single measure, such as a readability formula or paraphrased recall, for assessing 
the accessibility of any new material. Instead (see Ch. 6.6), the more sophisticated 
approaches which have been developed since the experimental work reported in 
this thesis was carried out are needed. 
However, the possibility of redrafting Code C is constrained by the continuing 
uncertainty, almost two decades after the implementation of PACE, about the purpose of 
the Appropriate Adult at the police station (Bean and Nemitz, 1994; Littlechild, 1996; 
Medford et al., 2000; Mencap, 1997; Palmer and Hart, 1996; Pearse, 1997; Pearse and 
Gudjonsson, 1996 Rhead, 1997; Robertson et al., 1996; see Ch. 7.1.4). The Home 
Office working party which has recently been convened (Ian Blackie, 2002, personal 
communication) needs to consider this issue in detail, consulting with a broad group of 
all those involved, including people who have received support from an AA. In the 
meantime, though, the courts could contribute positively to the present confusion by 
clarifying the meaning of an `effective' AA (Palmer and Hart, 1996), whilst the 
investment of resources in formal evaluations, and comparisons, of the many different 
AA schemes which have been set up would enable a sound basis for the provision of 
interim guidance about `best practice' (see Ch. 7.4). 
The problems with the `special provision' would be of less concern if the safeguards 
provided for all suspects were more adequate. First, the remarks which were overheard 
during piloting of the questionnaire to improve self-identification by `vulnerable' 
suspects (Study 14, Ch. 7.3) suggests that the sloppy delivery of the caution and legal 
rights which others have noted (Brown et al., 1992; McConville et al., 1991) 
is still, 
unfortunately, a feature of at least some `booking in' procedures, and 
demands attention 
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from senior police officers. Secondly, given the problems of the caution (Study 3, Ch. 
3.4), its complexity should at least be minimised by presenting the three sentences in 
turn, with simple standardised questions after each. A similar approach should be 
adopted for the other information about the legal rights which is normally read out to 
suspects. To encourage police officers to implement these changes, the Custody Record 
should be amended so that the actual responses (and those of Appropriate Adults for 
`vulnerable' suspects) could be monitored. 
Police officers, though, cannot present information adequately which they themselves do 
not comprehend fully. Whilst admittedly based on a small sample, perhaps the most 
worrying of all the findings presented in this thesis relates to the limited extent of 
understanding of the current caution among serving police officers (Study 3, Ch. 3.4). 
The legal significance of the modification of the right to silence under the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 means that it is not satisfactory for officers merely to 
receive an outline of the elements of the caution (National Crime Faculty, 1996); 
instead, they should receive a standardised explanation of its meaning. The description 
of an attempt to devise a more accessible version of the revised NDP (see Ch. 6) 
indicates the complexity of the task but, if the safeguards for suspects are to have any 
meaning, further efforts, perhaps drawing on the innovative methodologies developed 
recently, particularly in the field of forensic linguistics (Cotterill, 2000; Rock, 1999a, b; 
Shuy, 1997,1998; see Ch. 6.6), must be made. 
The findings of the studies reported in this thesis also have implications for the 
detention and interviewing of both suspects with learning disabilities and their 
counterparts in the general population. With the exception of Studies 10 and 11 
(Chapter 6), which involved intellectually disadvantaged participants, the `general 
population' groups who took part in the investigations were considerably more 
intellectually able than suspects at police stations (mean pro-rated Full Scale IQ: 83; s. d. 
14, Gudjonsson et al., 1993). The implication is that, in real life, some of the `overlaps' 
in the responses of the `general population' and `learning disabilities' groups (for 
example, in their perceptions of a suspect's need 
for legal advice after making a true and 
a false confession (Fig. 4.3.1), and some of the perceived consequences of confessing to 
(Fig. 4.3.2) and being convicted of (Fig. 4.3.3), an offence, and on the measures of 
acquiescence (Figure 5.3.1) and Total Suggestibility 
(Fig. 5.6.1)) are likely to be more 
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marked; indeed, the performance of the two groups may not be too dissimilar. In support 
of this suggestion, it is worth noting that many successful appeals against convictions 
based, in part, on confession evidence involve people whose intellectual functioning lies 
within the Borderline range (Gudjonsson, 2003). Though they are likely to be at greater 
risk of experiencing difficulties than their more intellectually able peers, their superficial 
`ordinariness' means that their problems may be particularly hard for the police to 
identify (Palmer and Hart, 1996; and see Ch. 7.1.2). Whilst new training initiatives for 
the police have been introduced which emphasise `investigative interviewing' (Central 
Planning and Training Unit, 1994a, b; National Crime Faculty, 1996,1998; see Chapter 
1.1), the effect of these, and other developments, such as `cognitive interviewing' (see 
Ch. 5.11), in improving the quality of police interviews (Baldwin, 1993,1994; Moston 
et al., 1992; Pearse, 1997; Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1996; Robertson et al., 1996) and 
minimising the relevance of the `psychological vulnerabilities' of suspects remains 
uncertain, and needs further research. 
Nevertheless, at least in `run-of-the-mill' cases, such as those analysed by Pearse et al. 
(1998), the behaviour of the police during interviewing seems to have little impact on 
detained persons. Instead, they seem to adopt a position from the start and remain with 
it. Whilst suspects often appear to be active decision-makers (Hilgendorf and Irving, 
1981; Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980), because, perhaps, because of high levels of anxiety 
(Gudjonsson et al., 1993; see Ch. 1.2), their ability to understand and use new 
information in their decision-making may be limited. Certainly, it does not appear that 
repeated experiences of arrest and detention necessarily improve understanding of the 
caution and legal rights (Cooke and Philip, 1998; Fulero and Everington, 1994; Grisso, 
1981; Olley and Ogloff, 1993). Instead, consistent with the evidence of the potential 
importance of `individual differences' (Baldwin and McConville, 1980; Gudjonsson, 
1984 et seq., 1989a et seq.; Gudjonsson and Petursson, 1991; Moston et al., 1992; 
Pearse et al., 1998; Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson, 1996b; Softley et al., 1980), and the 
findings of Study 5 (Ch. 4.3), decision-making during police detention and interviewing 
may, in part, reflect factors relating to suspects' experiences prior to arrest. Though 
PACE and the Codes must provide adequate safeguards for suspects, an additional 
approach, which has already been mentioned (Chs. 3 and 6), and which underlies the 
attempt to enhance the `special provision' (Study 14, Ch. 7.3), is to encourage 
`vulnerable' people, as well as children and adults in the general population, to develop 
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during everyday life much greater 'awareness of the criminal justice system and its 
operation. This need not be particularly subtle. For example, the naivety about the 
significance and consequences of making a confession to a serious offence shown by the 
`learning disabilities' participants in Study 5 (Ch. 4.3) would be of much less concern in 
the context of a high level of knowledge and understanding of the practical importance 
of legal advice for safeguarding suspects, including suspects who are innocent 
(Baldwin, 1992; Leng, 1993; McConville and Hodgson, 1993; Moston et al., 1992; 
Pearse and Gudjonsson, 1997; Pearse et al., 1998), and demonstrated ability to exercise 
this right, even in the face of discouragement (see McConville et al., 1991; Ch. 1.4.1). 
Though some materials have been developed (such as the books by Hollins and her 
colleagues: Hollins, Clare et al., 1996; Hollins, Murphy et al., 1996), and have received 
positive feedback, their effectiveness is unknown. The findings suggest that a task 
which needs to be undertaken is the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of a 
detailed, and accessible, `curriculum' which integrates information about the criminal 
justice system for `vulnerable' suspects and defendants, victims, and other witnesses. 
Such an initiative would be consistent with the principles of legal and civil rights, 
independence, choice, and inclusion which form the basis of the Government's recent 
strategy for people with learning disabilities (Valuing People, Department of Health, 
2001). 
Whilst the limitations of each study have been discussed as they were reported, there are 
three more general matters which need to be considered. First, the approach adopted in 
this thesis has been broad, rather than detailed. In addition to the examination of three 
domains of putative `psychological vulnerability' for people with learning disabilities, 
as a practicing applied psychologist, I chose also to explore two practical initiatives to 
address the implications of these `vulnerabilities' for police detention and interviewing 
of these `vulnerabilities'. The corollary of this approach is that the data analysis has 
focussed on the differences between the groups. With hindsight, it would have been 
helpful to have involved larger numbers of the same, rather than mostly different, 
participants in every study so that the possibility that there are some 
individuals with 
learning disabilities (or, indeed, in the general population) who are at risk of all three 
areas of `psychological vulnerability', could also 
have been explored. Secondly, though 
a `proxy measure' of social functioning (attending 
day- and/or residential services for 
people with learning disabilities) formed part of the criteria 
for allocation to the 
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`learning disabilities' or `general population' groups (see Methodological 
Considerations, Ch. 2.4.1), and its importance in decision-making was recognised (see 
Ch. 4.1.2; Ch. 4.4), the role of affective factors and other non-cognitive factors, which 
are so important in everyday social functioning, was not considered explicitly in the 
experimental studies. The possibility that these factors may contribute to the `overlap' 
in performance between people with learning disabilities and their `general population' 
peers still needs to be examined, perhaps in a multi-factorial study using a very large 
number of participants. Thirdly, no effort was made to examine the effects of gender or, 
perhaps more importantly, at least with regard to the measures of personality 
characteristics (Gudjonsson et al., 1995; see Ch. 5) and self-identification as a 
`vulnerable' suspect (see Ch. 7), of ethnic background. Given that men and women from 
ethnic minority backgrounds may be over-represented among people with learning 
disabilities (Mir, Nocon, Ahmad and Jones, 2001), this is a omission which needs to be 
addressed in subsequent studies and, in particular, in the development of materials to 
enhance understanding of the criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless, the work reported in this thesis presents the most detailed available 
exploration of the difficulties which people with mild learning disabilities may 
experience during police detention and interviewing, and has included an innovative 
methodology (Studies 4 and 5; see Ch. 4) which, with further development, might be 
used to examine the process of decision-making. Moreover, the findings have been of 
practical significance. However, the theoretical framework on which the studies are 
based needs to be revisited. 
8.2 `PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES' REVISITED 
Though deriving independently from the pioneering work of Grisso and his colleagues 
(Grisso, 1986; Grisso and Appelbaum, 1991,1995,1998; Hoge et al., 1997; see Ch. 
2.1), it has been argued here (see Ch. 2.1) that Gudjonsson's (1992a, 1993,1994,1999) 
concept of `psychological vulnerabilities' is positioned within a `functional' rather than 
a `status' approach. As was shown in the discussion of the case of Engin Raghip (see 
Ch. 2.1.3), and has been emphasised repeatedly by Gudjonsson (1993,1994,1997; 
2003), their relevance depends on the nature and circumstances of the particular case. 
Unfortunately, though, this point is often misunderstood (see, for example, Beail, 2002; 
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Cooke and Carlin, 1998) and it is assumed that `psychological vulnerabilities' are 
always important for a particular individual or group during police detention and 
interviewing. 
Drawing on Irving and Hilgendorf's (Irving and Hilgendorf, 1980; Hilgendorf and 
Irving, 1981) powerful argument, being interviewed by the police, and by extension, the 
period of detention which normally precedes interviewing, involve a suspect in a series 
of decision-making tasks (see Ch. 2). The extent to which an individual's understanding, 
knowledge, skills and abilities meet the demands involved in making decisions within 
this context depends not only on factors within the person, but also on the specific 
instance of this context (for example, detention following alleged shoplifting compared 
with alleged terrorist offences) and the support available. `Psychological vulnerabilities' 
may be conceptualised as the individual factors which may impair suspects' capacity or 
ability to make decisions which protect their rights. Though the positioning of 
`psychological vulnerabilities' within an interactional functional model has been 
emphasised recently by Gudjonsson (2003), nevertheless, his framework is not explicitly 
capacity-based. A capacity-based version of the framework presented in Fig. 2.2.1 might 
appear as Fig. 8.2.1. 
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Figure 8.2.1 A capacity-based framework suggesting the possible role of 
`psychological vulnerabilities' in the provision of unreliable, 
misleading or self-incriminating information by suspects with 
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What are the advantages of this framework? First, it is consistent with the empirical 
evidence (see Ch. 8.1 for a summary) which suggests that there are overlaps between the 
performance of people with learning disabilities and their peers in the general 
population and challenges the assumption of a `cut-off' between people with and 
without a diagnosis of mental disability. Such an approach is supported by other 
findings, involving different decisions (for example, Grisso et al., 1995; Marson et al., 
1994, Morris et al., 1993; Wong et al., 2000). These suggest that, though people with a 
diagnosis of `mental disability' are at increased risk of experiencing more difficulties in 
decision-making, implying that the `special provision' for `vulnerable' suspects under 
PACE should be retained, such difficulties are by no means inevitable; nor is it the case 
that the capacity to make a decision is never impaired among their `general population' 
peers. Instead, impaired capacity to make specific decision is always the product of the 
interaction between an individual's abilities and the particular circumstances of his or 
her detention and interviewing. The case of David MacKenzie (see Ch. 1.5 and Ch. 
5.10) highlights this point: though Mr. MacKenzie produced an abnormally high number 
of confabulations in relation to crime-related material, in other circumstances his 
confabulations were unexceptional. 
Secondly, a capacity-based functional approach is consistent with that taken by the 
courts towards the `psychological vulnerabilities' of suspects and defendants. Since the 
landmark judgement relating to Engin Raghip (R. v. Silcott, Braithwaite and Raghip 
1991; and see Ch. 2.4.1), the courts have `not been attracted' (judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, cited by Gudjonsson, 1992b, p. 249) to the notion that `vulnerability' can be 
established by predetermined criteria, applied in a `blanket' fashion, rather than the 
nature and circumstances of a particular case. At the same time, they ruled that, because 
of the different legal contexts, a jury should not be expected to judge from a defendant's 
demeanour during a criminal trial how he or she had responded as a suspect during 
police detention and interviewing (see Gudjonsson, 1992b, 
2003, for more detailed 
discussion). Moreover, both case law and statutory legislation have adopted or 
considered a capacity-based approach to other areas of 
legally-significant decision- 
making, including: 
9 consent to treatment (Re C (Adult) Refusal of 
Medical Treatment 1994); 
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" decision-making for people who are unable to decide for themselves (Mental 
Incapacity Bill (Law Commission, 1995; Lord Chancellor's Department, 1999); 
and, 
" reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Richardson, 1999), though the proposals 
have not, so far, been accepted by the Government. 
Thirdly, from the perspective of developing further the investigations reported here, a 
capacity-based approach encourages more detailed exploration than that of 
`psychological vulnerabilities' of the psychological processes which contribute to the 
differences between individuals in their knowledge, understanding, appreciation, 
reasoning, and communication of their decision-making. The heterogeneity of the 
responses among participants in the general population and, more interestingly, in the 
context of this thesis, their `learning disabilities' peers, suggests that such research may 
be helpful both in devising strategies to minimise the likelihood that men and women 
with learning disabilities will be `at risk' as suspects and, more broadly, in making 
suggestions to develop further access to justice for victims and other `vulnerable' 
witnesses. 
Recently, Gudjonsson (The Guardian, 17th December, 2002) has suggested that, in 
contrast with other jurisdictions, in England and Wales, the issue of miscarriages of 
justice involving unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating admissions made by 
innocent suspects during police detention and interviewing is now being addressed 
properly. It is sincerely to be hoped that new proposals to: 
`achieve end to end reform... (to) rebalance the Criminal Justice System in favour 
of victims' (Press release announcing the Criminal Justice Bill, Home Office, 21St 
November, 2002) 
do nothing to jeopardise this situation, particularly for `vulnerable' people such as men 
and women with learning disabilities. 
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PUBLISHED STUDIES DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE 
EMPIRICAL WORK REPORTED IN THIS THESIS 
L Clare, I. C. H. and Gudjonsson, G. H. (1991). Recall and understanding of the caution 
and rights in police detention among persons of average intellectual ability and 
persons with mild mental handicap, Proceedings of the Ist Annual Conference of the 
Division of Criminological and Legal Psychology, 1, Leicester: British Psychological 
Society, Issues in Criminology, No. 17,34-42. 
This first paper examined the impact of exposure to the information on recall and 
understanding of the Original version of the information in the Notice to Detained 
Persons (NDP) was examined among adults with learning disabilities and their 
counterparts in the `general population'. Awareness among people with learning 
disabilities of the need to identify themselves to the police as `vulnerable' if they 
were arrested as suspects was also assessed. 
" compared with their `general population' counterparts, the participants with 
learning disabilities had much poorer knowledge of the caution and legal rights 
initially and they benefited much less from exposure to the NDP; 
" however, the impact of exposure to the NDP on the `general population' 
participants was also limited, suggesting that, even for them, the material was 
too complex; 
" though participants in both groups performed relatively well on a questionnaire 
designed to elicit understanding of the information in the NDP, the findings 
must be treated with caution because of methodological problems; 
" only 65% of the participants with learning disabilities reported that, if they 
were arrested, they would inform the police of their difficulties. The police 
cannot rely on unprompted self-identification to help them recognise 
`vulnerable' suspects with learning disabilities. 
2. Clare, I. C. H. and Gudjonsson, G. H. (1992). Devising and piloting an experimental 
version of the "Notice to Detained Persons" . 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 
Research Study No. 7. London: H. M. S. O. 
From previous studies, it appeared that both the Original and Revised versions of 
the Notice to Detained Persons were too complex, even for people in the general 
population. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice funded an attempt to use 
psychological methodologies to a) rewrite the information about the caution and 
legal rights so that it would be more accessible; and b) encourage self- 
identification by people who would be `vulnerable' suspects. 
" it was possible to rewrite the NDP so that, on an objective measure, the material 
was much less complex. Indeed, it was more compared well with a popular 
`tabloid' newspaper; 
" piloting with experimental participants, whose mean intellectual functioning 
was similar to that of suspects suggested that the section of this rewritten, or 
Experimental, version which was intended to be presented orally by Custody 
Officers was of most help in improving knowledge and understanding of the 
caution and legal rights; 
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" at the same time, comprehension of the Experimental version was better than 
that of the Original version; 
" the questionnaire for encouraging self-identification seemed acceptable to 
participants; 
" about four-fifths (80%) of participants who, from independent information 
about their reading ability and intellectual functioning, would be `vulnerable' as 
suspects identified themselves as needing assistance; 
" it was recommended that the Experimental version of the NDP and the 
questionnaire were piloted in the real-life setting of a police station. 
3. Clare, I. C. H. and Gudjonsson, G. H. (1993). Interrogative suggestibility, confabulation 
and acquiescence in people with mild learning disabilities (mental handicap): 
Implications for vulnerability during police interrogation. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 32,295-301. 
Examining a different area of possible `psychological vulnerability, this paper 
presents preliminary data on the performance among adults with mild learning 
disabilities and their counterparts in the general population on established 
measures of three personality characteristics which have been found relevant to 
disputed or proven false confessions. Compared with their peers, the participants 
with learning disabilities were: 
" much more suggestible on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Form 2 (GSS 2, 
Gudjonsson, 1987), because of their susceptibility to `leading questions'. In 
contrast, they were no more `vulnerable' to interrogative pressure; 
" much more likely to confabulate during free recall of the story in the GSS 2; 
and 
" more likely to acquiesce, using the Acquiescence Scale of Winkler, Kanouse 
and Ware, 1982. 
4. Clare, I. C. H. and Gudjonsson, G. H. (1995). The vulnerability of suspects with 
intellectual disabilities during police interviews: A review and experimental study of 
decision-making, Mental Handicap Research (Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities), 8 (2), 110-128. 
After reviewing the experimental evidence relating to understanding of the caution 
and legal rights, and susceptibility to certain personality characteristics, this paper 
reported a study to examine a third possible area of `psychological vulnerability' 
for people with learning disabilities, that of decision-making. A fictional film was 
made of a police interrogation, depicting a male suspect making a true and a false 
confession. At scheduled pauses during, and just after, the film, items from a semi- 
structured interview schedule were presented. Compared with their counterparts in 
the `general population', the participants with learning disabilities: 
" were less likely to think that a police interview and false confession might have 
serious consequences for the suspect. Their views reflected the importance they 
placed on the suspect's actual, rather than professed, guilt or innocence; and 
" more likely to believe that an innocent suspect might be protected because his 
or her innocence would be evident to others. 
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5. Clare, Y. C. H., Gudjonsson, G. H. and Harari, P. M. (1998). Understanding of the 
current police caution (England & Wales). Journal of Community & Applied Social 
Psychology, 8,323-329. 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (England and Wales) modified 
suspects' right to silence during police questioning and required a new police 
caution, the current version. Understanding of this version was examined to assess 
its adequacy as a safeguard for suspects. 
" even under optimal conditions, when the participants could focus on each 
sentence in turn, only 1 in 10 of participants from the general population, 6 in 
10 of A-level students, and 9 in 10 police officers demonstrated their 
understanding by explaining all three sentences correctly; 
" for all groups, the middle sentence, which contains the information about the 
modification to the right to silence and its implications was the most difficult; 
and 
" each of the three groups of participants experienced more marked problems in 
understanding the caution when it was presented in its entirety, as would 
happen in real life. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SUMMARY OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDIES OF 
DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PARTICIPANTS 
Study: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Groups used: A, B C, D E, F, 
G 






Study: 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Groups used: A, B, 
K, L 
n/a L, M L, M B, D, 
L, M 
L, M n/a 
Key 
A. People attending designated day-services for people with learning disabilities, 
London 
B. People in the general population in paid employment, London 
C. People attending designated day-services for people with learning disabilities, 
London 
D. People in the general population, either in paid employment or unemployed, 
London and Cambridge 
E. `A' level students, Cambridge 
F. People in the general population, either in paid employment or unemployed, 
Cambridge 
G. Police officers, Maidstone 
H. People with learning disabilities who were hospital in-patients, London 
(piloting) 
1. People attending designated day-services for people with learning disabilities, 
London 
J. People in the general population in paid employment, London 
K. People attending designated day-services for people with learning disabilities, 
London 
L. People in the general population who were unemployed, London and Newcastle 
M. People in the general population who were unemployed, London and Newcastle 
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APPENDIX 3 
ORIGINAL AND REVISED (CH. 3), AND EXPERIMENTAL 
(CH. 6), VERSIONS OF THE NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS 
APPENDIX 3A: ORIGINAL NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS - 1sT APRIL 
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APPENDIX 3B: REVISED NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS - 1ST APRIL 
1991 TO 31ST MARCH 1995 
Form 3053 
METROPOLITAN POLICE 
Notice to Detained Person 
The section in capital letters is to be read to the detained person by the Custody Officer 
giving the notice to the detained person. 
If you are asked questions about a suspected offence, you do not have to say anything _-. less you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence. 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO: 
1. SPEAK TO AN INDEPENDENT SOLICITOR FREE OF CHARGE 
2. HAVE SOMEONE TOLD THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ARRESTED 
3. CONSULT THE CODES OF PRACTICE COVERING POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURES. 
YOU MAY DO ANY OF THESE THINGS NOW, BUT IF YOU DO NOT, YOU MAY STILL DO SO 
ANY TIME WHILST DETAINED AT THE POLICE STATION. 
More information is given below. 
Free Legal Advice. 
You can speak to a solicitor at the police 
station at any time, day or night. It will 
cost you nothing. 
Access to legal advice can only be 
delayed in certain exceptional 
circumstances (see Annex B of 
Code of Practice C). 
If you do not know a solicitor, or you 
cannot contact your own solicitor, ask for 
the duty solicitor. He or she is nothing 
to do with the police. Or you can ask to 
see a list of local solicitors. 
You can talk to the solicitor in private on 
the telephone, and the solicitor may 
come to see you at the police station. 
If the police want to question you, you 
can ask for the solicitor to be there. 
If there is a delay, ask the police to 
contact the solicitor again. Normally, the 
police must not question you until you 
have spoken to the solicitor. However, 
there are certain circumstances in which 
the police may question you without a 
solicitor being present (see paragraph 6.6 
of Code of Practice C). 
If you want to see a solicitor, tell the 
Custody Officer at once. You can ask for 
legal advice at any time during your 
detention. Even if you tell the police you 
do not want a solicitor at first, you can 





THE LAW SOCIETY 
L 
The right to have someone 
Informed of your detention. 
You may on request have one 
person known to you, or who is 
likely to take an interest in your 
welfare, informed at public 
expense as soon as practicable of 
your whereabouts. If the person 
you name cannot be contacted 
you may choose up to two 
alternatives. If they too cannot 
be contacted the Custody Officer 
has discretion to allow further 
attempts until the information 
has been conveyed. This right 
can only be delayed in 
exceptional circumstances (see 
Annex B of Code of Practice Cl 
The right to consult the 
Codes of Practice. 
The Codes of Practice will be 
made available to you on request 
These Codes govern police 
procedures. The right to consult 
the Codes of Practice does not 
entitle you to delay unreasonably 
any necessary investigative and 
administrative action, neither 
does it allow procedures under 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 
requiring the provision of breath, 
blood or urine specimens to be 
delayed. 
The right to a copy of the 
Custody Record. 
A record of your detention will be 
kept by the Custody Officer. 
When yo heave police detention 
or are taken before a Court, you 
or your legal representative or the 
appropriate adult shall be suoolied 
on request with a copy of the 
Custody Record as soon as 
practicable. This entitlement asts 
for 12 months after your release 
from police detention. 
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APPENDIX 3C: EXPERIMENTAL NOTICE TO DETAINED PERSONS 
(i) Information for the Custody Officer to read out to detained persons (the oral 
information); 
(ii) Information card outlining the main points of the verbal information (the 
information card); 
(iii) Further information leaflet, for detained persons' reference (the further information 
leaflet). 
(i) THE ORAL INFORMATION 
INFORMATION FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY THE POLICE 
For the Custody Officer to read out: 
You do not have to say anything to the police if you do not want to. If you do talk to 
the police, or answer their questions, they can use what you have said to help them 
find out if you or anyone else has done a crime. What you say may also be used in 
Court. 
" Do you want a solicitor to help you while you are at the police station? A solicitor 
has nothing to do with the police. You do not have to pay money to talk to a 
solicitor. The police will help you find a solicitor if you do not know one. 
" Do you want your family or someone who cares about you to know that you are at 
the police station? You do not need any money to pay for the police telling 
someone where you are. 
" Do you want to look at the Codes of Practice? The Codes of Practice is a book. It 
tells you what the police are and are not allowed to do while you are at the police 
station. 
If you do not want a solicitor right now, or you do not want someone told that you are 
at the police station right now, or you do not want to look at the Codes of Practice 
right now, you can change your mind later. 
If you do change your mind later, tell the police and they will help you. 
There is some special help the police must give to people who have reading 
problems. And people with learning difficulties (mental 
handicap). And people who 
have been to a special school. Do you need this special help? 
The police must also give special help to people who 
have recently been in a 
psychiatric hospital or who have a mental 
illness. Do you need this special help? 
I am now going to give you a card which tells you the main things 
I have said 
(Information for People Who Have Been Arrested By The Police). 
There is some more information in the leaflet (Further Information for People Who 
Have Been Arrested By The Police) on the desk. 
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(ii) THE INFORMATION CARD 
INFORMATION 
FOR PEOPLE WHO 
HAVE BEEN 




1. Ask the police if you want a solicitor to help you 
while you are at the police station. It will not cost 
you anything. 
2. Ask the police if you want your family or someone 
else who cares about you to know that you are at a 
police station. It will not cost you anything. 
3. Ask the police if you want to look at the Codes of 
Practice (the book which tells you what the police 




(iii) THE FURTHER INFORMATION LEAFLET 
FURTHER INFORMATION FOR PEOPLE ARRESTED 
BY THE POLICE 
1. GETTING A SOLICITOR TO HELP YOU: 
" You must be allowed to talk to a solicitor at any time, day or night, when you are 
at a police station. You do not have to pay any money to speak to a solicitor. 
" You can talk to a solicitor on the telephone without the police knowing what you 
are telling him or her. A solicitor may come to see you at the police station. 
" Most of the time, the police are not allowed to ask you questions until you have 
had the chance to talk to a solicitor. You can also ask for a solicitor to be in the 
room with you when the police ask you questions. 
" If you want a solicitor, tell the Custody Officer (the police officer who is in charge 
of you while you are at the police station). The police will help you get in touch 
with a solicitor. 
" If you do not know a solicitor or you cannot get in touch with your own solicitor, 
there is a person called the duty solicitor. The police will help you get in touch 
with him or her. He or she is nothing to do with the police. Or you can ask for a 
solicitor who lives nearby. 
" If a solicitor does not turn up, ask the police to get in touch with him or her again. 
However: 
The police can ask you to give blood samples, urine samples, and samples of your 
breath before you have talked to a solicitor. The Road Traffic Act, 1988, is the law 
which allows the police to ask you for these samples. 
There are some very special times when the police can ask you questions before you 
have talked to a solicitor. Information about these very special times is given in the 
Codes of Practice. This is the book which tells you what the police are and are not 
allowed to do while you are at the police station. 
If you want to look it up, it is in 
paragraph 6.6 of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice (page 48). 
There are also some very special times when the police will not 
let you speak to a 
solicitor straight away. Information about 
these very special times is given in the 
Codes of Practice. If you want to look 
it up, it is in Annex B of Code C of the Codes 
of Practice (pages 71-73). 
continued ... 
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2. TELLING SOMEONE THAT YOU ARE AT THE POLICE STATION: 
" You can ask the police to tell your family or someone else who cares about you 
that you are at the police station. You do not have to pay money for the police to 
get in touch with someone. The police will get in touch with someone as soon as 
they can. 
" If the police cannot get in touch with the first person you want to know that you 
are at the police station they will ask you for the name of someone else. If they 
cannot get in touch with this second person, they'll ask you for the name of 
someone else. 
" If the police cannot get in touch with any of the first three people you want told 
that you are at the police station, the Custody Officer (the police officer who is in 
charge of you while you are at the police station) may ask you for the names of 
other people. But the Custody Officer does not have to do this. 
There are some very special times when the police will not allow you to get in touch 
with anyone. Information about these very special times is given in the Codes of 
Practice. If you want to look it up, it is in Annex B of Code C of the Codes of 
Practice (pages 71-73). 
3. LOOKING AT THE CODES OF PRACTICE: 
" The Codes of Practice is a book which tells you what the police are and are not 
allowed to do while you are at the police station. 
" If you ask the police, they will let you look at the Codes of Practice. 
But you are not allowed to look at the Codes of Practice for such a long time that it 
holds up the police in finding out if you have done a crime. 
4. HAVING THE CUSTODY RECORD: 
" Everything that happens to you when at the police station is written down. The 
paper on which it is written is called the Custody Record. 
" When you leave the police station, you can ask 
for a copy of the Custody Record. 
If you do not want to ask for it, your solicitor or someone you 
know well can ask 
instead. The police have to give you a copy of the Custody Record as soon as they 
can. 
" You are allowed to ask the police 
for a copy of the Custody Record at any time in 
the 12 months (that is, the year) after you leave the police station. 
If you ask more 





MATERIAL RELATING TO THE FILM DEVELOPED IN STUDY 4, 
AND USED IN STUDY 5 (CH. 4) 
APPENDIX 4A: TRANSCRIPT OF FINAL VERSION OF THE FILM. 
DI SPEED: This interview is being tape-recorded. I am Detective Inspector Keith 
Speed and I am attached to Thamestown Police Station. We are in the interview room 
on the first floor of Thamestown Police Station. I am interviewing. Would you please 
give me your full name and address? 
MARTIN JAMES: Martin James, 18, Quincy Road, Thamestown. 
DI: Can I tell you, Martin that you are entitled to speak to a solicitor at any time day or 
night and that this legal advice is free? Do you wish to speak to a solicitor? 
M: No. 
PAUSE ONE 
DI: You are happy for this interview to continue without a solicitor? 
M: Yes. 
DI: There is no other person present. The date is Sunday, 20th June, 1993, and the time 
by my watch is 10.24 am. At the conclusion of this interview, I will give you a 
notice explaining what will happen to the tapes. Does that make sense, Martin? 
M: Yeah. 
DI: Now, when you were arrested, you were cautioned, and I propose to caution you 
again. And that caution reads `you do not have to say anything unless you wish to 
do so but what you say may be given in evidence'. 
PAUSE TWO 
DI: Do you understand? 
M: Yeah. 
DI: Tell me in your own words what that caution means. 
M: It means that I don't have to tell you something if I don't want to. 
DI: Very good. I am afraid, Martin, that I don't know a great deal about you. Would 
you mind telling me something about yourself, your lifestyle? 
M: I live at home with my brother, no parents... that's about it. 
DI: How about work, have you done any work? 
M: Bit of painting and decorating... other than that, no. 
DI: Tell me what you do with your day then? 
M: Go down the Job Centre, have a look what's going, go home and watch TV, go 
down the pub, watch TV with my mates... that's it. 
DI: What about yesterday, Saturday? 
M: Yesterday, got up about eleven in the morning, stayed indoors, watched the sport on 
TV. Then I got a video out in the afternoon and watched that. My brother... went 
down the pub. 
DI: You went down the pub with your brother? 
M: No, he went down with his mates, and I stayed at home and watched the video. 
DI: And you stayed in all evening? 
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M: Yeah. 
DI: Are you sure about that? 
M: Yeah. 
DI: When you were arrested by the police last night, at home, why do you think they 
picked on you? Do you think we just picked your name out of a hat? 
M: 
... DI: Shall I tell you why we arrested you? 
M: 
... Yeah. 
DI: Shortly before 8 o'clock last night, a member of the public phoned us up and she 
lives in the area. And she described someone climbing over the back wall into 36 
Beverley Road... She's given us an excellent description, Martin. She's described 
exactly what you were wearing... She's described your top perfectly... 
M: Don't know. It weren't me. 
PAUSE THREE 
DI: And what's more, Martin, she knows you. 
M: 
... 
Can I have a fag? 
DI: ` Course you can. 
M: ... I was there last night. DI: Well I don't think that was ever in dispute, Martin. Tell me what happened. 
M: I climbed over the back wall, went up to the back door, broke the glass in the back 
door and let myself in. But I only went in the kitchen. I looked round the kitchen. I 
found a tin in one of the cupboards with eight quid in it... then I went. 
PAUSE FOUR 
DI: Martin... I have been interviewing people for twenty years and I know when they're 
telling the truth ... 
Now, this may not be easy, but you have told me half of what's 
happened. You told me you broke in but that's because we've got a witness. Now 
you want me to believe that all you did was take eight pounds. This may not be easy 
for you to say because this is a very serious offence... but I can assure you that 
telling the truth is always the best thing to do. And I've found that when people do 
tell the truth and they get it off their chest, they feel greatly relieved. 
M: ... 
I don't remember everything but I did it. 
DI: Can you tell me what you mean `I did it'? 
M: ... 
I killed him. But I didn't mean it, it was an accident. 
PAUSE FIVE 
DI: Well, obviously I will need to interview you further. But having admitted what you 
have just done, I strongly suggest you seek the services of a solicitor. And I am 
quite prepared to stop this interview now so that you can 
be represented. Would 




DI: How are you feeling? 
M: Sick. 
DI: I'll stop this interview now... to let you recover and to let you speak to a solicitor. 
Is there anything you wish to add, anything further, or do you wish to clarify 




IC: The interview you have just seen is entirely fictional. The people you saw in the 
film are actors playing parts. They are not who they said they were. 
M: I am not Martin James. 
DI: And I am not Detective Inspector Keith Speed. 
END OF VIDEO-TAPED FILM 
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APPENDIX 4B: FINAL VERSION OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR 
USE WITH THE FILM 
In the file you are about to see a young man called Martin James is being questioned by 
a policeman, D. I. Keith Speed. D. I. Speed thinks that Martin broke into a house, stole 
some money, and killed the man who lived there. 
In fact, Martin did break into the house and take some money. But he did not kill the 
man. Martin did not even know that the man had been killed until he was arrested by 
the police. 
At different times on the film, I will stop the tape to ask you some questions. Please 
answer the questions as well as you can. 
Questions: 
1. Martin has just said that he does not wish to talk to a solicitor. 
1.1. Should Martin have a solicitor even if he did not commit (that means he didn't 
do) any crime? 
1.2. What could a solicitor do? 
1.3. If Martin had a solicitor with him, would it: 
a. Be free of charge? or 
b. Cost him money? 
2. D. I. Speed has just told Martin the caution. 
Please tell me in your own words what the caution means. 
3. Even though a woman saw Martin going over the back wall of the house where the 
man was killed, Martin has told the policeman that he was not at the house: 
3.1. Was Martin actually at the house? 
3.2. Why do you think Martin said that he was not at the house? 
3.3. What do you think will happen to Martin next? Do you think that D. I. Speed 
will: 
a. Let Martin go home now? 
b. Keep Martin at the police station and go on asking questions until he gets 
the whole story? 
c. Lock Martin up on his own in a cell at the police station and 
keep him there 
until he tells him the whole story? 
d. Do something else? What? 
3.4. Which of these is most likely to happen? 
3.5. Which of these is least likely to happen? 
4. Martin has now owned up that he was at the man's house. 
4.1. Do you think that D. I. Speed will: 
a. Let Martin go home? 
b. Keep Martin in the room and keep asking him questions? 
c. Send Martin straight to prison? 
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d. Lock Martin up on his own in a cell at the police station until he tells him 
the whole story? 
e. Do something else, what? 
4.2. Which of these is most likely to happen? 
4.3. Which of these is least likely to happen? 
4.4. Do you think Martin should ask for a solicitor now? Why/Why not? 
4.5. Martin has owned up that he was at the house. Did he kill the man? 
5. Martin has just told D. I. Speed that he killed the man, even though he did not do it. 
5.1. What do you think will happen to Martin in the next few minutes? 
5.2. Do you think D. I. Speed will: 
a. Let Martin go home? 
b. Keep Martin in the room and keep asking him questions? 
c. Send Martin straight to prison? 
d. Lock Martin up on his own in a cell at the police station until he tells him 
the whole story? 
e. Do something else. What? 
5.3. Which of these is most likely to happen? 
5.4. Which of these is least likely to happen? 
6. What do you think will happen to Martin in the next few months if he keeps saying 
that he killed the man? 
6.1. Do you think he will: 
a. Be able to go straight home and hear no more about it? 
b. Go straight to prison without going to Court and be kept there? 
c. Be able to go home until he has to go to Court? 
d. Have to go to prison until it is time to go to Court? 
e. Something else. What? 
6.2. Which of these is most likely to happen? 
6.3. Which of these is least likely to happen? 
7. If Martin says in Court that he killed the man, do you think the Court will find him 
guilty (that means say he did it), even though he didn't do it? Why/Why not? 
8. If the Court found that Martin had killed the man, what would happen to him then? 
8.1. Would the Court: 
a. Send Martin to prison? 
b. Make Martin pay a fine? 
c. Send Martin to hospital? 
d. Let Martin go home? 
e. Make Martin do something else? What? 
8.2. Which of these is most likely to happen? 
8.3. Which of these is least likely to happen? 
9. Do you think Martin should ask for a solicitor now? Why/Why not? 
10. If Martin now talks to a solicitor and tells the police that he has changed his mind 
and that he did not kill the man, will D. I. Speed believe him? Why/Why not? 
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APPENDIX 5 
SCALE FOR ASSESSING ACQUIESCENCE 
(WINKLER ET AL., 1982) 
Listed below are a number of statements. Read each item and decide whether in your view 
the statement is TRUE or FALSE. If the statement is TRUE, then circle TRUE; if it is 
FALSE, then circle FALSE. 
1. Prescription drugs frequently do more harm than good. TRUE FALSE 
2. It is always silly to suffer if a medicine will make you feel better. TRUE FALSE 
3. Good health is largely a matter of luck. TRUE FALSE 
4. There is little a person can do to prevent illness. TRUE FALSE 
5. Taking care of yourself won't affect whether you get sick or not. TRUE FALSE 
6. Medical care can't do much for you if you are really sick. TRUE FALSE 
7. I would rather my doctor just told me what to do. TRUE FALSE 
8. Doctors don't always check everything when examining their 
patients. TRUE FALSE 
9. Even good doctors disagree about how to treat an illness. TRUE FALSE 
10. Doctors never expose their patients to unnecessary risks. TRUE FALSE 
11. When a treatment involves risks, doctors always discuss risks with 
patients. TRUE FALSE 
12. Doctors don't usually explain your medical problem with you. TRUE FALSE 
13. Prescription drugs are almost always helpful. TRUE FALSE 
14. A person should take medicine only as a last resort. TRUE FALSE 
15. When it comes to health there is no such thing as bad luck. TRUE FALSE 
16. Anyone can learn a few basic health rules which will go a long 
way in preventing illness. 
TRUE FALSE 
17. In the long run, people who take good care of themselves stay 
healthier and get well more quickly. TRUE FALSE 
18. It mainly takes good medical care to get over an illness. TRUE FALSE 
19. When there is an important medical decision to make regarding 
any treatment, I want to be given enough information so that 
I can 
help make that decision. TRUE FALSE 
20. Doctors are very careful to check everything when examining 
their patients. TRUE FALSE 
21. Good doctors nearly always agree on how to treat a specific TRUE FALSE 
illness. 
22 Sometimes doctors prescribe treatments that involve unnecessary . TRUE FALSE 
risks. 
23. Doctors don't always explain to their patients the risks involved in 
certain treatments. TRUE FALSE 
24. Most doctors carefully explain what happens to their patients. TRUE FALSE 
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APPENDIX 6 
FORM 57M -APPROPRIATE ADULT AND MEDICAL 
CARE' (METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE, 
INTRODUCED 1998) (CH. 7) 
METROPOLITAN POUCE SERVICE A«m 
Custody Record - Continuation Sheet Appropriate Adult and Medical Care 
Custody No. 
- ....... _... _. _........ _......... 
Name 
....... _..... _.... _. _.. _. W.. _-... 
The questions in Parts A and 8 are to be raid aloud to the arrested parson. 
Part A Need for an appropriate adult (lick / relevant boxes and complete as applicable) 
1. "There is help that police must give to people with reading problems. " 
" Do you need this help? YES NO 
2. "There is special help that police must give to people who have learning di culties or learning disabilities 
(mental handicap). 
"Do you need this special help? " YES NO 
3. "The police must give special help to people who went to a special school" 
"Do you need this special help? YES [] NO 
4. "The police must also give special help to people who have a mental health problem or who suffer from 
mental illness. ' 
"Do you need this special help? YES [- NO Q 
5. "Do you need help for any other reason? YES M NO n 
_. ___. if YES "For what other reason 
do you need help?........ ................................ ............ . _.... _......... _.. __.. -------"--_. _........ 
The term special M/p' relates to the provision of an approprtate adult as defined within PACE Codes of Practice and the custody 
officer should explain the role of the appropriate adult to the detained person and the appropn to adult (sea below). 
Regardless of the answers to the, abovtr, if the custody officer has 'any awpicion, or Is told in good faith, that a person at any age may 
be mentally disordered or mentally handicapped, or mentally incapable of und. rstandinq the significance of questions put to him or 
his replies', an appropriate adult must be called. in an interview, the appropriate adult is not expected to act simply as an observer. 
The purposes of his/her presence are, first, to advise the person being questioned and to observe wheel q or not dis interview Is being 
conducted properly and fairly, - and secondly, to 
facilitate communication with the person being interviewed. Arrested persons who 
need special help are those who may. without knowing or wishing to do so be parttnularly prone 
in certain canna naaa to provide 
irdoIInaMea which Is unreliable. misleading or se f4nc, jminsting. 
Pert a Need for medical attention Crick / retevtrn boxes and complete as applicable) 
1. 'Artt you suffeering from- any medical condition, illness or injury? YES 
[] NO fK NO go to 3) 
ý... _.... __ if YES, please specify.. _......... -- ------------- ----- ----- ------- ---.... .................. _...................... _... 
2. "Are you receiving treatment for this condition, illness or injur/T 
YES[] NO[] 
If YES, please apecitY... - _-. __... _.......... _... _... _.. _.. _... - ..... _. _.. _............... _...... _.... _..... ........... _... _.. _. __ 
3. Are you taking any m. dicatioa? ' 
YES NO 
If YES. pese specify.................... --------- -------- -... --- _... _.... _ ý. _ _.. _ _ ._ 
4. "Have you ever tiled to harm yourself? ' 
YES fl NO 0 
M YES, please specily..... _.. __. _.. _. __.. _. ý _ .... _.. _ .................... _...... _... ___. __... _ __ . _. _ _ .__.. _ ... _... - -- --- 
of the answu *. If there are any doubts about the wrested person's medical condRion. action 
to aocun mýdm: at attention 
ess 
, houW tsk. n in accordance with 
Code C section 0 and current MPS policy. 
---.. --------- 




DETAILS OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS USED IN THE THESIS 
Throughout the thesis the data were analysed using Howell (1997), Siegel and Castellan 
(1988) and SPSS for Windows (SPSS-Inc., 1995). 
Tests of Difference 
The Binomial test for two related samples (McNemar's test) 
This test is used when the population consists of two categories (e. g. `right' or `wrong') 
in two related samples. For example, it can be used to determine whether there has been 
a significant increase in the number of participants who get a question right before and 
after a certain intervention. The null hypothesis is that, given that a response to a 
question has changed since the intervention, it is as likely to have become correct as 
incorrect. 
The Z-test (or Binomial test) for two independent samples 
This test is used to compare proportions from two independent samples. The null 
hypothesis is that the proportions are equal. 
The t-test, Mann-Whitney U test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test 
These tests are used to determine whether the scores from two samples come from 
populations with different values of measures of central tendency. If the data from 
independent groups of participants do not differ significantly from the Normal 
Distribution (as determined by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), then the t-test for 
independent samples is used to compare the means; Levene's test for equality of 
variances is applied to determine whether to use the test 
for samples with equal or 
unequal variances. If the data from either group cannot 
be approximated to the Normal 
Distribution, the Mann-Whitney U Test is used; this is a non-parametric test used to 
determine whether two independent groups have been drawn from populations with the 
same median. In cases 
in which the two samples are related (i. e. the data consists of two 
sets of measurements taken 
from the same sample), either the t-test for related samples 
is used or, in non-parametric cases, the Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test is used. 
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Tests of Association 
The Chi-Square test 
This test is used when the scores from two independent samples fall into one or other of 
two mutually exclusive classes. It is used to determine whether the frequencies observed 
in a2x2 contingency table differ significantly than those expected by chance. The null 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that the two variables in the table are unrelated. 
The Chi-square test requires that the expected frequencies in each cell are not too small 
(i. e. no more than 1 of the cells should have an expected frequency of less than 5, and no 
cell should have an expected frequency of 1). If the frequencies are too small for the 
Chi-square test to used, then the Fisher Exact test is used; the null hypothesis is based 
on the assumption that the two sample are unrelated, and the test calculates the 
probability of getting a result as OR MORE different from chance as that observed. 
Pearson 's Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient and Spearman 's Rank Order 
Correlation Co-efficient 
If the data from two independent variables do not differ significantly from the Normal 
Distribution (as determined by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test), then Pearson's Product- 
Moment Correlation Coefficient (r) is calculated in order to determine whether the 
observed correlation differs significantly from 0; otherwise (i. e. if the data from either 
variable are non-normal), Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Coefficient (p) is used. 
The significance of r, and the difference between two independent rs, can be tested 
using t-tests (Howell, 1997), whilst the significance of p is tested by using critical value 
tables in Siegel and Castellan (1988). 
,h 
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